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Taxation and Representation: The Whiskey Rebellion and the Tyranny of the Minority
Shira Lurie

"Showing Its Flag": The United States, The Philippines, and the Vietnam War
Matthew Jagel

Amir Locker-Biletzki

Book Reviews by Dawn Cioffoletti, Jeffrey Cox, Carl C. Creason, Katrin MacPhee, Nathan Pavalko, Marc Sanko

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Taxation and Representation: 
The Whiskey Rebellion and the Tyranny of the Minority

Shira Lurie
University of Western Ontario

Abstract

The common scholarly interpretation of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 takes for granted its popular nature. Historians consequently interpret the Washington administration’s decision to send in the militia to crush the rebellion as a hypocritical violation of the revolutionary principles it had previously fought to uphold. However, this article argues that the Whiskey Rebellion was not a popular movement. First-hand accounts from Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the federal commissioners sent into the region instead reveal that a belligerent minority was intimidating otherwise moderate men into rebellious behavior. As a result, the federal government intervened not simply to assert its authority, but primarily to liberate these men from the tyranny of their neighbors.

After the American Constitution was ratified, the leaders of the new republic faced the paradoxical task of consolidating federal power to protect the legacy of a revolution fought to ensure individual liberty. The early national period was therefore a time of great instability and uncertainty as revolutionaries transitioned to politicians and the young country attempted to define how the government should relate to its citizens. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 was one instance in which tensions over the size and nature of the new government erupted. Western Pennsylvanian farmers rose up in opposition to Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton’s whiskey excise of 1791, using threats and violence to intimidate federal tax collectors and to prevent the carrying out of the excise law. The rebels felt that the burdensome nature of the whiskey excise was evidence that the needs of the West

1 Other examples of upheaval after the Revolution include Shay’s Rebellion, confrontations during the ratification debates, the Sedition Act crisis, and Fries’ Rebellion.
were not being adequately represented in Congress. Despite having concluded the same battle against British taxation without representation just a few years prior, the Washington administration showed no revolutionary solidarity. The federal government sent 15,000 militiamen into the region to quash the rebellion and restore law and order.

The tragic tale of the spirit of ’76 being crushed by the once-revolutionaries seems to be the early republic’s greatest irony. Scholarship on the Whiskey Rebellion tends to emphasize the hypocritical actions of the Washington administration. They argue that this early challenge to federal sovereignty evoked a condemnatory attitude within the national government toward the very principles it had been founded to protect. Indeed, a recent monograph on this event, Thomas P. Slaughter’s The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution, asserts, “some readers may… be surprised that heroes of the American Revolution espoused during the 1790s the very ideas that… they had once risked their lives and fortunes to oppose.” This characterization, however, ignores both the local conditions of the rebellion and how the Washington administration chose to respond to them.

The Whiskey Rebellion is often simplistically described as a widespread uprising sparked by perceived taxation without adequate representation. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick state in their influential synthesis The Age of Federalism that “the entire region appeared on the verge of armed rebellion…and [the Whiskey Rebellion] may thus be regarded as an authentic popular manifestation.” Primary accounts, however, reveal that the rebellion was in fact a radical fringe movement that used terror to intimidate otherwise moderate men into rebellious behavior. The Whiskey Rebellion, then, was more a disagreement about what constituted the voice of the people than a struggle over sovereignty. The Washington administration’s reaction is consequently more complex than the current historical interpretations suggest.

Hugh Henry Brackenridge’s Incidents of the Insurrection provides a useful primary account of these local dimensions of the Whiskey Rebellion. Although historians have questioned his reliability, an issue that will be discussed later in this paper, Brackenridge offers a detailed contemporary narrative from within the rebels’ camp. He provides a window into local attitudes and conditions that are lacking in

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3 Slaughter, 227.

4 Elkins and McKitrick, 461-462.
the focus on Hamilton and issues of national power. Similarly, the reports of the federal commissioners who were sent to Pennsylvania have also been undervalued. They provide a useful link between events on the ground and the federal government’s information and decision-making. In conjunction, the primary accounts of local and federal witnesses indicate that the rebels terrorized moderate men into participating in the uprising, which deceptively inflated their numbers. The commissioners who witnessed this phenomenon recommended the application of governmental force to liberate innocent citizens from the tyranny of this radical minority.

Scholars have hitherto examined these primary sources with an exaggerated emphasis on federal politics that has mistakenly taken the popular nature of the uprising as a given. However, a focus on local conditions and experiences within these eyewitness accounts suggests that the Whiskey Rebellion was not an accurate expression of the public will in the West. Thus, while the opposition to the excise in western Pennsylvania was in large part an argument against unsatisfactory representation in Congress, the Washington administration’s choice to send in the militia was not simply a means of reasserting federal authority. Rather, the decision was based primarily on the understanding that the rebellion did not coincide with the popular will of the western populace and so was similarly rooted in notions of representation and liberty.

In 1791, Hamilton levied an excise tax on distilled liquor as part of his financial program to fund the national debt that the United States had accrued during the Revolutionary War. An excise is a form of internal taxation laid on a specific type of good, which obliges a large segment of society toward payment. An external tax, on the other hand, is a duty on imported goods and so affects mainly merchants and traders. Excise taxes were the preferred instrument of Federalists and those who wanted a strong central government. Unlike a tariff, excises offered a much more stable form of raising revenue, since the goods subject to tax were not vulnerable to the dangers posed to shipping by war, piracy, and the unpredictability of the ocean. Furthermore, citizens voluntarily controlled how much of the tax they paid based on their own consumption, which, in the case of whiskey and other vices, seemed like a policy that promoted morality.

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6 Barber, 59. Slaughter, 24.

7 Ibid., 14.
Antifederalists and other citizens who feared the threat to liberty posed by a strong national government were wary of internal taxes. The argument against this form of taxation was rooted in English history and persisted throughout the American Constitution ratification debates. Those opposed contended that internal taxation power should lie with local governments, since only those representatives who lived among their constituents could truly recognize regional conditions and needs. State representatives had fewer constituents and understood the importance of certain goods in the local economy. The federal legislature, on the other hand, held none of these advantages. In fact, the average congressman represented 30,000 citizens; it would be impossible for him to advocate for all of them adequately. Such a reality, argued opponents, meant that minorities were sure to be ignored. The potentially burdensome nature of internal taxation made Congress the wrong body to hold this power. The representation in the national legislature was simply too limited, and so it would not be able to levy internal taxes fairly and mindfully.

The risks posed by an unrepresentative Congress were made even more dangerous by the threat of force through which it was sustained. The national government had the military power to enforce its decisions on the underrepresented groups whose voices were not adequately heard in the House. Opponents argued that a central government with the ability to tax internally would be both an economic and physical threat to liberty. Such power was only safe with local governments who lived among their constituents and understood their unique circumstances and needs. However, the Constitution of 1787 did in fact grant the federal government unlimited taxation power. The worst fears of western Pennsylvanians were confirmed with the passage of Hamilton’s whiskey excise of 1791.

The tax on distilled liquor seemed to ignore certain conditions unique to those in the western counties. The key role that whiskey played in the local economy made the excise particularly burdensome. Grain was too heavy to be feasibly transported to eastern markets given the poor road conditions and the closure of the Mississippi River by the Spanish. As a result, farmers had to distill their grain into whiskey and then carry it across the Allegheny Mountains. Once in the East, they could then sell it for a large profit, because demand doubled the price of what whiskey would fetch in

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9 Barber, 61; Slaughter, 25.
10 Slaughter, 23.
the West. The production of whiskey seemed difficult, and indeed undesirable, to avoid. In addition, Westerners would use whiskey to barter, and so the excise presented a particularly vexing problem. Unable to simply raise their price to incorporate the cost of the tax, a farmer would have to attempt to increase the value of his whiskey arbitrarily in reference to other goods that were not subject to the excise. Due to these conditions distinct to western Pennsylvania, the distillation of whiskey was an economic necessity; to these men, making whiskey the target of the excise was both ignorant and unjust.

Compounding these frustrations were two arbitrarily harsh elements of the law. The tax was to be levied on production, not sale, and so the western distillers would have to bear the cost of the excise upfront, without being guaranteed a return on their expense. Placing the onus on the producer seemed an unfair burden and certainly did not fit with the so-called moral argument for taxing consumers’ vices. In addition, the law stipulated that tax offenders were to be tried in federal courts in Philadelphia, some three hundred miles away. A farmer charged with tax evasion would have to abandon his farm for weeks while simultaneously absorbing the cost of travelling to Philadelphia, staying there for the duration of his trial, hiring a lawyer, and then travelling all the way back, circumstances that could easily result in financial disaster for a common Pennsylvanian farmer.

Underlying all of these concerns was the general belief that the economic interests of easterners were being pursued at the expense of the West. With recent frustrations over federal incompetency in dealing with nearby native populations and the continued British occupation of northwest outposts, the excise appeared to be yet another eastern plot to limit western prosperity. Furthermore, it was felt that the national government had been apathetic with regard to the Spanish control of the Mississippi River. The failure of the Washington administration to reopen it was one of the very reasons the production of whiskey was a necessity for western Pennsylvanians in the first place. The frustration with this perceived conspiracy made the whiskey excise the conclusion to a long list of grievances that the frontiersman felt were not being heard in Philadelphia.

The complaints about the whiskey excise were an implied indictment of the unsatisfactory nature of representation in Congress. As the antifederalists and other

12 Baldwin, 25.
14 Hemberger, 317.
15 Baldwin, 72; Hemberger, 318; Sharp, 121.
16 Elkins and McKitrick, 471.
17 Ibid.
opponents of internal taxation had warned, the excise law ignored the significance of whiskey in the West and so disproportionately burdened western Pennsylvanians. Other aspects of the excise increased the severity of the law for seemingly no apparent reason. All of this corresponded to the traditional opposition to excises. Congress had passed the law without understanding the disastrous effect it would have on westerners. Frontier opinions were not being adequately represented and so western Pennsylvanians were now saddled with a tax that was both harsh and unjust.

However, most primary and secondary accounts do not reveal the fact that western objections to the tax were heard in Congress. Indeed, all of the representatives from the frontier districts opposed the excise law and voted accordingly. In fact, the western counties had three representatives in the House even though their population only qualified them for two, thereby making this section of Pennsylvania the best represented of the entire state. Such a revelation dilutes the above claims about unsatisfactory representation and hints at a side of the story not usually told. Western interests were being represented; they were just outvoted. What at first seemed like a cautionary tale against taxation without representation is actually a critique of majoritarian democracy. The Whiskey Rebellion that occurred in western Pennsylvania was, in a sense, the playing out of this tension between storylines. While the rebels felt the need to make their opposition to the tax known, the Washington administration’s concerns about the will of the majority led them to intervene.

Opposition to the excise in western Pennsylvania began, as it would continue, with the rebels intimidating much of the population into cooperating with their actions. Radical activities commenced with the tarring and feathering of tax collectors almost as soon as the excise law was passed. However, this harassment evolved to the point that regular citizens who were merely suspected of being either sympathetic or compliant with the tax were similarly persecuted. William Richmond and Robert Shawhan were the first to experience the scare tactics of the radicals, having their hay, grain, and barns burned to the ground for their perceived submission to the excise. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a moderate contemporary who found himself within the rebel camp, wrote that a local innkeeper was hesitant to

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18 Hemberger, 317.
20 Findley, 82-83; Sharp, 121.
admit him and his company since Brackenridge was viewed, at that time, with suspicion. Brackenridge “mentioned the uneasiness” in order to demonstrate “the fear which was impressed of seeming to have anything to say to anyone that might be disposed to take a part on behalf of the excise officer.”

According to Brackenridge, fear of the mob was so strong that people were frightened even to associate with someone who was suspected of being sympathetic to the excise enforcers.

With the general population sufficiently afraid of them, the rebels then began to organize. At a meeting on August 22, 1792, a resolution was passed declaring their resistance to the excise since it posed a threat to liberty. The resolution concluded with a strong warning to excise officers and to those who supported them:

> In future we will consider such persons as unworthy of our friendship; have no intercourse or dealings with them; withdraw from them every assistance, and withhold all the comforts of life which depend upon those duties that as men and fellow citizens we owe to each other.

The rebels warned that “upon all occasions” they would purposefully “treat them with that contempt they deserve.” In “earnestly recommend[ing]” others to “follow the same line of conduct,” they put into writing the exact intimidation that Brackenridge described in reference to the frightened innkeeper.

These events were enough to convince Hamilton that a strong show of force was necessary. However, Washington decided instead to accept the advice of caution from Attorney General Edmund Randolph and issued a proclamation denouncing the resistance.

The government took further action to try to quell the rebellious activities in the spring of 1794 when Congress passed a bill, at the recommendation of Hamilton, to allow the use of state courts for trials in which the seat of a federal court was more than fifty miles away.

Washington’s condemnation, combined with this removal of one of the chief grievances, led to a period of relative calm. However, the amendment to the excise law was not retroactive, an issue that sparked the full-scale rebellion that summer.

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25 Baldwin, 110.
On July 15, United States marshal David Lenox and federal excise inspector for western Pennsylvania John Neville rode together to serve summons to sixty tax evaders; having already been processed prior to the passage of the aforementioned amendment, these trials were to take place in Philadelphia. A disgruntled group of about thirty men who had been harvesting and drinking together decided to follow Lenox and Neville. The group caught up with the officers as they were having a disagreement with William Miller, a farmer who refused to receive the writ. One member of the mob fired his gun, and Lenox and Neville both fled. The next day, Neville awoke to find his house surrounded by armed rebels. After exchanging fire, the mob retreated. However, a day later, five to seven thousand men from the Mingo Creek Regiment arrived at Neville’s house and demanded that he resign his post as excise officer. They overpowered the United States soldiers that were guarding Neville’s house and set fire to the property; Neville fled to Pittsburgh.

On July 23, the rebels gathered at the Mingo Meetinghouse. Brackenridge attended with, as he claimed, the intention to advise for moderation. He remarked upon other individuals in attendance that he knew not to be radicals either, such as James Marshall and David Bradford, both prominent members of the Mingo Creek society. Brackenridge revealed that these men were warned they must “come forward and support what was done [to Neville], or [the rebels] would burn their houses” as well. What is puzzling, however, is that Bradford later became one of the leaders of the rebellion and openly advocated for war. However, Brackenridge explained Bradford’s active role as arising precisely because of the threat of the mob: “Yet from my knowledge of the man, I doubted whether he spoke according to his wish or harangued according to the humor of the people and from a fear of them.” Bradford’s leadership simply provides further evidence of the compliance the rebels were able to extort from otherwise moderate men. From the Mingo meeting onward, the rebels were adding to their ranks those who did not wish to participate, yet were too afraid to resist. Even neutrality would risk similar treatment to Neville. As Brackenridge explained, “To withdraw would be the same thing as to oppose.”

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26 Elkins, 463; Hemberger, 320; Wilentz, 63.
27 Baldwin, 113-114; Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 64; Hemberger, 320.
28 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 64; Hemberger, 320.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 86. Brackenridge similarly rationalizes the rebellious actions of Bradford and others on pages 94-95, 105, 113, and 153.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
Three days later, the rebels intercepted the federal mail and discovered letters from men in Pittsburgh condemning their activities to Philadelphia. Infuriated, a meeting was then called for August 1 at Braddock’s Field, where they would prepare to march on Pittsburgh. Again, moderates were forced to show their support for fear of what would be done to them otherwise. In the days leading up to Braddock’s Field, Marshall attempted to dissuade the mob from their violent plans. He was rewarded with the tarring and feathering of his front door and the threat that he had better declare his willingness to participate in the attack on Pittsburgh or risk worse. Brackenridge also felt compelled to ride with the mob and was cognizant that it was not only he and Marshall who were there against their will: “It was impossible to know the real sentiments of almost any one among the multitude; how far they were from necessity or from choice. Every man was afraid of the opinion of the other.”

Following the attack on Pittsburgh, all of the excise offices in western Pennsylvania were either abandoned or destroyed. Brackenridge remarked that the general atmosphere was one of anarchy in which “it was the mass of the people that commanded, and it was the fear of them that operated on the minds of the more conspicuous individuals.” Brackenridge’s version of these events contends that the true rebels were smaller in number than they appeared, having extorted cooperation from moderates who feared that any lack of compliance would make them the next targets. The rebels were in control, they “commanded,” and so dictated the actions of what may have otherwise been a lawful majority.

Brackenridge’s account poses a challenge to historians due to the compromising conditions under which it was written. His earlier writing against the excise and his activities during the rebellion had led to suspicions of treason. After Hamilton absolved him, Brackenridge wrote his account in 1795 in order to restore his public image. He articulated this motive at the start: “What I write is with a view to explain my conduct, which has not been understood.” This has led historians to doubt his reliability as a witness and assert that his so-called fears for his personal safety were self-serving exaggerations after the fact.

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33 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 91; Hemberger, 320; Sharp, 122.
34 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 95.
35 Ibid., 104.
37 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 143. He makes a similar point on page 101.
38 Ibid., 63.
However, there are considerations that temper this instinct to dismiss Brackenridge’s testimony outright. While his intentions are transparent and perhaps made him prone to some embellishment, Brackenridge also spent a great deal of time explaining the conduct of others, such as Bradford and Marshall. Furthermore, even if his defense of the actions of himself and his associates are an exaggeration, his account, at minimum, demonstrates that rebel intimidation was still well known enough so as to provide a plausible excuse for his behavior. Therefore, while the details he provides may be subject to question, the very nature of his argument only serves to reinforce the idea that moderates were being threatened into compliance. Most significantly, much of Brackenridge’s story is corroborated by the federal commissioners who, from the beginning of August until the end of September, reported back to Philadelphia of the moderates’ inability to assert themselves over the rebels. The comparison of Brackenridge’s account with that of the Commissioners’ strengthens the case for his reliability.

In the wake of the renewed rebel activities, negotiations with the Governor of Pennsylvania, Thomas Mifflin, commenced. It was eventually decided that a federal commission would be sent to Pennsylvania to parley with the rebels, while Washington simultaneously sent preliminary calls to various state militias. On August 7, Washington issued a proclamation ordering the rebels to disperse by the first of September. Attorney General William Bradford, Senator James Ross, and Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Jasper Yeates were appointed to the commission and were instructed by Randolph to grant full amnesty and absolution for previously unpaid excise taxes in exchange for pledges of loyalty and obedience to the national government; they were not, however, to promise a repeal of the law.

Bradford and Yeates rode together for Parkinson’s Ferry, where they met Ross. Ross had attended a rebel meeting there on August 14 in which a committee of twelve was selected to negotiate with the Commissioners. On August 17, the Commissioners sent their first report to Philadelphia. In it they described a division of sentiment that Ross witnessed at the Parkinson’s Ferry meeting, akin to Brackenridge’s depiction. The report stated that there was a group of radicals who wished to separate from the union, but that this segment was “not very numerous.”

40 Kohn, 571-575; Sharp, 123.
43 Meeting at Parkinson’s Ferry, August 14, 1794, Papers Relating to What is Known as the Whiskey Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Archives, Vol. 4 (Harrisburgh: E.K.Meyers, 1890), 136; Slaughter, 197.
There was a second group who did not wish to secede, but were still opposed to the excise. Finally, there was a third group of moderates who were “overawed” by the first two groups:

The threats which have been expressed against all who countenance the excise, the banishment of some reputable citizens on that account, & the destruction of property, have produced an apparent unanimity of sentiment. We know, with certainty, that many reputable citizens have been obliged to turn hypocrites, & even to appear as the leaders of these enraged: [sic] The Civil authority affords them no protection, as they dare not trust each other they have no point where they can rally in their own defence. Although a real majority (as we believe) of the meeting consisted of this Class of men, they did not dare to exert their influence.  

This report echoes Brackenridge’s description in every regard. The moderates were a numerical majority, but due to the rebels’ violent actions, they “did not dare to exert their influence.” Indeed, they “dare not trust each other” and so had no way to organize a resistance to the radical minority. These circumstances “have produced an apparent unanimity,” but this was not actually the case. As a result, the commissioners saw no “prospect for enforcing the execution of the laws but by the physical strength of the nation.” Having witnessed the tyranny of the rebels that Brackenridge described, the commissioners suggested that only force could compel obedience and liberate the moderates from the radical fringe.

In addition to this report, Bradford sent a personal letter to Washington that contained “a few observations” that were not “so proper in an official communication.” Bradford outlined the necessity of continuing to prepare for the use of force because any delay would only aid the rebels in improving their supplies and corrupting the moderates further. His insistence indicates the degree to which he thought force was necessary, given the situation Ross had witnessed at the Parkinson’s Ferry meeting. Bradford further stated his intention to “prevail on the moderate party to declare themselves openly and exert themselves with the spirit in support of the Laws.” However, he observed that the “terror” of the rebels had been “extreme” and so had “converted many into gross hypocrites.” In fact, Bradford even

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44 William Bradford, et al. The United States Commissioners to the Secretary of State, August, 17, 1794, Papers Relating to What is Known as the Whiskey Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Archives, Vol. 4 (Harrisburgh: E.K.Meyers, 1890), 139-140.
45 Ibid., 140.
named Brackenridge as an example of one of these men. That Brackenridge’s fears were already known to Bradford certainly indicates that rebel intimidation was not a retroactive defense created by Brackenridge after the rebellion in order to restore his public image. After only a few days in the western counties, the commissioners were already certain that the insurrection was not a popular uprising. However, due to the effective coercion by the rebellious minority, the militia was needed to restore law and order and thereby free the moderates from the radicals.

The commissioners’ report reached Philadelphia on August 23. In response, Washington called an emergency cabinet meeting, and after consulting privately with both Hamilton and Randolph the following day, he decided to mobilize Virginia’s militia under Governor Henry Lee. It was also determined that additional troops would be necessary to increase the total force to 15,000 men. However, Lee was told to remain secretive and postdate all paperwork as September 1 in order to allow the negotiations in Pennsylvania to continue undisturbed.

After conferring with the committee of twelve, the federal commissioners were growing increasingly optimistic. The commissioners had submitted a proposal to the committee on August 22 stating that a general pardon would be granted if they would declare their submission to the law and recommend it to the people, as well as conduct a survey to discern the population’s disposition. The committee agreed to recommend these propositions to the committee of sixty, the representatives of the townships. A meeting was then held in Brownsville at the Redstone Old Fort on August 28 and 29. At first the resolution for submission was met with hostility; the committee of sixty had wanted either a suspension or repeal of the law, not a grant of amnesty that was contingent on their obedience. Brackenridge, who was a member of the committee of twelve, attempted to appeal to his fellow moderates, stating that “men affect to be for war because they are afraid to speak their real sentiments.” The danger of timidity had now become apparent. In fearing to express their true feelings, the moderates were tacitly agreeing to wage war on the United States. This was an undertaking, argued Brackenridge, that was akin to attempting to “[toss] the Allegheny mountain from its base.”

47 Ibid.
49 Kohn, 578-579; Slaughter, 198-199.
52 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 146.
53 Ibid., 151. See also 101.
54 Ibid., 150.
It was moved to put the matter to a vote. When it received no support except from the committee of twelve, it was then suggested that a secret ballot be used. Again, only the committee of twelve was in favor. A motion was made to vote by ballot only to determine the opinions of the committee, and not as a final verdict on the commissioners’ terms. However, “there was hesitation even at this, for every man was afraid the handwriting, even of his ballot, would be known” and so give his opinion away.\textsuperscript{55} At a time when voting by voice was considered the proper democratic process, it was felt that even a secret ballot was too dangerous, as it held the potential to reveal a man’s true sentiments. The controversy over voting techniques provides strong evidence of rebel intimidation. It reveals both a high level of individual fear and also a general recognition that the rebels were frightening many into actions they would not otherwise take. Indeed, it was understood that precautions were necessary for the vote to be truly indicative of the body’s opinions.

Finally, a solution was proposed: everyone would be given two slips of paper, one with the word “yea” written on it, and the other with the word “nay.” Each man would cast his preferred vote with the one, and destroy the other.\textsuperscript{56} It was felt that only a vote conducted with absolute anonymity would hold the true will of the group. Brackenridge was fascinated to “observe the carefulness” with which each man guarded his vote and destroyed the non-used slip of paper.\textsuperscript{57} The votes revealed thirty-four to twenty-three in favor of accepting the government’s terms.\textsuperscript{58} While such an outcome indicates the rebels to be a significant minority, it is worthwhile to consider that this vote reflected only the committee of sixty’s opinion and was not a popular vote, nor did it require any obligation toward the commissioners’ proposal. The commissioners later stated that numerous attendees of the meeting had told them that if the vote had been public, a “considerable majority” would have voted against the proposal.\textsuperscript{59} Again, this information confirms that fear of the mob was so intense that it would convince an otherwise moderate man to vote for war in order to conceal his true opinion.

This particular vote provides another piece of evidence that dilutes the rebels’ majoritarian claim. Thomas Miller, the man who had been served the writ that sparked the attack on Neville’s home, later revealed to Brackenridge that he voted in favor of the proposals. Despite feeling that the $250 fee and trial in Philadelphia

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 153-154.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
would financially “ruin” him, Miller was still not radicalized enough to advocate secession. His position indicates that the grievances with the excise were not as desperate as the radical fringe, or indeed the conventional historical interpretation, contends. Rather, as a victim of one of the harshest elements of the excise, Miller was still in favor of obedience to the law instead of open rebellion.

The commissioners wrote to the committee of twelve on September 1 expressing their dissatisfaction with the Brownsville vote. A slim majority of eleven meant that two-fifths of the meeting rejected the government’s terms, a proportion much too large for their liking. Furthermore, those in the majority only supported the commissioners’ proposal based on their general opinion; the manner of this vote purposefully avoided an explicit and binding avocation for submission, as the commissioners had required. Of greatest significance to the commissioners was the fact that the vote had been cast anonymously: “There were among [the representatives] men whose advice and example have had influence in misleading the people, and it was proper [that these men] should be instrumental in recalling them to their duty.” One of the main purposes of the exercise, according to the commissioners, was to compel those who had commandeered the public will to right this wrong. The commissioners not only believed that radical individuals had coerced others into rebellion, but also that they held enough influence to reverse these actions. The commissioners concluded by offering the western Pennsylvanians one last chance. They stated that if the polling of the public revealed a satisfactory level of willingness to submit, the promised pardons and absolutions would still be granted and a confrontation with the militia would be avoided. The following day, Bradford and Yeates began their journey back to Philadelphia, while Ross remained to supervise the public referendum.

Rebel violence and intimidation accompanied the survey for submission. Brackenridge described mobs patrolling and threatening death to anyone who wished to sign the pledge of obedience. Armed men invaded the Mingo Creek polling place and proceeded to destroy the papers being used to gather the pledges. In southern Allegheny, a masked mob surrounded the house of the committee member in charge of carrying the papers and seized the pledges from him. In most other areas, armed rebels prevented or discouraged those who wished to sign for submission from doing so.

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60 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 157-159.
62 Ibid.
63 Kohn, 580; Slaughter, 201.
64 Brackenridge, “Incidents,” 170-171.
While such activities were predictable given the circumstances described thus far, Brackenridge provides an interesting revelation:

[James Ross] was pursued a day’s journey by two men under pretense of taking the papers from him, but who, coming up, informed him they wished to get their names put down. As it afterwards appeared, these very men had been active in their own districts at home to hinder others from signing... The officers of the district subscriptions had been pursued in many places after they had left the ground, under the same pretense, by some who had appeared the most violent in opposing the submission but who now with tears in their eyes solicited to have their names put upon the paper.  

According to Brackenridge, some perceived rebels who were causing a disturbance were actually moderates in favor of submission, but afraid to act accordingly. Indeed, the fact that some who had “appeared the most violent in opposing the submission” were now pledging obedience certainly demonstrates the lengths to which moderate men were willing to go in order to hide their true sentiments and appear as passionate rebels. In an effort to balance their fear of the mob with their wish to obey the law and avoid treason, these men were compelled to denounce those who submitted while in the public eye and clandestinely to pledge obedience afterward.

The commissioners submitted their final report to the president on September 24. In it, they stated that the pledges of submission were not substantial enough to convince them that an office of inspection could be safely erected in any of the western counties. The circumstances in western Pennsylvania were such that only a federal show of force would quell the uprising and free the lawful population from the tyranny of the minority:

The underwritten firmly believe that there is a considerable majority of the Inhabitants of the fourth survey, who are now disposed to submit to the Execution of the Laws; At the same time, they conceive it their Duty explicitly to declare their Opinion, that such is the state of things in that Survey, that there is no probability that the Act for raising a Revenue on distilled Spirits & Stills can at present be enforced by the usual Course of civil authority, and that some more competent Force is necessary to cause the Laws to be duly executed, & to insure to the Officers & well disposed Citizens that Protection which it is the Duty of Government to afford.  

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65 Ibid., 171-172.
The commissioners recommended force as the only satisfactory way to protect the “considerable majority” who wished to follow the law, but were too frightened to do so. It was the “duty” of the federal government to use its military might to defend the liberty of its citizens and ensure that the popular will was enforced, as reflected both in Congress and the western counties themselves.

The following day, Washington issued a proclamation stating that he had no choice but reluctantly to send in the militia to quash the rebellion. He aptly characterized the uprising as a “contest” over “whether a small portion of the United States shall dictate to the whole union.” Indeed, the disproportionate empowerment of a disgruntled minority was precisely the local experience of western Pennsylvanians during the Whiskey Rebellion.

Led by Lee, troops from Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania marched toward the western counties. The rebels put up no resistance to the militia; many had dispersed and fled before the troops even arrived on October 24. Twenty suspects were taken for trial in Philadelphia, and everyone else pledged obedience to the law and civil authorities. The ease with which the militia was able to gain compliance is certainly an indication that the rebellion was not as widespread or passionate as it seemed on the surface. Indeed, as the commissioners had suggested, all that was necessary was a show of force to overpower the scare tactics of the radical fringe and allow the majority of westerners to obey the law and avoid trouble, as they had always wished.

The story of the Whiskey Rebellion is one that has been largely misunderstood. Historians usually characterize it as a frontier uprising against a precarious federal government who responded militantly in recognition of its own vulnerability. This has led to the mistaken interpretation of these events as the ironic epilogue to the American Revolution in which the radicals-turned-politicians followed in the footsteps of their former British oppressors. However, local conditions reveal that this was hardly an exercise in the assertion of national power. Rather, primary accounts indicate that the uprising consisted of a relatively small group of rebels who terrorized moderate men into participating in the rebellion. As a result, the commissioners recommended force, since it was clear that the climate of fear produced by this tyranny of the minority was more than the majority could overcome. The relations between the rebels and the Washington administration was

68 Hemberger, 323; Kohn, 584; Sharp, 124; Wilentz, 64.
69 See Slaughter, 4, 227-228.
not a debate over who held control, but rather a struggle over competing definitions of what constituted the will of the people.

While historians are eager to interpret the rebellion in terms of representational issues, they apply this reading only to one side. Rooted in antifederalism, the rebels’ grievances with the excise reflected a clear position that representation in Congress was inadequate. However, scholars largely ignore the fact that the federal government’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion was, in large part, also rooted in questions of the popular will. Thus, these events boil down into differing definitions of the nature of representation. The rebels interpreted the needs of the minority as being crucial to the democratic construction of just laws. Conversely, the federal government viewed representation as a means of revealing and facilitating the will of the majority, a will which must be upheld according to basic democratic principles. Whereas the former led to opposition to the law, the latter led to its reinforcement.

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70 See, for example, Hemberger and Sharp.
“Showing Its Flag”: The United States, The Philippines, and the Vietnam War

Matthew Jagel
Northern Illinois University

Abstract

The Americanization of the Vietnam War began following the disintegration of the French colonial empire in Indochina at the Geneva Conference of 1954. The subsequent increased advisory and military role of America in aid of the new Republic of Vietnam was done primarily in a unilateral fashion. The United States soon deemed a multinational face to the conflict necessary to winning the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese population, and thirty-nine separate international governments were recruited to participate as allies. One of these countries was the Republic of the Philippines, whose main contribution was PHILCAG, or the Philippine Civic Action Group. Obtaining this support was difficult, as the divisions created by the war were not solely centered in United States politics and public opinion, and the position of the Philippines in the war would go on to divide that country as well. The following attempts to analyze the political implications for a Filipino presence in Vietnam from both American and Philippine perspectives as well as to look at some of those Filipinos working for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam.

The concept of the Vietnam War as an American endeavor was born out of the United States’ failure to sign the Geneva Accords on 20 July 1954, following France’s loss at Dien Bien Phu to the Ho Chi Minh-led Viet Minh. Subsequent U.S. actions and increased military presence, previously executed begrudgingly at the behest of France for the sake of its empire, now operated unilaterally. The United States government soon afterward deemed a multinational face to the Vietnam conflict necessary to winning the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese population. Thirty-nine separate international governments were recruited to participate as U.S. allies in the Vietnam War. With contributions ranging from financial aid to medical assistance
to combat units, these nations were the flags of an international war on communism, and they provided broad international support for the United States to increase its military presence systematically.

One of these countries was the Republic of the Philippines, whose main contribution was PHILCAG, or the Philippine Civic Action Group. American public relations officials saw utilizing the help of Asian nations in this Asian war as a necessity, particularly under the leadership of President Lyndon Johnson. Obtaining this support would prove to be difficult, as the divisions created by the war in Vietnam were not solely centered in U.S. politics and public opinion. The Philippines’ position in the war would go on to divide that country politically as well, and by the end of Filipino involvement, the nation found itself living under martial law.

Current historiography on the role of the Philippines in the Vietnam War is sparse. The focus of major Vietnam War surveys stems from the perspective of the United States, with little, if any, attention paid to the internal views of the Filipino politicians. No history focuses solely on the Philippines in Vietnam, instead framing Philippine involvement as part of a larger geopolitical scheme. There are, however, some that do include more than a terse recognition of Filipino involvement.¹

Stanley Robert Larsen and James Lawton Collins Jr.’s Allied Participation in Vietnam was originally released shortly after the war. Under the commission of the United States Army, this work details how the Philippines, as well as other nations, were fighting the so-called “good fight” against communism in Vietnam. While there is some value in its succinct history of Philippine involvement, and some details are useful in the study of PHILCAG, Larsen and Collins present no internal Philippine perspective, and their analysis ends in 1967. Robert M. Blackburn’s Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”: The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War is a damning critique of the U.S. “more flags” policy, which dictated that additional countries be recruited to aid in the Vietnam War effort. While his coverage of the Philippine ends in 1969, his overall analysis trumps any of his few competitors for depth and reliability. W. Scott Thompson’s Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States 1965-75 focuses on the political aspect of these relations, although he includes little on the specifics of war and PHILCAG in particular.

This paper attempts to fill in the gaps in this existing historiography. Its goal is to analyze the political implications of a Filipino presence in Vietnam from both American and Philippine perspectives, as well as to look at some of those Filipinos who worked for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam. What follows is the curious, complicated history of PHILCAG in Vietnam.

The relationship between the United States and the Philippines began at the end of the nineteenth century, when the United States was prepared to follow the British model and accept Rudyard Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” as the rationale for colonial empire. According to Michael Hunt, advances in technology made expansion seem easier, served security, and had the potential for domestic benefits.\(^2\) With the conclusion of the Spanish-American War (1898-1902), U.S. imperialism began anew in the archipelago of the Philippines. The success in the nation-building of the Philippines by both the Spanish and the Americans is clear in the subsequent dependence of the native population on their oppressors. While colonial leadership changed after the Spanish-American War, little change was realized in the daily lives of the native Filipino population. According to historian Paul Kramer, “For Filipinos, the war meant trading—after an eight month interval of embattled political independence—one imperial antagonist for another.”\(^3\) According to Kramer, when the Philippine-American War broke out a short time later, the race war began in the United States.

During this period, Filipino migration to the United States began to increase. Putting an end to, or at a minimum dramatically reducing, the influx of Filipinos into America became maximum priority for many nativists. When exclusion proved impossible, they began to push for independence for the Philippines as a means of stemming the tide. Despite such sentiment, and Wilson’s unenthusiastic support for the bill, the promise of eventual independence in the Jones Act of 1916 was, in the global scheme of the era, actually quite groundbreaking, and was the precursor to the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which created a Commonwealth and granted independence to the Philippines in ten years’ time. Despite this autonomy, the United States retained the rights for various military bases in the Philippines, notably Clark Air base, just north of Manila. These bases were the key to America’s predominant position in the Pacific, which had been all but guaranteed following the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, and they proved to play a pivotal role in the war in Vietnam.


Kramer’s explanation of the Philippine-American War draws connections to later American overseas incursions. The derogatory term “gook,” widely used during the Vietnam War, is based on “gu-gu,” a term commonly used in the Philippine-American War to describe Filipino revolutionary fighters. Guerilla fighters in the Philippines during that war were not seen to be fighting a civilized war, and therefore America did not afford them the rights of prisoners of war. Many Filipinos and Americans alike considered the Philippine-American war to be primarily a nation-building effort. Additionally, the war was declared prematurely over on a number of occasions by American leadership. All of these would prove to be hallmarks of the war in Vietnam.

Initial Filipino involvement with the State of Vietnam began in 1953, when a group of Philippine doctors and nurses arrived in the country. Their mission was to supply medical aid to various hamlets and villages throughout the republic as part of the privately funded project Operation Brotherhood. Edward Lansdale, a former member of the Office of Strategic Services during the Second World War, arrived in Vietnam a short time later, in June 1954. Then working for the CIA, his specialty was “psychological warfare,” and he counted on Philippine auxiliaries as part of a series of early covert operations targeted against the communist North Vietnam.\(^4\)

The first contingent consisted of seven doctors and nurses, and a clinic was established at the main refugee reception center in Saigon. Other volunteers followed, until 105 Filipino doctors and nurses were at work in Vietnam. With other countries contributing, Operation Brotherhood treated over 400,000 patients in its first year alone. It was designed to lend the new South Vietnamese government an air of legitimacy as Asians worked together with other Asians under the eye of the United States. Lansdale publicly expressed support for the group’s goal of wanting to “ease the suffering of their fellow Asians,” yet in a government memorandum, his words were markedly different, where he called Operation Brotherhood “another private Filipino public-service organization,” over which there was “a measure of CIA control.”\(^5\)


Although this aid was welcomed in some circles, Vietnamese leadership was hesitant to accept aid from foreign Asian countries. The new Republic of Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem stated that the Vietnamese did not need the help of “a bunch of orators and nightclub musicians,” a reference to Filipino dance bands that were popular throughout Asia at the time. Needing to reconcile these cultural and regional differences to forge a clear path for a Filipino contribution, Edward Lansdale was instrumental, at one time even using pretty Filipino nurses as part of the negotiations to get Operation Brotherhood personnel to the impoverished city of Camau alongside Vietnamese military.\(^6\)

At a meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board’s Special Working Group on Vietnam on 7 November 1955, the significance of a Filipino contribution to Vietnam was discussed. It was noted at a meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board’s Special Working Group on Vietnam that “Operation Brotherhood, supported by the Philippines, gave an added psychological support in convincing the people that they were being considered not only by their own government but by foreign governments.”\(^7\) At this point, Filipino contributions were deemed a minor success by the United States in the overall effort to thwart the advance of communism on the Indochinese peninsula.

The second project, the Freedom Company of the Philippines, was administered directly under the CIA. Started in 1955, this group was composed of Filipino World War II veterans who performed various operations throughout Indochina, including guerilla warfare activities, the training of Diem’s presidential guard battalion, and even aided in the composition of the South Vietnamese constitution. While the self-proclaimed purpose of the Freedom Company was to further “the cause of freedom,” the main goal was to perform tasks that could not be connected to either the United States or South Vietnam. American support was later withdrawn and it was renamed the Eastern Construction Company, continuing operations until the late 1960s. The CIA also discussed using the Philippines as a military training ground for Vietnamese students.\(^8\) Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay was receptive to this concept, and while U.S. officials implemented the initial stages of planning, it never materialized.\(^9\)

Operations such as these were the forebears of the “more flags” policy. Despite the aid of the United States, these early efforts by the Philippines to support the infantile country of South Vietnam could hardly be deemed a success. According to Gloria Emerson, who reported from Vietnam for the *New York Times*, “The Philippines did not become an important anti-Communist force in Vietnam; the Vietnamese did not at all trust other Asians manipulated by the Americans.”\(^{10}\)

In a conversation with President Dwight Eisenhower on 9 May 1957, South Vietnamese President Diem remarked that he felt a grave threat from the North, and that while SEATO may have been a political deterrent to the North, only Thailand and the Philippines were potentially ready to come to the Republic of Vietnam’s aid.\(^{11}\) Diem stated that most of the Philippines 60,000 troops were needed at home anyway, as a means of protections against potential communist threats there. At this early stage, American policy makers had little faith in further contributions from the Republic of the Philippines. It would be seven years before discussion on additional Filipino aid to South Vietnam began.

In the interim, the two nations retained generally friendly relations as they worked together through the SEATO treaty, although there was a slight controversy following the U.S. House of Representatives’ failure to pass the Philippines War Damage Bill, which caused President Diosdado Macapagal to postpone a May 1962 trip to Washington. When he finally did visit in 1964, he toasted the two nations’ shared “ties and ideas and ideals—democracy, freedom, love for peace, and the rule of law” at a White House dinner.\(^{12}\)

Initially started in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson’s administration, the “more flags” policy attempted to bring, as historian Robert Blackburn has noted, a “visible symbol of free world support for [Johnson’s] Vietnam policies.” It was intended to buttress the access to Filipino air bases which the United States already possessed. Strategically, the Philippines played a large role in American geopolitical considerations. The significance of these bases to Washington’s containment policy was well noted. On 9 June 1964, the Board of National Estimates sent a memo to the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, which emphasized their importance.

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US military strength in the Far East is based on the chain of islands from the Philippines to Japan.... As long as the US can effectively operate from these bases, it will probably still be able to deter... overt military aggression.... In the Philippines, there would be some impetus to the tendency of ultranationalists... to press for reduced cooperation with the US.... We do not think this would affect Philippine government policy, at least as long as the present administration is in power in Manila.\(^{13}\)

In the early stages of negotiations for an increased Filipino presence in Vietnam, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk leaned on his allies in the Philippine government, notably Macapagal. A proponent of sending combat forces in support of medical and engineering units, Macapagal represented the ideal Asian “more flags” ally. What complicated matters was the need for Philippine congressional approval. The major sticking point for passage of the bill was the amount of American support, financial or otherwise, that would complement a Filipino contribution.

On 8 July 1964, the Philippine House and Senate agreed on the wording of the authorization of a one million peso appropriations bill, which would support the first contingent in Vietnam under the “more flags” auspice. The following day, Philippine Ambassador James Ledesma, in a meeting with Johnson, notified the president that the Philippine government had decided to enlarge its assistance program for South Vietnam. The president responded that he was glad that the Philippines would be “showing its flag.” While dissent within the Philippine Congress at this point was minimal, one of the leading opponents of the appropriations bill was Senate Majority Leader Ferdinand Marcos. His opposition was grounded on his claim that Macapagal used Vietnam policy to indulge his totalitarian tendencies. The more plausible scenario was Marcos’ anger at Macapagal for supposedly backing out of a commitment to not seek reelection.\(^{14}\)

A few months earlier, a State Department memo to the American Embassy in Manila stated that “in order to enhance the possibility of maximum Philippine contributions... be prepared to add supplemental inducements.”\(^{15}\) This would prove to be necessary, as the one million pesos allocated for this Philippine contingent

\(^{13}\) Blackburn, Mercenaries, 1; Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone), 9 June 1964, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 1:486.
\(^{15}\) Blackburn, Mercenaries, 71.
(PHILCON I) was insufficient to support the medical and psychological war teams. This price tag was of little concern to the United States, as its main goal in negotiations with the Philippines was simply to secure its contribution.

Initial Philippine support consisted of a contingent of sixteen doctors, nurses, technicians, and civic action officers from the Philippine Armed Forces, who arrived in Vietnam on 16 August 1964. Official documentation from the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) recounted that PHILCON:

assisted in the advisory effort directed toward psychological warfare and civil affairs in III Corps. They were initially assigned in pairs... in the provinces of Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, and Long An. Of the four remaining officers, one acted as OIC, while one each worked with the Psywar Battalion.16

Being assigned to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Psywar companies and platoons and actually traveling and working with teams of these units, the Filipinos and their South Vietnamese counterparts helped to ensure that the psychological warfare portion of the pacification plan was being carried out in this region. In the short time the Filipinos operated in the field in 1964, they were able to make a notable contribution to the psywar effort, which prompted South Vietnam to request an additional contingent of sixteen officers who were then scheduled to arrive in Vietnam in mid-January 1965.17

U.S. officials were pleased with the immediate impact that PHILCON had. An internal State Department memo noted, “We enthusiastically agree that there should be more Asians helping Asians. We’re impressed with the performance of Fils already there, and would warmly welcome more.” The success of this initial contribution encouraged additional requests for aid, with U.S. officials increasing the pressure on Macapagal. Additional State Department memos emphasized that “the Philippines... will be pressed for additional contributions along the lines of the program for approximately 1800 men already submitted to President Macapagal.” Hopes at this point were for an additional military contribution, an idea which Macapagal supported. He was quick to offer additional help, as Secretary Rusk noted in a memo to President Johnson:

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16 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1964 (unpublished), in MACV, SGS MACJ03, Military History Branch, Annual Command Histories, RG 472, Box 1, National Archives II, College Park, MD, 157, 77.
17 Ibid.; Annex A, Tran Van Do, 23 March 1965, FWMAO Admin Office, General Records, RG 472, Box 8, NA II.
On September 22, [Macapagal said he] expected to discuss the Viet-Nam situation with you, that he thought it was approaching “desperation,” and that he thought part of the trouble might be that the American advisers and military units, being “Westerners and white men,” seemed to the Vietnamese little different from the French and are consequently unable to “convey a sense of common purpose to them.” He suggested that the 16,000 American soldiers in Viet-Nam be replaced by an equal number of Filipinos and Thais. He recognized that “massive logistic support and ultimate control must remain in American hands.”

While this proposal never got out of initial planning stages, it nevertheless provided an example of Macapagal’s strong commitment to the efforts in South Vietnam.

Macapagal visited Washington on October 5-6 for the first official discussions between the two countries on a heightened Filipino involvement in Vietnam. This included talk of the possibility of a 2,000 troop deployment, which both Macapagal and Johnson agreed should be pursued. Macapagal said that the Philippines was ready to send support in teams of public health, medical, engineering, and military special forces, and that he would be willing to send “as many as useful.” President Johnson replied, “We think we can be helpful.”

While both heads of state were in agreement, Philippine congressional approval was still needed for this new aid package, entitled the Philippine Civic Action Group. The Johnson administration was concerned about how the Philippine Congress would respond. The largest hurdle would be the financing of PHILCAG. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler sent a memo to the embassy in Manila detailing Washington’s position. “Recommend you let Macapagal raise question of funding.... We prefer donor countries support costs of contributions to greatest extent possible. Nevertheless, if necessary in order to secure meaningful and substantial third country aid to Viet Nam, we are prepared to pay entire bill.”

The dispute between U.S. and Philippine officials over the amount contributed to PHILCAG by the United States remained the sole sticking point. The Philippines not only demanded that the entire operation be funded by the United States, but also wanted additional concessions. The specifics of Filipino demands were:

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18 Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Counsel Staff to President Johnson, Washington, 5 October 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 26:659-60; Paper Prepared for the Executive Committee, Washington, 2 December 1964, ibid., 1:972; Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, 3 October 1964, ibid., 26:656-57.
20 Blackburn, Mercenaries, 76-77.
1. Complete equipment and logistic support of PHILCAG while in South Vietnam
2. Overseas allowances
3. Costs for a replacement unit in the Philippines
4. Two swiftcraft (river patrol boats) in addition to two already promised
5. Accelerated funding for three already funded engineer construction battalions
6. M-14 rifles and M-60 machine guns for a Filipino battalion combat team to be stationed in the Philippines

U.S. officials felt that the demanded per diem for overseas Filipino troops was excessive, but Philippine negotiators refused to budge. This refusal raised American frustrations, and no compromise was made. This development put an end to any realistic proposal of Filipino combat forces being sent to Vietnam, negotiations for which officially came to an end on 19 February 1965. At that time, Rusk had the embassy in Manila notify the Philippine government that an engineering task force would be acceptable to the United States, and that over $9 million per year would be provided as funding. With these matters agreed to, the only thing keeping their deployment from proceeding was the Philippine Congress. As of 1 June 1965, there were only 73 Filipinos in Vietnam, with Macapagal waiting for congressional approval of the 2,000-man task force. Congress was split on the prospect of becoming enmeshed in a war that had no end in sight.

1965 was a congressional and presidential election year for the Philippines, which made the prospect of obtaining congressional approval problematic. The United States continued its support of Macapagal in the upcoming elections, where he faced an underdog challenger in Ferdinand Marcos, who had previously been unfriendly to the prospect of PHILCAG. Macapagal was not optimistic, saying, “The reality is that the bill faces an uncertain future.” There was nothing for Washington to do but wait.

The November elections produced a startling upset, with Marcos prevailing. Despite this perceived setback, officials in Washington continued to pursue the PHILCAG task force. Lyndon Johnson sent five diplomatic missions in an attempt to change Marcos’ mind on PHILCAG, led by such notables as Vice President Hubert

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21 Blackburn, Mercenaries, 78.
22 Ibid., 78-81; Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and James C. Thompson Jr., of the National Security Counsel Staff to President Johnson, Washington, 1 June 1965, FRUS 1964–1968, 26:675.
23 Ambassador of the Philippines to Department of State, 5 July 1965 in The Presidential Papers of Ferdinand Marcos, file no. 279, National Library, Manila, Philippines, 1.
Humphrey, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Senator Mike Mansfield, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and Edward Lansdale. The theme of Humphrey’s report on his trip was expressed in a speech given by Marcos shortly after: “Those who fight for liberty fight for us.” There seemed to be some hope for reconciliation.24

During a phone conversation with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara on 17 January 1966, Johnson inquired as to whether there had been progress on obtaining a Filipino presence on the ground in Vietnam. McNamara noted that the presidential change in Philippines had hampered negotiations. He described the progress being made on bringing the Koreans into the fold, but noted that “we must have some Philippine contribution as well.”25 While Marcos remained adamant about not sending a combat unit, he did rescind his prior position against sending medical and engineering teams to Vietnam. The key to his position reversal was the economic incentives offered by the United States.

Many nations up to this point, including the Philippines, preferred to provide civic action and medical assistance as opposed to active military participation, although this kind of proposed assistance was still often met with considerable opposition within national legislative bodies. “Some of this opposition was caused by the unstable political situation in RVN from March through June.... [U.S. officials] worked behind the scenes with defense ministries and heads of states... to secure favorable legislative reactions to the assistance program. In almost all cases, the US paid for the equipment, transportation, and in-country support of the personnel of the FW [Free World] assistance groups.” The prospect of the United States providing such quantities of aid was able to sway some nations in their decision-making. The Johnson White House expressed much optimism when discussing allied forces in the Pacific. They “are more sympathetic to the peace offensive than we might have expected,” noted Bundy.26 The foundation for a true coalition was beginning to take shape.

Marcos kept the previous Macapagal agreement in tact, with slight adjustments. The major change was that the U. S. would no longer be expected to pay the full costs of forming new units within the Philippines to replace those sent to Vietnam. Marcos felt that if he allowed the United States to pay those costs, his troops would be regarded as mercenaries or “cannon fodder” for the Americans. During a meeting between Johnson and congressional leaders, a discussion of

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25 Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, 17 January 1966, Ibid., 79.
26 Command History 1966, 82; Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, Washington, 3 January 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, 4:5.
Marcos followed. “In Manila, found Marcos a real leader. Put his entire political life on the line. Dastardly are the news stories coming from the U.S.—Philippines are human mercenaries.’ Marcos made strong statement—courageous statement—in which he came down firmly on side of U.S.”

The internal dispute within the Philippine Congress, however, nearly brought all proceedings to a halt. By 1966, passions were further inflamed by pressure from Marcos for a passage of the PHILCAG bill. On March 1 of that year, Senator Francisco Rodrigo delivered a speech to the floor of the Senate in support of the proposal. He noted Marcos’ “stand on an issue which vitally concerns the security of our country,” and recounted the forming of the Philippine Declaration of Principles, in which the defense of the state is a “prime duty of the government.” According to Rodrigo’s and others’ defenses of the bill, a main reason for intervention in Vietnam was the perceived internal threat to the Philippines of the communist Huk rebels. Rodrigo maintained his position that self-defense was central to the Vietnam question, and reiterated the potential for a communist menace in Vietnam. The fear of “Red China” and the thought that communism could take root in the Philippines was also prominent in forming the pro-PHILCAG policy. Some wanted not only a PHILCAG commitment, but a military one as well. Senators questioned what the response would be if the tables were turned. “How would we feel if, at a time when the Philippines is the target of armed aggression, we ask the United States for soldiers, and she sends us Peace Corps volunteers?”

At that point, Thailand had not yet committed troops to Vietnam, which became a major area of contention for those protesting against PHILCAG. Senator José Wright Diokno observed that if Thailand, a country much closer to the communist threat from North Vietnam or China, had not yet sent troops, then why should the Philippines feel obligated? Senator Rodrigo quickly countered that Thailand needed “her troops precisely because she is now practically within attack.... Consequently, she needs her troops within her borders.” Another supporter of PHILCAG, Senator Raul Manglapus, stated on March 24, “Before anyone in this august Body [sic] was ever pro-Vietnam, I was.”

There were other opponents. Senator Alejandro D. Almendras recounted “an incident during the war [World War II] in which an American major called the

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29 Ibid., 698, 1005. The Royal Thai Army Regiment did eventually come to South Vietnam in September 1967.
Filipino soldiers ‘monkeys.’” Almendras, who was an officer in the Filipino Army at the time, beat up the American who made this slur and was court-martialed. Although he was later acquitted, his venom for the United States had not waned. “I hate not only the Americans for taking us for granted but also any alien for that matter who is enjoying our hospitality because this is the only country that God has given us and I love her very much.”30 Another of the most outspoken opponents was Senator Juan R. Liwag, who wrote extensively in protest of the Vietnam War and candidly expressed his outrage at Philippine involvement. He questioned, “Why should we allow ourselves to get involved in a war of a highly controversial and questionable character?”31

After months of similar debate, the PHILCAG bill finally passed the Philippine Congress on June 3 1966, although it was subject to Congressional review on a yearly basis. The Republic of Vietnam agreed to the Philippines’ offer on August 15, and soon afterward, “a five-man US MTT [military transition team] was sent to the Philippines to provide the CAG an orientation on VC weapons, tactics, and techniques.”32 Advance elements of the 2,000-man Philippine Civic Action Group began to arrive in Tay Ninh province in South Vietnam on August 17. On September 14, 1966, the first official members of PHILCAG began arriving, with Brigadier General Gaudencio V. Tobias acting as commander. Massive demonstrations against PHILCAG were planned for September 12, the day Marcos was scheduled to leave on a trip to Washington meant to coincide with the PHILCAG deployment, with counterdemonstrations planned as well.33

As the contingent settled in Vietnam, the Manila Conference was held on October 24-25, with President Johnson in attendance. The seven participating countries pledged to “continue our military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended.”34 While this was intended to be a demonstration of solidarity among Southeast Asian neighbors in support of United States action in Vietnam, tensions between nations arose during the conference.

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32 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1966, 577; MACV, SGS MACJ03, Military History Branch, Annual Command Histories, Record Group 472, NAI.
33 Note from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Vietnam to Embassy of the Philippines, 15 August 1966, FWMAO, Admin Office, RG 472, NA II; Command History 1966, 842, 290; Ambassador of the Philippines to Department of State, 8 September 1966 in The Presidential Papers of Ferdinand Marcos, File no. 2694, National Library, Manila, Philippines, 1.
34 Command History 1966, 663.
Shortly after its conclusion, a story was leaked regarding “top secret” tape recordings made during the conference. On 2 November, the *Manila Daily Mirror* published alleged dialogue from those secret sessions from various heads of state. The *Mirror’s* story alleged that President Johnson cursed, pounded the table, and behaved like “the angriest hawk of all.” The U.S. Embassy noted in response that it “normally does not comment on works of fiction,” but many other newspapers carried quotations almost verbatim to those of the *Manila Daily Mirror*, lending some credibility to the report.35

Amando Doronila of the *Manila Daily Mirror* wrote of a closed door session during the conference where a heated argument broke out between Presidents Johnson and Marcos over the latter’s insistence of the insertion of the words “constitutional processes” in a paragraph of the final communiqué from the summit. (Marcos apparently won the battle, with the publicized version of the communiqué

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reading: “Action taken in pursuance of policies herein stated shall be in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.”)\(^{36}\) The following conversation, according to Doronila, began with Johnson’s counter to Marcos.

Johnson: You are doing this because you are afraid of your Senate.
Marcos: Mr. President, we are all afraid of our Senate. After all, you have your own Fulbright, Morse and Mansfield [Johnson’s critics in the United States Congress].
Johnson: Damn it. Forget them. Don’t remind me of my Senators.
Marcos: In the United States, you don’t have only one government—you have two governments.
Johnson: What do you mean?
Marcos: You have the State Department and the White House.
Johnson: You are damn right. If the State Department had its way, the U. S. will be at war with every country in the world.\(^{37}\)

For the United States, the result of the conference was a realization that Marcos refused to play the role of “America’s boy” for Johnson, although official reports of the summit painted a rosy picture of leaders working together for a common good.

While the majority of PHILCAG’s time was spent rebuilding roads or performing medical and dental operations on the local peasant population, they were involved in occasional defensive battles. In November, PHILCAG became acutely aware of the realities of war in Vietnam. “Operation ATTLEBORO, fought in the snarled thickets of War Zone C [near Tay Ninh], became [up to that point]... the largest operation of the war,” lasting over a month. Fighting was fierce, with the first documented enemy tear gas attack of the war occurring.\(^{38}\) The PHILCAG contingent was not spared, with four wounded in action on November 4. While fighting in battles such as this was not standard protocol for PHILCAG, it would see action off and on throughout its years in Vietnam.

By the end of 1966, there were a total of 441,190 troops on the ground in Vietnam, of which the FWMAF (Free World Military Armed Forces) made up 52,622. The Philippines had 2,063 men in country at this time. There was some desire on the side of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam to ask for an increased commitment, but it was a touchy political situation. In April 1967, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Philippines Narcisco Ramos received an official communication from Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
\(^{38}\) Command History, 1966, 386, 851.
While Ky expressed hope that the Philippines would increase its commitment, Ramos stated that this would prove difficult, as congressional disapproval of the current Philippine contribution to Vietnam could prevent the passage of the pending bill to pay the expenses of the civic action program.\textsuperscript{39}

The United States found similar difficulty in gaining additional commitments from the Philippines. In a memo from Ambassador William P. Bundy to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy stated that “the Embassy feels it is definitely premature to seek additional military contributions, and that any further non-military assistance should arise from clear GVN [Government of Vietnam] initiative,” which could reduce the perception of overt American pressure.\textsuperscript{40} The close vote and narrow approval of PHILCAG in the Philippine Senate in June made American officials wary to press the issue any further.

President Johnson had a different view. Clark Clifford, a Democratic presidential advisor dating back to the days of Harry Truman, had been at Johnson’s side on his visit to Manila in October 1966. In 1967, looking to shore up public support for an additional troop increase, Johnson sent Clifford and Maxwell Taylor on a presidential mission to meet with Asian and Pacific allies, the hope being that by gaining additional troop increases from allied nations, the American public would stomach yet another troop increase themselves.\textsuperscript{41} They were to push for another Manila-type summit and to secure new commitments from regional nations on a trip scheduled to depart on July 22, 1967.

Upon learning of Clifford and Taylor’s intentions, Marcos said that he “saw no need” for a visit so shortly after the Manila summit, and promptly cancelled his meeting. After visiting the countries of South Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea (none of which were prepared to offer additional wartime commitments), the Presidential mission did “visit” the Philippines, with engine trouble forcing an unscheduled landing at Clark Air Force Base. According to Clifford, “Marcos pretended we were not in his country.” Taylor and Clifford returned with drastically different interpretations of the Asia/Pacific trip. Taylor accepted the excuses of the allies at face value. Clifford, on the other hand, “returned both puzzled and troubled” at the failure to secure additional commitments. For Clifford, a long time Vietnam War hawk, the trip began his erosion of support for the war.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 857; Memorandum of Conversation, 17 April 1967 in The Presidential Papers of Ferdinand Marcos, File no. 5507, National Library, Manila, Philippines, 1.

\textsuperscript{40} Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington, 15 November 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, 4:846.

\textsuperscript{41} Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 448.

\textsuperscript{42} Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel, 448, 451-2. After months of negotiation with the United States, Thailand did eventually send additional troops to South Vietnam in July, 1968, for which the United States paid a substantial amount. See Blackburn, Mercenaries, 113-114.
Despite such setbacks, Washington was content with the news coming from Tay Ninh. The President’s Special Counsel, Harry McPherson, visited the PHILCAG contingent in June, and reported back to the President:

I visited Philcag, and was stunned by the soldierly bearing of the Filipino soldiers.... Their commander, General Tobias, is a spit-and-polish tiger. I asked him if many of his men had fought the Huks. He said, “Yes, but compared to the VC, the Huks were amateurs.”

On a short visit the next month to his PHILCAG contingent in the field, Marcos seemed pleased with the progress the team had made. He continued his vocal support for the role of the Philippines in Vietnam and stated from the Saigon airport, “The aggression in Vietnam must be stopped right here if the security of Asia, and indeed ultimately of the world, is to be safeguarded.” While he did not want to appear too close to the United States, Marcos still supported the Filipino effort. Under relentless political pressure at home, Marcos made a number of speeches in support of his policies where he echoed American talking points. “Vietnam is the focus of attention now.... It may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance.... For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia.”

Marcos was also concerned with communist subversion at home in the Philippines, and his offer for a new Operation Brotherhood in Vietnam came with a price tag of infrastructure and roads to be built by the U.S. This would “increase mobility in the Huk Territory.” Despite his rhetoric, Marcos’ hands remained politically tied with respect to the introduction of combat troops in Vietnam. When it appeared that the Philippine Congress might not reauthorize the spending bill in support of PHILCAG, Marcos began to feel the demands to reduce the number of men serving in Vietnam, which had remained slightly above 2,000 throughout 1966 and 1967. As pressure in the Philippines mounted for an end to the contingent, the reliability of the Philippines as an ally for the United States came into question.

On January 8, 1968, MACV commander General William Westmoreland summoned Tobias to a meeting. Recently declassified documentation recounts the

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43 Memorandum from the President’s Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson, Washington, 13 June 1967, FRUS, 5:497.
45 Marcos, as quoted by Lyndon Johnson in an address made before the National Legislative Conference at San Antonio, TX, on September 29, 1967, State Department, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LVII, No. 1478, Publication 8304, 23 October 1967.
46 FRUS 26:791, 93-4.
discovery by the United States that Tobias had developed a relationship with the Northern Liberation Front, and Westmoreland confronted him. During this meeting, Tobias recounted the history of PHILCAG’s contacts with NLF leadership, which dated back seventeen months to PHILCAG’s arrival in Vietnam. He had received orders from Marcos to establish contact with the NLF and thereby gain contacts with Hanoi leadership. The orders came to him on August 15, 1966, the same day that South Vietnam officially accepted the Philippines’ offer of PHILCAG. Marcos sought to begin peace negotiations without the consent or knowledge of the United States or the Republic of Vietnam. The plan was kept secret, with only Marcos, Tobias, and a few select Filipino cabinet members and military officials knowing the details. An unnamed Philippine captain and two enlisted men were selected as “action officers” to do the leg-work of meeting with NLF operatives, but even they had limited information as to the objectives or scope of the operation.47

The first contacts were made in February 1967. The details of these initial contacts are not entirely clear, but on April 25, 1967, Tobias received a response letter from Luu Kiet, Vice Chairman for the Front Liberation Committee of Tay Ninh Province. Kiet’s response to the General read:

Your letter has been received. You are being used by the Americans. You are bombing and destroying our houses and schools. It is the Americans who are the aggressors and whom our forces are fighting valiantly.... The Americans are losing and will continue to lose.... We want no part of you. Our advice to you is to go home to the Philippines and have no part of the grand aggressive design of the imperialist Americans.48

Tobias sent a letter in response, which was approved by Marcos. This was intercepted by the Government of Vietnam on November 7, 1967, along with the text of a July 16 speech by Marcos to PHILCAG troops. In the letter, Tobias urged Kiet to reconsider. Quoting Marcos’ speech, Tobias wrote that his mission was “not to kill, it is to give life and support; to bring happiness, not sorrow; to build and not destroy.”49

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48 Ibid., 2, 6.
Overall, there were six meetings between the unnamed Philippine captain and NLF political cadre. Three of these meetings occurred in Tay Ninh province and three across the border in Cambodia. Reaching the Cambodian site, in particular, was a challenge for the Filipino men. Taken by escorts down Route 13 from the city of Tay Ninh, the captain then took a jungle trail across the Cambodian border to a well-camouflaged camp. Tobias described the NLF’s operations as “both secretive and well organized,” but noted that they were “courteous and proper at all times.”

Tobias expressed his concern over the embarrassment that would follow him and his government should this information be released. He emphasized that he was not trying to bargain with the NLF, just “attempting to develop an arrangement that would result in the VC leaving the PHILCAG forces alone.” Marcos even attempted

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50 Ibid., 11 January 1968, Document #73-c, 2.
51 Ibid., 4, 5.
in late 1966 to make contact with Hanoi in hopes of serving as an intermediary to peace negotiations. Earlier on the same day of the Tobias/Westmoreland meeting, General Frederick Carlton Weyand, Commander of Second Field Force, sent a memo to Westmoreland detailing new intelligence reports, one of which described a PHILCAG vehicle with covered markings delivering medicines and food to an NLF contact. Both South Vietnam and U.S. leadership were quite disturbed at these “additional indications that PHILCAG is persisting in unilateral efforts to establish a relationship with the VC.”

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Filipino contacts with the Northern Liberation Front from the perspective of the United States was the PHILCAG leadership’s insistence that the Philippines was performing independently from the coalition Lyndon Johnson had put together. From Marcos and Tobias’ perspective, they were in Vietnam “merely to help all Vietnamese people in peaceful pursuits without respect to their ‘beliefs and persuasions,’ and... therefore, the NFLVN might consider them [sic] as being a kind of neutral position outside the fighting war.” There was a belief in the Philippines that, because of their peaceful, non-combatant pursuits, they were not resented by the NLF, and were thus in a favorable position to act as intermediaries to bring about a peace settlement.

Discussions with GVN President Nguyễn Văn Thieu revealed a series of distressed conversations, with Thieu stating “emphatically [sic]” how unwise a move this was on the part of Marcos. There was great suspicion in the minds of South Vietnamese leadership of a future with PHILCAG, but not wanting to upset Marcos or the coalition, the United States’ official position was to stay out of the affair, allowing Marcos to handle media reports, should they come out in the press.

This “Illinois” situation, as it was referred to within the State Department, revealed Marcos’ continued movement away from Washington and his attempts to establish himself as a world player. His attempts to negotiate his own peace showed his rogue, dominant personality and his unwillingness to accept a submissive role in America’s war. With pressure in the Philippines to bring PHILCAG home from the war, and with this new rift in relations with both the American and South Vietnamese governments, the writing was on the wall for Marcos to end Filipino involvement.

As these developments moved forward, the war raged on for the men and women of PHILCAG. The staggering amount of work accomplished by PHILCAG

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52 11 November 1967, Document #73-j, 1; Ibid., 8 January 1968, Document #73-d, 1.
53 Ibid., 18 November 1967, Document #73-g, 1.
54 Ibid., 20 January 1968, Document #73-a, 1; Ibid., 10 January 1968, Document #73-b, 2; Ibid., 30 April 1968, Document #69, 2.
included the construction of 59 kilometers of roads, building two modern, two-lane concrete bridges over the Tay Ninh River, and digging 200 wells. In addition, PHILCAG was heavily involved in food and clothing distribution, as well as various psywar operations, including the training of defectors in welding and equipment operations. Operations for the construction of “resettlement” hamlets were also a major function of PHILCAG, the largest of which occurred in Phuoc Dien, three kilometers from Tay Ninh.\textsuperscript{55}

On July 30, 1968, the American embassy in Manila was informed that President Marcos had reduced the number of men in PHILCAG from 1,735 to 1,500. This was an attempt at political compromise by Marcos, who was fending off calls from Congress to reduce PHILCAG’s numbers by 1,000. While he had been supportive of the Philippines’ contingent in Vietnam, congressional support continued to flounder. While local editorials, such as those in the \textit{Philippines Herald}, maintained their hawkish edge, local opposition to the war continued to gain strength. In 1968, a Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines was organized.\textsuperscript{56}

Crowds swarmed Clark Air Base on September 30 to, in the words of Ambassador to the Philippines G. Mennen Williams, “punish the U.S.”\textsuperscript{57} Their demands consisted of a withdrawal of PHILCAG from Vietnam and a “modification or termination”\textsuperscript{58} of the U. S.–Filipino bases agreement. There was little United States fear, however, of a complete withdrawal of PHILCAG at this time. Such a move would sacrifice Marcos’ claim for a place at the table for peace negotiations, as well as his “chance to share in the post-war division of American military equipment.”\textsuperscript{59} Facing internal political pressure to distance himself from the United States and the Vietnam War, as well as the prospect of a new potential trade block, Marcos reconsidered his position on relations with communist nations.

On November 24, during his weekly radio-TV chat, Marcos answered questions regarding the future of Philippine/communist relations. When queried if he expected to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries, he replied, “Personally, my answer will be yes,” and that it was “about time” to establish trade and diplomatic relations with smaller socialist governments.\textsuperscript{60} On November 27, Marcos convened his Foreign Policy Council to consider this. Secretary of Foreign

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{FRUS 1964–1968}, 26:820.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 822.
\textsuperscript{60} American Embassy, Manila to Secretary of State, 25 November 1968, Subject Numeric Files 1967–1969, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, NA II.
Affairs Ramos, among others, cautioned against a sharp turn from long-standing anti-communist policy, which likely influenced Marcos’ decision to replace him as his new term began. Others, such as Senator Tanada, advocated full trade and diplomatic relations with communist nations. The result was a compromised solution, whereby trade with the “Eastern Bloc” countries would continue on a limited basis and cover only “distressed export products such as abaca, copra, coconut oil and tobacco.” A new direction was clear. It was known as New Developmental Diplomacy.

On January 2, 1969, Carlos Romulo assumed office as the new Foreign Secretary and, according to historian and diplomat Claude A. Buss, “declared that the Filipinos were no longer children seeking guidance from a parent, but mature adults independently pursuing their own security and well-being.” The U.S.–Filipino relationship was to be reexamined. Romulo stated that the United States “served us, but not too well.... They promoted our interests to a limited extent, but not enough to justify the almost unlimited advantages that accrued to others at the cost of our own self-reliance and initiative.” Senator Diokno stated that the American diplomatic pressure that got PHILCAG into Vietnam (among other grievances) was proof that America did not support Philippine aspirations. Salvador P. Lopez, the Philippine Ambassador to the United States, warned that a power vacuum would be left in the wake of an American withdrawal from Vietnam, and that, although the Philippines had been a loyal ally since World War II, it would consider closer future relations with both the Soviet Union and China.

When he visited Washington in April 1969 for the funeral of former President Eisenhower, Marcos met with President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. Marcos stated that he felt the Philippines would be a more effective force if it withdrew PHILCAG and concentrated on helping the South Vietnamese develop an “effective constabulary force.” He offered to conduct training programs in the Philippines, which Kissinger took under consideration.

Facing continued political opposition at home, in conjunction with a new foreign policy with respect to communist nations, commitment to the cause of South Vietnam began to wane for President Marcos. By November 1969, Marcos had ordered PHILCAG’s removal from Vietnam, leaving only the original PHILCON medical units as a Filipino representative of the “more flags” program. With this

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61 American Embassy, Manila to Secretary of State, 29 November 1968, Subject Numeric Files 1967–1969, RG 59, NA II.
63 Quoted in ibid.
64 Ibid., 54-5.
dramatic change to Filipino policy, and with the new Nixon administration in the
United States utilizing a policy of “Vietnamization,” the concern with the “more
flags” program was greatly diminished. The Philippines began a Vietnamization
program of its own, with withdrawals of men rapidly increasing from year to year.
By late 1972, a mere 71 officers and enlisted men remained in Vietnam as Marcos
declared martial law, ostensibly to protect the Philippines from the same communist
threat faced in Vietnam.  

The Philippines’ loss of their youth to the ravages of the war in Vietnam was
relatively small when compared to the other Free World nations. Nine men were
killed in action, and four died from “other causes” from the period of 1964-1973. The
final remnants of a Philippine presence in Vietnam finally came home in March,
1973. Shortly after the collapse of the South Vietnamese government, Marcos stated
that South Vietnam could have fared better if it had relied on its own will and
strength rather than that of another. While directly a reference to the United States,
this statement managed to refute all of his previous statements that served as a
rallying cry for Filipino intervention in aid of South Vietnam.

The years of support for the government of South Vietnam, the years of
supporting the “free world,” the years of communist opposition—all this was
forgotten when diplomatic relations were established with the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam in 1976. In early January 1978, new economic, scientific, and technical
agreements were made between the two former enemies. Marcos described the event
as a “historic record of the growing friendship and cooperation between the two
countries and proof of the sincere intentions of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for
the maintenance of peace, friendship and freedom in Southeast Asia.” For the
Philippines, the war was over.

The attempt by the United States government to add an Asian face to an
obviously American endeavor was, ultimately, a failure. Not only had South
Vietnam fallen, but relationships with allied nations were strained. While the U.S.
did recruit representation from various Asian nations, this representation ultimately
did not change the course of the war. For the Filipinos, PHILCAG would not be
celebrated in years to come. Entrance into the Vietnam conflict was hotly contested,
and departure came quickly. What will linger in memory, despite the
accomplishments that were achieved on the ground, was the fact that the Philippines

66 American Embassy, Manila to Department of State, 21 April, 1970 in The Presidential Papers of
Ferdinand Marcos, File no. 5125, National Library, Manila, Philippines, 1.
67 Rodolfo C. Valenzuela, Administrative Officer, to ACoFs, J1, “Report of Philippines Casualties,” 24
June 1972, FWMAO Admin Office, RG 472, NA II.
played a subservient role to America in a losing effort. The fear of communism that had permeated Filipino government remained, but communist neighbors were received with open economic arms. Just as the fiasco that was Vietnam came into perspective for the two nations, the Philippines fell into years of military rule under Marcos’ martial law.
Abstract

The History of Communism in Palestine/Israel since its foundation in 1919 to the present day is hotly debated among Zionist, Palestinian, and cultural historians. The main issue in contention between the historians of the PKP (Palestine Communist Party) and MKI (Israeli Communist Party) was the relationship between Palestinians and Jews within the Party; this article wishes to add a new point of view to this debate. It argues that an examination of the language, symbolism, and rituals that the Jewish Communists developed to describe their Palestinian comrades and Palestinians at large resulted in the creation of an affirmative and positive view of them, but that at the same time, the Jewish Communists did not fully appreciate the power of Palestinian nationalism. This myopic understanding of Palestinian national feelings was one of the reasons underlying the 1965 split of the MKI and Banki (Young Israeli Communist League).

Introduction

Jewish–Arab fraternity was one of the main elements of Israeli Communist ideology. Jewish Communists defined it as joint political action of Arabs and Jews against reaction and imperialism, as well as personal and social interaction among people of both groups. This article deals with the way the Jewish Communists of the Israeli Community Party (MKI) perceived their Palestinian–Israeli comrades and Palestinians in Israel, from the foundation of the Jewish–Arab MKI and the State of Israel in 1948 until 1965, when the MKI was split, mainly across national fault lines.¹

By analyzing the language, symbolism, and rituals that the Jewish Communists developed, this article will argue that, while the Jewish Communists developed an affirmative and positive view of their Palestinian–Israeli comrades, at the same time they did not fully appreciate the power of Palestinian nationalism and the effect of the *Nakba* (Arabic: “disaster,” the Palestinian name for the 1948 war) on their Palestinian comrades. This myopic understanding of Palestinian nationalism was one of the reasons underlying the 1965 split of the MKI and Banki (Young Israeli Communist League).

The article moves along three thematic axes, all of which follow the history of the Party and Banki from 1948 to 1965. The first axis deals with the language created to describe Palestinians by the Jewish Communists. The second portrays the symbols used by the Jewish Communists to describe the link between Arabs and Jews. These sections will be followed by an analysis of the instructional material used by Banki to instill in its members the values of Jewish–Arab fraternity. We will argue that the instructors’ brochures used in this capacity were textual sites, where the language and symbolism of Jewish–Arab fraternity were applied to create solidarity between Arabs and Jews. The third axis will describe the rituals developed by the Jewish Communists to celebrate Jewish–Arab fraternity.

The scholarly effort dealing with Communism in Palestine/Israel is dominated by the analysis of relations between Arabs and Jews within the Communist Party. Zionist scholars and Palestinian nationalist scholars have debated those relations extensively. Both schools present contrasting arguments. Zionist historians argue that the turn of the Party towards Palestine’s Arabs failed. Palestinian historians claim that the Arabization of the Party produced a Palestinian

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2 The term *Nakba* was coined by Constantin Zureiq, a Syrian Professor at the American University of Beirut, in 1948. See Constantin Zureiq, “Mashma’ut Hasho’a Mehadash” [The New Meaning of Nakba], in Yehosafat Harkabi, *Lekah Ha’aravim Mitvusatam* [The Arabs’ Lessons from Their Defeat] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), 184-210.

nationalized Communism, a precursor of 1970s Palestinian nationalism. A third school of cultural historians argues that Palestinians and Jews were part of the shared political cultural discourse, which, although filled with schisms and misunderstandings, shared common concepts. This article wishes to take the work of the cultural historians and make it more nuanced, analyzing the cultural categories which Jewish Communists used to view their Palestinian counterparts.

It is important to place the discussion about the history of Arab–Jewish relations in the MKI within the historical context of Communist history from the early 1920s, the founding years of Communism in Palestine, to 1948. This was a troubled history. The way Jewish Communists viewed their Palestinian comrades had its roots in the Communism in Palestine of this period. Jewish Communists campaigned against the exclusion of Palestinians from the workplace and the economy. They struggled against the dispossession of Palestinians from their land. But despite their desire to forge alliances with the Palestinian national movement, Jewish Communists, in essence, viewed Arabs and Jews as part of a joint anti-imperialist struggle that surpassed their national identities. For instance, a 1932 booklet issued by the Palestine Young Communist League called upon Jewish youth to join forces with the Arab youth. Common interests necessitated joint struggle,

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6 See for example a handbill of the Jewish Section from the 1930s calling “to struggle against ‘the alliance for defending Hebrew products!’” in “Understanding between the Peoples,” Lavon Institute for Labour Research, IV-445-2.


8 For the attempts of the PKP to from alliance with parts of AI-Istiqlal Party, see: Weldon C. Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Ruth Lubitz, Baharti Lihyoit Bena’avak [I Chose a Life of Struggle] (Tel-Aviv: Hasher Publishers, 1985), 112.

with the text posing a rhetorical question: “Is it true that the paths of the Jewish and Arab youths are separate... The fate of the masses of toiling Arab youth is your fate, his struggle your struggle, and his victory your victory.” This internationalist view, as subversive as it was to the ethnic order forming in Palestine, hindered Jewish Communists from fully engaging with Palestinian nationalism, as successive splits in the Party (1937–1940, 1943–1965) would show.

**The Language of Jewish–Arab Fraternity**

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War changed the demographic makeup of Palestine. In the conflict, the well-organized and well-funded Israeli armed forces managed to break the uncoordinated Palestinian resistance and to repel the invasion of the armies of the Arab League. In the wake of the Israeli victory in the war, the majority of the Palestinian population of Palestine was expelled beyond the borders of the Jewish State in what amounts to ethnic cleansing. The Palestinians who remained in Israel became a minority in a Jewish state. Palestinian Communists lost their base of power within the Arab working class that dispersed beyond the borders. Loyal to the Soviet Union, the Arab Communists supported the UN Partition Plan and objected to the Arab States’ invasion of Palestine. For that position, they were persecuted in the territories under the Arab armies’ control. They fared no better at the hands of the new Israeli authorities. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) did not distinguish between Palestinians of different political leanings and arrested Arab Communists, at times re-arresting those who had been detained by the Arab armies. After the British closed its newspaper and its power base was dispersed—branded as traitors by the Palestinians and suspected by the Israelis of subversion—the National Liberation League (NLL), which was the organization of the Palestinian Communists founded after the 1943 split from the bi-national Palestine Communist Party (PKP), sought to reunite with the Jewish Communists. Jewish Communists who had taken part in the Israeli war effort were now willing to restore the bi-national makeup of the Party.

The reunification of Arab and Jewish Communists sparked new discussions about Palestinians among the Jewish Communists. They spoke of the unification in the language of Marx–Leninist internationalism. At the celebratory Party Central Committee meeting marking the unification, all the speakers devoted their remarks

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10 Ibid.
12 For detailed account of the persecution of the NLL and other Arab Communist Parties and their support for partition, see Ben Zaken, *Komunizem Ke’imperializem Tarbuti*, 153-214.
Amir Locker-Biletzki

to attacks on Western imperialism. The issue of Kol Ha’am (The People’s Voice, the Party’s newspaper) on the day of the unification featured attacks against imperialism using similar Marxist internationalist language. The editorial titled “On the Agenda” accused the “British and American Imperialists, served by the reaction of the invading Arab States” of causing war.13 The act of unification was celebrated as part “of a joint and coordinated political struggle against the external imperialist enemy.”14 The present bloodshed was to stand in contrast to the “daily and historical interest of both peoples.”15

The same Marxist–Leninist language was used by the Jewish Party leaders in their speeches at the Central Committee Plenum of October 1948. In her opening speech, Politburo member Esther Vilenska stated that the unification was “symbolic of the great chance of Jewish–Arab victory over the imperialist enemy.”16 In a lengthy speech entitled “The Road to Victory,” Party general secretary, Shmuel Mikunis, placed the struggle in Palestine/Israel in its international context as part of the struggle between “the black forces of imperialism” and the “representatives of victorious Socialism and popular democracy.” As for the 1948 war, “the events in Eretz-Israel from November 29, 1947 prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Anglo-American imperialism bears direct responsibility for the violation of peace and bloodshed.”17 The Arab leaders of the unified Party, Emile Habibi and Tawfik Toubi, used the same Marxist–Leninist and internationalist language; clearly this discourse was shared by Arab and Jewish Communists.18

The use of Marxist–Leninist concepts was a continuation of elements that had been part of Communist discourse before 1948. This usage imparted the view that Arabs and Jews had a joint common interest fighting imperialism beyond their national identities. However, despite its inclusionary assertions, this view disregarded but could not really mask the national agency of the Palestinian Communists joining the MKI. Behind the scenes of the unified party existed—as the historian Eli Rekhess described it—“deep political disputes” between the Palestinian and Jewish leaders that would tear apart Party unity.19 As early as 1951, Emile Habibi demanded that in the parts that Israel occupied beyond the 1947 Partition borders,

13 “On the Agenda, With the Unification,” Kol Ha’am, October 22, 1948.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 “The Road to Victory,” Kol Ha’am, October 24, 1948.
“the MKI [would] continue to be named the National Liberation League,” thus retaining its separate Palestinian identity.  

Nonetheless, despite the continued use of Marxist terminology to describe the relations between Arab and Jews, the 1948 war had changed the discourse. The first element to be added was advocacy on behalf of the Palestinian minority. The Communists in Palestine had been involved in advocating Arab rights since 1924. Yet until 1948, this advocacy had been on behalf of the majority of the country’s inhabitants, albeit one struggling against and increasingly powerful minority. The Palestinians who remained in Israel after the Nakba were reduced to the status of a humiliated minority ruled by a military government. Already in the early stages of the 1948 war, the Jewish Communists had shielded the Palestinians left in the new state’s territory. The advocacy for Palestinian–Israelis’ rights was more pronounced in the speeches made at the unity conference in Haifa. Resorting to the language of democratic civil rights, Vilenska’s opening speech vowed “to fight so the new state will wipe away every manifestation of discrimination from its boundaries, and will be a home and motherland to all its citizens regardless of race, nationality and faith.” Mikunis did not shy away from condemning the Israeli government’s “antidemocratic policy against Israeli–Arabs,” blaming it for creating “ghettos for Arabs in the cities.”

The 1950s and early 1960s were marked by an intense public struggle by the MKI and Banki on behalf of the Palestinian–Israeli citizens. The Palestinians in Israel in the aftermath of the 1948 war suffered from oppression in the form of military government. Stunned by military defeat and the results of ethnic cleansing, they were a persecuted, frightened minority in a state not of their own choosing. In this oppressive context, the Communist Party treated its own members equally, according to the values of Jewish–Arab fraternity, and advocated on behalf of the

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21 Ibid., 30.
22 On the attempt by Zionist colonizers to colonize Arab lands near Afula and the assistance the Communists gave the Arab peasants, see: Israeli, Mapas–Pey.Ka.Pey.–Maki, 31-34; Dothan, Adumim, 23.
26 For the state of the Palestinians in Israel after 1948 and the changes that followed in later years, see: Rekhess, The Arab Minority in Israel; Ilana Kaufman, Arab National Communism in the Jewish State (Jacksonville: University Press of Florida, 1997).
wider Arab populace in order to promote equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel. The Jewish Communists' main aim was to end the military government imposed on the Palestinian–Israelis after the 1948 war. Seeking to attract audiences outside the MKI and the Banki, and abiding by the rules of the Israelis political democratic system, the Jewish Communists phrased their appeals for Jewish–Arab fraternity in the language of civic rights. In that sense, the Communists struggled to instill democratic values within Israeli democracy. At the same time, they appealed to Jewish morality and historical sensibilities after the Holocaust.

Wall posters and handbills from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s reveal the use of language about democratic and Jewish values in the day-to-day struggles of Banki and the MKI. Handbills appealed to democratic sensibilities by describing the arbitrary arrests of Arabs and the disruption of their daily lives. A 1955 handbill of the Israeli Young Communist League told the story of Reziek Abdu, a twenty-year-old from Nazareth, who was arrested, not given a trial at first, and remained incarcerated even after a court found him not guilty. The handbill sharply criticized the use of British Emergency Laws used to put down the “struggle of the masses of the people and youth against the British mandate government.” One of the high points of the Communist struggle on behalf of the Palestinian–Israelis came at the time of the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, which occurred in the context of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, when Palestinian–Israelis were placed under curfew. A group of workers who worked in the fields of the village Kafr Qasim were not informed about the curfew hour and arrived late; they were killed by an Israeli border police unit. At first the Israeli authorities tried to cover up the event, but the massacre was disclosed to the public by Party leader Tawfik Toubi in a Knesset speech, tens of thousands of copies of which “were distributed by Banki members across the country, in houses and public places.” A wall poster a year later called for a public rally in commemoration of the massacre. The massacre also served to highlight other wrongs done to the Palestinian–Israelis. A handbill of the Israeli Young Communist League entitled, in allusion to the biblical story of Cain and Abel, The Blood Cries Out from the Ground, condemned the government’s failure to investigate a series of Arab children’s death from discarded ammunition against the backdrop of “the horrible murder trial in Kafr Qasim.”

27 “The Movement needed to act as part of a wider protest front, which would be shared by intellectuals, social and economic figures, who were not necessarily identified with the views of Communist Party,” writes Markovizky, Hultsa Levana Aniva Aduma, 97.
28 Yad Tabenkin Archives, “Why is Reziek Abdu still in jail? The Israeli Communist League, June 13, 1955.” Documents from the Yad Tabenkin Archives without file numbers are not catalogued and were given to the author by the archive director.
29 Ibid.
30 Markovizky, Hultsa Levana Aniva Aduma, 103.
31 Yad Tabenkin Archives “The Blood Cries out from the Ground, November 17, 1957.” Not catalogued.
The May Day 1958 clash in Nazareth between Arab demonstrators and the Israeli police was another notable event in the Communist struggle on behalf of Palestinian–Israelis. Led by the local Communist branch, the demonstrators marched without the permission of the military government authorities and were attacked by large police forces. The mass arrests and widespread repression that followed were strongly condemned by Jewish Communists, and again they used the language of democratic rights and Jewish morality in their struggle. A wall poster from May 1958 tried to debunk the official version of the events in Nazareth. It ended with a cry appealing to Jewish collective memory of the Holocaust and national pride: “Jews! Will you sit quietly by while the persecution of the Arabs continues? Will the Jewish people who came out of the ghetto—agree to a ghetto for the Arabs? The detainees must be returned to their families! The military government that shames our national honour must be abolished! Jew, speak up!”

Jewish Communists’ advocacy on behalf of Palestinian–Israelis continued well into the late 1950s and the early 1960s (and persists to the present day). A 1962 handbill that called for a meeting of Jewish and Arab youth asserts that “the campaign to end the military government is getting wider and stronger than ever.” By that point the Communists, using language that was shared by a wide range of Israelis, had managed to mobilize parties from the left and right to agitate for the abolition of the military government. The civic democratic concepts that Jewish Communists used as the language of struggle against the treatment of Palestinian–Israelis had, as in the case of the use of Marxism–Leninism, created a positive view of Palestinian–Israelis. However, this language also masked Palestinian nationalism. The limitation of this discourse can even be seen through literature. In the novel A Locked Room, a young Arab Communist becomes disillusioned with the Party’s stand on Palestinians. In an argument with his local branch secretary, which effectively brings his membership in the Party to an end, he says: “The Arabs in Israel are not Blacks who want equal status with the white man!” He accuses the Party of “disregarding the national aspect; the Arabs in Israel are part of a people that were driven out of their land, whose lands were stolen, so that they became a people of refugees.”

The Symbolism of Jewish–Arab Fraternity

The first symbolic expression of Jewish–Arab fraternity in the post-1948 era appeared in an article in Kol Ha’am. It was a handshake motif symbolizing the joining together of the Arab and Jewish Communists, under the distinctly Communist

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32 Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 17-18, “The Truth about Nazareth, Tel-Aviv, May, 1958.”

33 Yad Tabenkin Archives, “Public Appeal to the Secondary Students!” Not catalogued.

symbols of the Hammer and Sickle and the Red Star. The captions, in Arabic and Hebrew, provided the local context: “The Unification of the Jewish and Arab Communists.”

The foremost symbol of Jewish–Arab fraternity from the 1950s to the mid-1960s was the Jewish–Arab duo, an image consisting of figures of an Arab and a Jew shaking hands or standing shoulder to shoulder. Its root lay in Soviet Socialist realism, one example of which is Vera Mokinah’s 1936 statue The Industrial Worker and the Kolkhoz Worker. The statue juxtaposes two opposites, city and country, industry and agriculture, man and woman, uniting them under the symbol of the Hammer and Sickle. The Jewish Communist model adapted the same motif to the local Israeli landscape, depicting the Palestinian either dressed in traditional Arab peasant clothing or marked by just a keffiyeh and the Jewish figure dressed in European style. The image of the Arab and the background in which it is portrayed might be construed as paternalistic and Orientalist. However, this image of the traditional keffiyeh-clad Palestinian was to also be part of Palestinian national iconography. For example, a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) poster from 1980, issued in Lebanon for Land Day, depicts a Palestinian peasant traditionally dressed with a keffiyeh and holding a pickaxe; the background is terraced village representing the landscape of rural Palestine. Although a direct influence is hard to establish, it is not impossible that some Communist images were shared between Palestinian nationalism and Communism.

As early as 1947, in a Banki poster for a youth meeting for joint Jewish–Arab action against the British, the Jewish–Arab duo appears hacking their way through British barbed wire. The Arab is dressed in traditional Arab peasant garments. The Jewish figure is wearing European clothes.

In a wall poster announcing Banki’s national peace camp in 1951, the centre of the picture is occupied by three figures. Two are manifestly Jewish, and the third is an Arab wearing a keffiyeh. A photograph taken in Ramla in 1951 provides another take on the motif of the Jewish–Arab duo. It again shows two men, one an Arab wearing a keffiyeh, the other a Jew dressed European-style. The two are photographed

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35 See “On the Agenda, With the Unification,” Kol Ha’am, October 22, 1948.
39 Banki and MKI poster collection, Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 17-18.
from below, blowing trumpets, two Red Flags waving above them. The influence of
Soviet artistic motifs is evident in the heroic stance of the two figures, which is
reminiscent of A. Rodchenko’s 1930 Socialist-Realist photograph of “The Pioneer
Trumpeter.”

The fusion of Soviet and local symbolism is perhaps best illustrated by a 1953
postcard that was distributed for the Bucharest Festival of Students and Youth. It
shows an Arab and a Jewish figure, contrasted by their dress. The Jewish youth is
holding the national flag. Below them appear idealized scenes of settlements with
water towers, tents and palm trees. The Jewish–Arab duo is stretching out their
hands over a globe to a group of youths dressed in clothes representing the world’s
continents. Behind them wave flags adorned with the peace dove and the symbol of
the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and banners with the words
Pea ce and F rien dship. Jewish–Arab fraternity had become an integral part of
Communist internationalism.

The symbolic language created by the Jewish Communists to signify their
alliance with Palestinian–Israeli Communists contained many diverse, sometimes
contradicting motifs. Orientalist elements obscured the Palestinian as the carrier of
modern secular nationalism. They reduced him to the image of the traditional
peasant in contrast to the advanced European Jew. At the same time, alongside the
Orientalist elements, other images of the Jewish–Arab duo presented the Palestinian
as youthful, modernized and dynamic. These showed him as part of an egalitarian
alliance of Jews and Arabs. As was the case of the language used by the Jewish
Communists, the symbolism of Jewish–Arab fraternity married together an
affirmative and egalitarian view of Palestinians while blurring their national agency.

Language and Symbolism: Arabs in the Eyes of Jewish Communists

Jewish Communists conversed with their Palestinian comrades in the
language of Marxist internationalism. To advocate the case of the oppressed
Palestinian minority in Israel to wider audiences, they used the language of Jewish
historical sensibilities and democratic civic rights. At the same time, to the Jewish

41 Photograph courtesy of Mr. Yoram Gozansky, February 23, 2009.
42 “Exhibition: ‘Alexander Rodchenko – Revolution in Photography’ at Fotomuseum Winterthur,
rodchenko-revolution-in-photography-at-fotomuseum-winterthur-zurich/.
43 The “Blue and White” was used in order to signify Israel as it merged into internationalist world
Communism. Undoubtedly there was a contradiction inherent in the fact that an Israeli flag was
depicted alongside descriptions of the very people on the ruins of whose society Israel came to
existence. However, as in the case of the traditional Arab garb, this was meant to signify an Israeli
locality outside of its Zionist context.
44 For the way the contrast between the European Jew and the Oriental Palestinian was constructed see
Communists, especially in the Banki, attempts at understanding Arabs were an important part of their educational work. In instructors’ brochures created in the aftermath of the 1956 Sinai campaign in January 1957, young Jewish Communists were encouraged to learn about and discuss the Palestinian people. These documents were sites where the elements of the language and symbolism of Jewish–Arab fraternity found expression.

The cover of one brochure, entitled *We and Our Neighbours*, showed another variation on the theme of the Arab–Jewish duo. They held each other’s shoulders and shook hands, symbolizing the unity of Arabs and Jews. The background consisted of a Jewish settlement and an Arab desert dwelling. It displayed all the elements of Communist symbolism. The Jews were European and urbanized, while the Arab was depicted as a desert dweller on a background of tents. The egalitarian stand of the meeting of the two opposites was also shown in the stance of the two archetypical figures shaking hands and holding each other’s shoulders. The brochure itself was made up of three stories dealing with Jewish–Arab relations from the pre-1948 period to the then-current struggle against the military government. Each story was followed by points for a discussion after reading. The brochure ended with a discussion about the future way to peace.

The aim of the brochure was not only “to give deep and convincing explanations of the reasons for the conflict and the way to peacefully resolve it,” but also “to root out from children’s hearts the fear, hate and nationalistic arrogance toward the Arab people and nurture in their hearts friendship, trust and the desire for peace,” to be achieved by studying the history and current affairs of the Palestinians. In recounting the history of the clash between Arabs and Jews in pre-1948 Palestine, the brochure reverted to the language of anti-imperialism. Jewish–Arab relations in the pre-1948 era had been “neighbourly and friendly.” The conflict in 1948 was not fuelled by the peoples themselves, but by the “British who set Arabs and Jews against each other.” As the two oppressed peoples’ struggle for freedom intensified, a solution had been offered in the form of the UN Partition Plan. The 1948 war was described, again in anti-Imperialist terms, as an attack “by the Arab States that were incited and organized by the British... that wanted to prevent the Jews and Arabs from establishing their own independent states.”

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45 “We and our Neighbours” was the name of a series of instructors’ brochures used to help Banki members to understand the Arab peoples in the neighbouring countries. See Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 31, March 1957, “We and our Neighbours, The Egyptian People”, and “We and our Neighbours The Jordanian People, October, 1957”, Lavon Institute for Labour Research, IV-104-85-7. There was no evidence in the archive of brochures dealing with Lebanon, Syria, North African or Arab states.
46 Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 24, “Instructors’ Brochure, We and our Neighbours the Arab Eretz-Israeli People.”
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
made use of the language of Marxist–Leninist concepts to describe the history of the Palestinian–Zionist conflict.

In regards to the massive ethnic cleansing of Palestinians during the war, imperialism and the Israeli government were projected as the culprits. “Who caused most of Israel’s Palestinians to flee or be deported from the country during the war?” the brochure asked, and in answer it laid the blame squarely on “the English and the Arab rulers who incited them to flee and leave the country, and also the government of Israel that was interested in their departure.”

The mass deportation of Palestinians was perceived by the Jewish Communists as “a disaster for us Jews and for the Arab people” that created the refugee problem, a huge obstacle to Arab–Israeli peace. Despite the sympathetic tone struck in the brochure towards the plight of the Palestinians, the text did not refer to the national agency of the Palestinians, who were referred to, in what amounted to a gross denial, as the “Arab Eretz-Israeli People.”

The third discussion in the brochure deals with the military government. Here, in an internal document that was not intended for public consumption, Banki members use the language of appeal to Jewish sensibility. The military government was called a ghetto, and the policy toward the Palestinian citizenry of Israel described as “oppression, terror,” refuting its contribution to Israel’s security. The last discussion as concerned with peace, citing the conditions that would enable peace, the end of military government, and a “severing of the connections with the enslavers and oppressors hated by the peoples of the Middle East.”

Jewish–Arab Ritual

A 1962 Banki document stated that “the big national festivals of Jewish and Arab youth have become a fine tradition; they demonstrate the desire for fraternity and peace.”

Jewish–Arab fraternity was manifested, then, not only in the political struggle, but in rituals as well, like Party conferences and Jewish–Arab friendship festivals. In contrast to state sponsored rituals, these rites demonstrated the unity of the struggle among Palestinians and Jews and desire for Arab–Israeli peace. Starting

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50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
in the late 1940s, in the aftermath of the 1948 war, Jews and Palestinians engaged in performative events that tried to bond together both peoples.

There is no evidence of ritualistic activity manifesting Jewish–Arab fraternity in the underground era, during the years 1921–1941, when the Communist Party was deemed illegal and persecuted by the British and Zionists, and in the years leading up to 1948. The first documented mass ritual concerning Arabs and Jews was the unification ceremony in Haifa on October 22, 1948. The ceremony itself was not elaborate, consisting of speeches made to receive applause from the audience. The May Theater in Haifa was bedecked with Communist Red Flags; on either side of the stage stood the Israeli national flag and Red Flags. Between portraits of Lenin and Stalin stood the symbol of the convention, “a friendly handshake of brave hands—a symbol of friendly fraternity, the Hammer and Sickle.”

The hall was also decorated with slogans of Stalin and various others “that set the appropriate atmosphere for the important historical event.” Despite its importance in the Party’s collective memory, however, the unification ceremony did not give rise to any ritualistic tradition among the Jewish and Arab Communists.

The first Jewish–Arab youth festival took place in 1949 on Mount Carmel overlooking Haifa. It lasted for five days and included sports events and exhibitions on such themes as Banki’s history, the achievements of the U.S.S.R., and the casualties of the 1948 war. The high point of the festival was a joint march of Arab and Jewish youths, the biggest in the country to that date.

The next well-documented festival celebrating Jewish–Arab fraternity was held in April 1955 in Tel-Aviv, against the background of escalating border skirmishes between Israel and its neighbours that led to the 1956 Sinai Campaign. It was an elaborate enterprise whose aim was “to instill among youth the idea of fraternity and friendship,” and extensive preparations for it took place. A series of artistic balls were held in Arab and Jewish towns, including choirs, dance troupes, and local festivals that included sports events and artistic performances. The preparations included public meetings at workplaces and schools where the idea of the festival was explained. Organizers and Jewish youth also travelled to Nazareth and to Arab villages, and badges emblazoned with the festival symbol were distributed. The mass nature of the event is evident from the fact that around 12,000 people participated in the pre-festival ball and another 20,000 received the badges.

57 Ibid.
58 Leah Babko, interview by Amir Locker-Biletzki, Tel-Aviv, February 12, 2009.
59 Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 1, “The Festival of Friendship.”
60 The number of participants is derived from the Communist daily, Kol Ha’am, but under the military government, it is highly unlikely that the numbers were that high. However, the sheer volume of coverage the festival was accorded in Kol Ha’am indicates that it was an important mass event.
The festival itself began on Monday, April 4, 1955, when the participants, Jews and Arabs, congregated in Tel-Aviv. A rally was held in the evening, to which torch rallies came from all over the country. The next day was dedicated to movies and an afternoon ball, consisting of artistic performances and songs by the Party’s choirs. In the evening the festival participants sailed on the Yarkon River and held a bonfire party on its banks. The last day of the festival started with sports events followed by a symposium, entitled *Culture in the Service of Peace*. The festival ended with a march to Independence Park.\(^{61}\)

Two photos of the marches held during the festival adhere to what had become the conventions of Jewish Communist representation of Jewish–Arab fraternity. The first showed a group of two young men and two young women standing in front of banners. The men were wearing *keffiyehs*, and the women were garbed in European clothes. One man was holding a peace dove in one hand and the symbol of the festival in the other. The symbol consisted of two profiled figureheads, one an Arab wearing a *keffiyeh*, the other a Jew. A second photo showed young men and women marching past watching bystanders. The group in the foreground consisted of four young Arabs, three of them dressed in traditional peasant clothing; the fourth was dressed in the Banki uniform and playing a flute. Behind them, a group of Jewish girls were holding up a banner.\(^{62}\)

These series of images represented the idealized symbolic image that the Jewish Communists had created in regards to Palestinians. The symbolic world these images created made Arabs and Jews, young men and women, into harmonious partners in the struggle for peace. These images presented a vision that Communists had of a society where Arabs and Jews lived in peace, a projection of the future as it was depicted in the images. The photographs, as well as other visual images, also showed the stereotypical way Palestinians were perceived, as traditional and peasant in contrast to the modernized European Jew. At the same time, though, some of these images presented the Arab as proud, young, and dynamic. In all the images derived from the friendship festival, there was an attempt to present the national agency of Palestinians as separate from the partnership with Jews. As with other cultural practices of the Jewish Communists, the affirmative view of Palestinians was intermingled with a great deal of stereotyping.

\(^{61}\) Yad Tabenkin Archives File 1; “The Jewish Arab Youth Festival”; Published in, *Kol Hanoar*, April 1955,

Interestingly, however, the brochure produced for the festival made a conscious effort to avoid Communist language and to demonstrate the wide-ranging support of artists and intellectuals. Although some of the signatories to the festival manifesto were identified Communists, others were not. The manifesto itself was worded in terms of Israel’s enlightened self-interest “to break the wall of isolation enclosing it.”

The brochure stressed the historical cases of coexistence of Muslims and Jews, paralleling current Arab and Jewish relations. It also quoted a decorated Jewish 1948 war veteran and an Eastern Orthodox priest in support of the ideas of Israel–Arab peace and Jewish–Arab fraternity.

**Jewish–Arab Communitas**

The rituals that enshrined Jewish–Arab fraternity in the MKI and Banki were meant to bond together Arabs and Jews. The symbolism of Communist Jewish–Arab fraternity was filled with representation of bonding. As we have seen, the Jewish–Arab pairs so prevalent in the Communist literature were often depicted shoulder to shoulder, holding each other’s shoulders or shaking hand.

The group bonding of Arabs and Jews is clearly evident in a wall poster produced for the 1955 festival, which showed a group of Arab and Jewish youths of mixed gender. The Arabs were identified by their keffiyehs and head coverings. All were standing in a close group, bonded together as one. In this poster, a rare representation of a mixed-gender group of Arabs and Jewish youth, the artist Gershon Knispel presented his subjects distinctively by the keffiyehs worn by the Arab figures. However, at the same time, they were presented as young and modernized. Another poster produced for May Day 1954 features three figures, two men and a woman. The two men repeated the motif of the often seen Jewish–Arab duo, one of them bareheaded, the other wearing a keffiyeh. In allusion to proletarian internationalism, all three figures carried work tools in their hands. Above them, a banner in Hebrew and Arabic proclaimed Long Live May Day 1954, a red Hammer and Sickle flag waving beside it. These posters clearly showed how the Jewish

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63 Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 1, “The Festival of Friendship.”

64 The concept of *communitas* is derived from the British anthropologist Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process*, 94-131. It is used here as an interpretive concept to analyze the effects of the rituals performed by Jews and Arabs between 1948 and 1965.

Communitas arose from a state of liminality between and betwixt the social hierarchy. Suitable conditions for a state of liminality were created in the rituals surrounding Communist Jewish–Arab fraternity. The sites of the festivals in 1949 and 1955, Mount Carmel and the Yarkon River respectively, placed the participants at the liminal margins of the urban centres and outside the social order these implied. The participants’ status within Israel’s social structure was also liminal. The Jewish Banki members were marginalized in Jewish–Israeli society, suspected and despised as the left-wing other. The Arab members of Banki were alienated from Israeli society as the Palestinian other, connected to the enemy beyond the territorial borders of the state. This meeting of the marginalized was meant to alleviate the continued tension between Arabs and Jews within Israel and in the region. The escalating conflict along the borders was constantly contrasted to the festival atmosphere: “Night after night the borders are set on fire; the fire of guns and mortars, mines and grenades, the fire of hate and alienation... but on a spring day, a bright spring day, joyful and promising, on this day—another fire was lit along the land’s borders, in all four directions: the fire of friendship and peace.”

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66 Yad Tabenkin Archives, File 1, “The Jewish–Arab Youth Festival”; Published in, Kol Hanoar, April 1955.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 The term is derived from Turner, The Ritual Process, 94-131.
70 Ibid.
A rare photo from the 1949 Jewish–Arab Friendship Festival showed the MKI general secretary, Shmuel Mikunis, seated among a group of Arab and Jewish youth. To the unknowing onlooker, the participants may have looked the same. One boy was playing a flute. Others were dressed in the Banki uniform. One girl who was looking straight at the cameras wore a *keffiyeh*.\(^{71}\) In many ways this photograph represented what the Jewish members of MKI and Banki tried to create: a bond between Jews and Arabs that would transcend the national identities of Palestinian–Israelis and Jewish–Israelis.

**Conclusion**

Between the years 1948 and 1965 Jewish Communists developed cultural practices that were to shape their view of Palestinian–Israelis. In language, symbol and ritual, the Jewish Communists developed a positive and affirmative stereotype of Palestinian–Israelis. Fusing together local Israeli, Jewish, and Marxist–Leninist elements, the Jewish Communists created an image of the Palestinian as a traditional peasant as well as a modernized youth. They used a language of Marxist–Leninist concepts to describe Palestinians as partners in an anti-imperialist struggle. They celebrated their alliance with Palestinian–Israelis in rites that were meant to bond Arabs and Jews beyond their national identities. The Palestinians and the Arab peoples at large were a subject of study, mainly in the Banki. Instructors’ brochures that were used to further the intellectual understanding of Arabs were textual sites where the symbolism and language of Jewish–Arab fraternity were used as tools to create a political understanding of and solidarity with the Palestinians. However, despite the affirmative view of Palestinians by the Jewish Communists in all their cultural practices, they did not fully comprehend the experience of loss of a homeland. The *Nakba* was blamed on British imperialism and, to an extent, the Israeli government. But its impact on shaping Palestinian nationalism, and indeed Palestinian agency as such, were absent from the Jewish Communists’ awareness.

In the end, the misunderstanding of Palestinian nationalism was at the heart of the 1965 split of the MKI. This split was a part of a general breakup of Marxist organizations in the Middle East. The Zionist Marxist United Workers Party (MAPAM) and the Egyptian Communists, as well as the MKI, could not contend

with the allure of nationalism, so their organizational integrity was compromised. After the 1965 split, as the Jewish MKI disintegrated into the Zionist left, the predominately Palestinian–Israeli New Communist List (RAKAH) brought to the fore the process the MKI started in the 1950s, forming the Palestinian–Israelis into an ethno-national community. With the stress on Palestinian–Israelis as the base of Communism in Israel, Jewish–Arab fraternity became less pronounced in RAKAH ideology, and a more attentive approach to Palestinian nationalism appeared. Indeed, the Communists were among the first in Israel to make contact with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s.

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72 See Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?*, 204-255.
73 For that process see Kaufman, *Arab National Communism in the Jewish State*; for a detailed history of RAKAH see Rekhess, *The Arab Minority in Israel*. 

*Little Rock: Race and Resistance at Central High School* is a detailed account of the events surrounding the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Written by Karen Anderson, the work looks beyond the integration attempt and President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to deploy the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock. Instead, Anderson offers readers the entire story, showing that the events surrounding the school’s decision to integrate were as important as the integration itself. Anderson argues that through the integration of Central High School, Little Rock became the site for the beginning of class-conscious thought about race, which would eventually result in the creation of a “color blind” law in the South as well as the rest of the United States long after the *Brown v. Board of Education* court decision (8).

Following a detailed introduction, the first chapter looks at the beginning stages of the Little Rock school desegregation, looking at desegregation attempts in other parts of Arkansas as well as Governor Faubus’ plan to prevent integration at all costs. This sets the stage for the remainder of the work, showing that despite the *Brown* decision, integration would not be easy. Chapter 2 looks at the plans of local segregationists to prevent integration, highlighting their specific concerns regarding desegregation by looking at the 1957 school year, specifically the month of September, from the first day of school through Eisenhower’s decision to deploy the 101st Airborne Division. The third chapter looks at the Mother’s League of Central High School and the decision to close the school before the start of the 1958-59 school year, providing insight into the power of middle-class white women in the area in regards to securing the school’s closure. Chapters 4 and 5 look at the political shifts in Little Rock that were revealed as the events at Central High continued to unravel. These chapters look at the blame placed on public school administrators by segregationists for allowing integration to occur. The final chapter offers an analysis of Central High following its reopening. The chapter looks at the continued integration of the Little Rock school district well into the 1960s. Lastly, the conclusion offers an analysis of the disappointments of the integration of Little Rock.

The work’s major strengths are Anderson’s attention to detail. The final product is a thorough analysis of the events which occurred, looking beyond the school’s integration. Readers learn that there is more to the story of Central High’s integration than is often taught and that decisions regarding the school’s integration were not made overnight. Anderson supports her thesis by showing readers that events which occurred in Little Rock before and after the integration of Central High are perhaps more important than the events of September 1957.
The one main critique of the work is that its analysis of the initial integration of Central High School in September 1957 is not as detailed as the rest of the work. Rather, it predominately focuses on the events that occurred as a result of the decision to integrate the school. Including a more detailed account would have made the work appeal to a wider audience.

Anderson consulted a variety of primary sources when writing the work. These include the personal papers of those involved, the *Arkansas Gazette* and the *New York Times*, as well as interviews with some of the key figures in the events. Lastly, Anderson consulted a variety of monographs and journal articles.

Anderson includes twelve images in her book, two emblems and ten photographs. Anderson’s use of images offers additional support to the written descriptions of the events. The one critique of the images is that Anderson chose to not place them throughout the work. The images would have made a bigger impact if they were referenced in the work where they were first described. For example, referencing the image of Hazel Bryan taunting Elizabeth Eckford outside of Central High on the first day of school would have been a powerful addition to Anderson’s description of the event (2, Figure 11).

The work is a thorough analysis of the events that occurred. Supporting her thesis, Anderson shows readers that following the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, the South and the rest of the United States saw the beginning of the idea of a “colorblind” law and that through the integration of Central High, Little Rock became the site for the beginning of a class-conscious thinking about race. This detailed analysis is an important piece of historiography on the subject.

Dawn Cioffoletti
Florida Gulf Coast University


*Not Fit for Our Society: Nativism and Immigration* by Peter Schrag explores the peculiar history of the American relationship with immigration and how the history of the country’s reaction to immigration helps to explain the modern problems facing the United States. As a nation known for the idea of the Great Melting Pot, America has harbored a long history of anti-immigration laws and societal organizations. Adding difficulty to the question of immigration is the question of citizenship, which is also discussed, complicating who is and who is not an “American.” As a German Jew
seeking refuge from Nazi Germany who finally made it to the United States on a transit visa to Mexico in 1941, Schrag brings a personal experience of immigration to his work.

This study discusses the earliest origins of American anti-immigration policies and attitudes. By doing this, Schrag illustrates the long history of American anti-immigration, hoping to instill in the reader the idea of a debate that is more than a few decades old. After quickly highlighting the colonial and early Republic years in the first chapter, he moves on to the major waves of migration to the United States, focusing on European and Asian migration in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Schrag discusses more than just political issues, including societal issues as well that have always plagued Americans.

Schrag discusses many major themes in anti-immigration and links them quite well to a recurring debate in American history. Among these themes are: the anti-Catholic movements; the scientific movements highlighted by the eugenics in the early twentieth century; and of course, the ever-present fear of job stealing. After spending a considerable portion of the book on the historical trends, Schrag finishes with a look at the present and a glimpse into a potential future for America. The final chapter delves into the idea that immigration, if embraced, can be the key to reviving American “Rust-Belt” cities. Schrag points to Toronto as a city thriving with the influx of immigrants, much to the envy of Great Lakes cities like Cleveland. It is in this chapter that Schrag discusses the modern fears of immigration in detail and soundly refutes these ideas by relating the ideas of previous generations shown in the preceding chapters.

The book does a good job of illustrating the longstanding difficulty Americans have had with immigration and the perception of immigration through anti-immigration laws and policies. Schrag links the historical treatment of the Irish, Germans, Italians, Jews, Chinese, and Japanese to the modern treatment of Hispanics with logical analysis, connecting current trends in politics to those found throughout the past two centuries. It is a well written work and is highly useful to scholars of immigration and the United States. Immigration, Schrag argues, is what built the United States into the country that stands today, and if embraced, it could be the key to a rebirth of American power.

Marc Sanko
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania

In Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations, author Howard Jones, Professor of History at the University of Alabama, details the often complex and largely interwoven diplomatic relations between the Union, the Confederacy, Great Britain, France, and, to some extent, Russia during the American Civil War. Ultimately, Jones proves that, although Confederate recognition from across the Atlantic seemed inevitable at time, the Lincoln administration proved to be the superior diplomats, which helped to secure a Union victory.

Jones gives purpose to his book in the epilogue by claiming that foreign relations have not been a well-researched and thoroughly analyzed theme of the war. Yet, diplomacy remained a vital issue—particularly during the first two years of fighting—in which both parties exhausted all attempts at establishing favorable relations with Great Britain and France. Unlike previously published works on the subject, Blue and Gray Diplomacy carefully combines the foreign relations of both the Union and the Confederacy with Europe to “fully convey the complicated underpinnings of a transatlantic diplomacy that had a major impact on the war’s outcome” (7).

To accomplish this task, Jones includes nine painstakingly researched chapters that detail the key issues confronted by emissaries, foreign ministers, and national leaders from all sides involved in diplomacy. The primary topics that the diplomats faced included: the role of slavery in the war; events involving international law; national economic interests; and humanitarian obligations. Jones reveals the diplomats’ positions on these topics through a multitude of primary materials located on both sides of the Atlantic, including individual papers and diaries, nineteenth-century periodicals, and manuscript materials from the United States Department of State. Jones excels at utilizing his sources to portray, analyze, and explain clearly the thought processes of leaders and diplomats.

Jones’s treatment of the implications of the Battle of Antietam and the subsequent issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation should be considered one of the author’s greatest contributions. Unlike the majority of Civil War historians, who conclude that the Emancipation Proclamation ended all hopes of European recognition of the Confederacy, Jones argues that “despite Lincoln’s high hopes, the Union victory at Antietam had combined with the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to encourage, rather than undermine, intervention” (234). The increased British fervor for intervention developed from the document’s reception in Europe as a last resort effort for Union victory. Palmerston and other British leaders interpreted the Emancipation Proclamation as an attempt to “stir up a
servile insurrection in a desperate attempt to defeat the Confederacy” (234). Not until the spring of 1863 did the British government realize that “the White House’s move against slavery, regardless of motive, had made intervention even more difficult to endorse” (282).

Ultimately, Jones proves that the threat of war with the United States served as the major factor in preventing European intervention during the Civil War. Lincoln and his Secretary of State William Seward threatened both the British and the French on numerous occasions that any form of intervention in United States domestic matters meant war with the Union. From 1861–1863, the Union Navy made significant technological advancements in ironclad warships that, according to the British, would have potentially destroyed any European wooden fleet. As Jones makes evident in his conclusion, the Confederacy had nothing that “either the British or the French considered so vital to their interests that it was worth fighting a war with the United States” (323).

Within the first pages of Blue and Gray Diplomacy, Jones does not refrain from acknowledging the difficulty of his work’s undertaking by stating that “if the ensuing story is readable and understandable while maintaining its complexity, the book will have fulfilled my purpose” (7). While readers will undoubtedly identify the conundrum of Civil War diplomacy, the book highlights clearly the Lincoln administration’s ability to navigate the subject’s complexity in order to prevent recognition or intervention during the war. Overall, Jones should be praised for Blue and Gray Diplomacy’s contribution to a decisive topic in Civil War history as well as his motivation and dedication to mull through the complicated and interconnected relationships between America and Europe in order to provide his audience with an eloquent and intellectually written work.

Carl C. Creason
Murray State University


In Making the Scene, Stuart Henderson seeks to reconstruct Yorkville’s decade as what he deems “the most famous hippie centre in Canada” (6). Centrally situated as Toronto’s “belly button,” Henderson argues that hip Yorkville was a “literal and metaphorical” site of intersection and contestation between an emergent youth-driven counterculture and the dominant culture with which it was engaged in a hegemonic “call-and-response” (5-8). Tracing the village’s different incarnations as a
posh shopping district, a hip haven and, by 1970, a somewhat violent scene crumbling in on itself, Henderson weaves a complex narrative of a vibrant, evolving space. Throughout his study, he views his village subjects through the lens of identity categories such as hippies, bikers, and greasers. As Henderson believes that identities are wrapped up within acts of performativity, much of his narrative is concerned with the ways in which hip actors and their observers participated in an ongoing, mutually-constructed spectacle throughout the 1960s. *Making the Scene* is hence simultaneously an examination of a site bound by concrete geographical and temporal limits and an exploration of more abstract processes of cultural change and searches for authenticity.

However, Henderson’s use of terms associated with performance to describe the behavior of Yorkville inhabitants seems vague and unsatisfying at different points in his book. Perhaps this will not be the interpretation of those better versed in this topic, but Henderson seems to imbue performativity with pejorative connotations. For instance, he writes that Yorkville residents became anxious that tourists were corrupting the space’s meaning: “Whatever Yorkville meant to represent was being... faked, performed by poseurs and pretenders” (46). Meanwhile, he simultaneously suggests that all identities are acts of spectacle. Hence, Yorkville is seen as providing “the opportunity to perform gay and lesbian identities,” and for greasers to act out their working class identity (61-6). It seems problematic to equate performance with fakery and co-option while using the same term to describe identities rooted in ideas about class or sexuality. It also implies doubt as to how genuine villagers’ commitment to their counterculture truly was, despite his warning that Yorkville ought not be discounted as a real moment of refusal within the hegemonic process. Henderson would have done well to explain his understanding of performativity, especially since he does invest so much effort in explaining Yorkville as a stage across which rather transient attempts at counter-cultural identities were tried on for size.

Perhaps Henderson lingers over matters of image due to choices made about his methodological approach. *Making the Scene* was written with help from interviews with twenty eight former “villagers,” the archives of local papers, but mostly through the fascinated coverage which the *Toronto Telegram*, the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Daily Star* piled upon hip Yorkville (24-26). Our insight into the scene is hence largely mediated by sources which held the village at arm’s length. Though the authors Henderson leans upon provide an important perspective on the village, it is one that can only really speak to rather superficial aspects of the lives of its hip inhabitants. Even his discussion of Yorkville’s attempts at an alternative press draws upon judgements passed by journalists writing for large, mainstream papers (135-136). Perhaps Henderson’s decisions about his sources are why the book
sometimes reads as a history of images of Yorkville, rather than a history of the scene he attempts to deconstruct. With a relatively small area as his subject, one wonders why Henderson chose to rely upon media outlets that had a stormy relationship with the village instead of attempting more of a locally-sourced study.

Henderson’s methodological decisions are perhaps to blame for another weakness of *Making the Scene*. While he outlines his intent to problematize common conceptions of the counterculture as the domain of white, middle class, straight males, he is only partially successful in doing so. Despite his assertion that working-class “greasers” lived and performed in Yorkville in much greater numbers than hippies, they remain rather marginal to Henderson’s study, as do the bikers whom he also deems to have had working-class backgrounds (132). This seems to be because, as Henderson states, most of the anxiety the media rained over Yorkville was concerned with white, middle class hippie children run astray (12). To be fair, Henderson devotes considerable effort to including women in his narrative and works to provide diverse accounts of their experiences in Yorkville. Still, his use of sources preoccupied with the very subjects he seeks to displace as the center of the counter-culture limits his ability to do so in a meaningful way.

These criticisms aside, Henderson has authored an absorbing, immensely readable and very eloquent account of Canada’s 1960s counterculture. Although *Making the Scene* was seemingly intended for a mostly academic readership it will doubtless also be enjoyed by a broader audience, indeed, by all who, like Henderson, feel tugs of longing for hip days gone by.

Katrin MacPhee
Queen’s University


In *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America*, Stephen G. Rabe endeavors to describe the effects of U.S. Cold War policies on Latin Americans. While this is not a particularly new focus, he presents this narrative in a style that is complete, thorough, and easily accessible. This is essentially a textbook geared toward moderately advanced history students. But it is a textbook with a clear, discernible argumentative thesis. It is easy to navigate, with chapters that clearly demonstrate the shifts in U.S. policies, and the unique set of consequences each shift created. It is made even more navigable by the fourteen page chronology at the beginning, which assists readers in understanding where they are at any point in the
book, and what is going on around them.

In simplest terms, Rabe portrays Latin Americans as “casualties of U.S. Cold War policies” (31). Rabe tracks U.S. policies toward Latin America, portraying Cold War U.S. policies as a sustained effort to prevent or at least limit Soviet influence, accurately describing his work as “a concise, interpretive history of the U.S. drive to win the Cold War in Latin America” (34). The first chapter breezes through the first 150 years or so of U.S.–Latin America relations thoroughly and concisely. His in-depth analysis begins in Chapter 2, discussing the Truman administration, the focus of which is George Kennan’s drastically critical report on Latin America. Chapter 3 addresses the Guatemalan intervention, describing the various strategies employed to effect the transition, while arguing that there was no real evidence to suggest it was necessary. Chapter 4 addresses Cuba, including the Bay of Pigs and the private war against Fidel Castro, outlining the ignorance and misunderstanding that contributed to these failed policies. Chapter 5 discusses the larger U.S. response to the Cuban Revolution, including the failure of policies such as Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, again stressing ignorance and basic ideological and cultural incompatibility. In Chapter 6, Rabe describes the Nixon administration’s preference for right wing dictatorships and the appalling consequences. Chapter 7 focuses on Central America and the inability of the U.S. to alleviate the violence there. Finally, “Aftermath” describes efforts to heal the damage and punish those responsible.

The history of U.S. policies in Latin America, as Rabe presents it, is a history of failure and unintended consequences. Ultimately, many of the policies implemented, and their consequences, were unnecessary. Recent scholarship, including The Killing Zone, convincingly demonstrates that U.S. policy makers were overly cautious or overly aggressive when it came to communism in Latin America. Rabe acknowledges that “the United States was not omnipotent,” but warns against “denying the realities of the global distribution of power or the active U.S. role in fomenting chaos in the region during the Cold War” (33). However, Rabe endeavors to look into what information was available and what forces were at work to present a fair assessment of the decisions of U.S. policy makers.

Rabe does not lay the blame for the tragic events of the Cold War period in Latin America solely on the shoulders of U.S. policy makers. He recognizes the “deep socioeconomic inequities” that were so prevalent in Latin America (31). He freely acknowledges and analyzes the simple truth that nearly all atrocities committed in Latin America were carried out by Latin Americans. Rather than suggesting that the U.S. deliberately caused these atrocities or deliberately established regimes that perpetrated such atrocities, Rabe describes the diverse means by which U.S. policies helped to create the conditions in Latin America that led to repressive regimes and bloody civil wars.
The easy narrative style makes *The Killing Zone* very user friendly, while the scholarship and research would meet even the most rigorous standards. It is an excellent resource for instructors teaching courses on U.S.–Latin American relations, for those merely interested in the topic, or as a starting point for those who wish to look deeper into the topics addressed.

Jeffry Cox  
Southern Illinois University


Thomas Borstelmann’s reassessment of the 1970s is a refreshing and insightful look at a decade often noted for its corruption, inflation and malaise. The monograph places the decade in the context of something more than just “the long 1960s.” Edward Berkowitz noted in *Something Happened* that historiography of the 1970s falls into three schools of thought: “One... proclaimed the existence of a lazy, apathetic, narcissistic... seventies.... A [second] holds that the seventies reversed the great dreams of the sixties but in a positive way that led to the great American revival of the 1980s. [And] yet another... makes the seventies out to be an important era.... What exactly [it was] remained somewhat vague.”¹ Borstelmann seems to have answered what the decade was, arguing that it had a far-reaching impact beyond the United States or even the decade in which it was contained. He reasons that the 1970s was a time in which the United States embraced “two profound yet... antagonistic values: formal equality and complete faith in the marketplace” (4). Indeed, these two values shaped American culture and politics for decades after by emphasizing two fundamental American values: inclusion for all and success by one’s own hard work in a free and open market of opportunity.

Borstelmann begins by describing domestic political events of the 1970s, most prominent of which was the explosion of the Watergate scandal and subsequent resignation of President Richard Nixon. The Watergate scandal created a lack of confidence in political leadership for most Americans. This led many Americans to turn inward and focus on issues of equality and inclusiveness. It also fostered a confidence in the free market and a rejection of the traditional Old Left reliance on big business and big government. The seventies embraced smaller technology-based business and a free market which could solve problems and act more rationally than government.

The author has written an insightful and readable text concerning a decade not often given attention, and while Borstelmann’s thesis is well-argued, one has the sense that the author’s judgment of events is colored by the time period. When discussing the events of the Watergate scandal and the degradation of public confidence in the president, Borstelmann states, “Citizens, until Vietnam and Watergate taught them otherwise, tended to assume their presidents were moral and competent men” (40-41). While Watergate and Vietnam did shake the confidence of the American people, it was hardly the first time that they questioned the morality or competence of their presidents, or even of Richard Nixon.

The Checkers scandal during the 1952 campaign nearly ended Nixon’s run as Vice-President with Dwight Eisenhower. While he came out of the scandal mostly unscathed, many Americans, well before Nixon’s involvement in Watergate, questioned his suitability as president. Indeed, Nixon noted in his own autobiography that the New York Herald Tribune and Washington Post both ran editorials calling for his resignation from the ticket. While this scandal was not as damaging as Watergate, it did cast a negative light on both men and was an early example of political scandal at the presidential level well before Watergate.

Borstelmann does, however, acknowledge that his formative years were in the 1970s, and he does indeed have a connection to the decade. Despite this issue, the author explores recent historical events and gives them much-needed perspective, linking the 1970s to recent events, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the election of Barack Obama. He utilizes a wealth of secondary sources as well as pop-culture references, making the work accessible beyond an academic audience. The 1970s would be a fine addition to any course on twentieth century America, especially the Cold War.

Nathan Pavalko
Ivy Tech Community College

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About the Contributors

Shira Lurie received her B.A. with an Honours Specialization in History and a Minor in English from the University of Western Ontario, and she has returned to Western to complete her M.A. in History. Her research focuses on the political history of the early American republic and examines the interplay between local and national experiences of dissent. In 2014, Shira will enter the University of Virginia’s doctoral program to work with Alan Taylor. She dedicates this to her grandfather, Harry Samuels, who drank scotch, but rarely rebelled.

Matthew Jagel is a Ph.D. candidate in history at Northern Illinois University. His focus is on United States Cold War foreign policy and Southeast Asia, specifically Cambodia. His dissertation will focus on Cambodian nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh and the United States–Cambodian relationship from 1945–1975. Mr. Jagel spent the 2011–12 academic year in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where he conducted research as a Fulbright Fellow.

Amir Locker-Biletzki earned his B.A. in History and Philosophy from the Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, his M.A. in History and Philosophy of Education from Tel Aviv University and he is currently completing the history Ph.D. program in the University of Guelph. The article presented here is a shortened version of part of his Ph.D. dissertation, which deals with the way that myths, symbols and rituals from Jewish, Soviet and left-wing European, and Israeli sources shaped Jewish Communist identity and subculture from 1919 to 1965.