Explanations for German colonial violence in Africa tend to revolve around either proto–Holocaust centered theories or the colony as a permeated space of continual violence. Both methods falter due to overgeneralization, often through lack of nuanced consideration of differing societal groups within the German colonial populations. This article addresses one of these populations, namely the German military administrations and personnel, primarily before the scandal of the Herero genocide resulted in a loss of relative administrative power for the colonial army. Military violence in the colonies arose through a combination of army values developed in Germany, an adapted version of metropolitan masculinity, and potent interpretations of European discourse on the colonized peoples. Coercive command became standard policy to maintain the equilibrium of the perceived power differential between colonizer and colonized. Although this balance became the standard goal of native policy for all German societal groups within the colonies, the military remained the only group with the ability to exert coercive command on a large scale.

Since 1894... [t]his indefatigable, dashing, militarily and scholarly distinguished officer made a name for himself... Adored by his colored troops, he was the terror of all agitators.... His name... made the colored hearts tremble. Iron energy and the greatest lack of consideration for himself, he coupled this with a jubilant temperament and an unflagging benevolence for his subordinates.

EULOGY FOR MAJOR HANS DOMINIK, 1911

The popular newspaper Kolonie und Heimat expressed these panegyric sentiments after Major Dominik died from the strains of quelling an uprising of the Maka people in Cameroon. The uprising began after Dominik led a “punitive expedition” (Strafexpedition) in response to a tale that a “German trader had been ‘eaten’ in the area.” He was, in the end, regarded as a great pacifier of the region. Dominik’s methods of warfare would have been atypical on a European battlefield, but the underlying ideas originated in the metropole. This military training was coupled with a form of masculinity also transmitted from the homeland, but adapted to the colonial environment. The eulogy depicts Dominik as the “whole man,” occupying such contradictory positions as idolized/feared, benevolent/ruthless, and serious/exuberant. He is militaristic, yet scholarly; energetic and dashing, but contemplative when needed. Armed with an overbearing and purposely manufactured feeling of superiority over the native African population, Major Hans Dominik could enact violence in the euphemistic name of justified pacification. His case is not unique among the military in the colonies. A framework can be constructed in which colonial military violence in German Africa can be explained by three causal factors: standardized military training and indoctrination in Germany; the transfer of the “whole man” ideal from the metropole and its subsequent transformation into hyper-masculine form in the colonies; and, stereotypic conceptions of the colonized Other as existing outside European or German norms.

This article attempts to specify an origin of German violence in Africa within historical context, which has hitherto remained historiographically problematic. Many previous studies have focused on the genocide against the Herero as a precursor to the Holocaust, often with allusions to the once-ubiquitous Sonderweg theory. Although the issue of historical continuities is most often at the forefront, a subtler issue is the difficulty of building a comprehensive theory of colonial violence predicated on a specific endpoint that was neither “the end,” nor a representative case. Some scholars have attempted a generalized framework in which colonists performed violence as an integral part of a system of dominance. While this piece does not deny such a framework, a more nuanced view shows that varying motivations among colonial societal groups resulted in differing levels and types of violence. Central to investigating this theme are the strides made in the historiography since 1970, specifically in the way that the colonial spheres are viewed. The
of colonialism are no longer ignored under the pretext of existing as an ephemeral phenomenon. More recently, historians have used historical, cultural, and literary studies to probe the depths of colonists’ minds, but also those of the colonized. The following framework for colonial violence takes a similar interdisciplinary approach to include the effects and interactions of institutions and actors. The most significant contribution of the recent historiography is that “actors” now includes the colonized peoples, who are no longer viewed simply as those "acted upon." This article continues this historiographical trend by differentiating sources of agency, but also by recognizing the interactivity of groups.

The German army is a useful starting point for inquiry into group differentiation. Though many institutions and classes of actors existed on the German side during the colonial era, the army contrasted most with other factions. The German army developed unique systems and beliefs that distinguished it from other contemporary European militaries. Experiences in the Wars of Unification formed an ideology that placed a premium on harsh expedients in pursuit of “military necessities.” Doctrines such as mission-based tactics (Auftragstaktik) gave individual commanders significant amounts of autonomous authority to determine military necessity. The army had little regard for international laws in Europe and even less so in the rugged and “uncivilized” context of the African colonies. Without a specific colonial army, Germany transferred its European-based military to an area subject to much less governmental oversight as well as outside the effectual, though highly circumscribed, realm of emerging international law. This provided the impetus for the evolution of violence from military campaigns (Feldzüge) during the initial colonization phase to the punitive expeditions of occupation. It is the peculiar manifestation of the latter that this article attempts to explain. The fundamental difference between military campaigns and punitive expeditions was whether a legitimate military goal existed. Beyond this ambiguous definition, punitive expeditions were more localized and often conducted during times of occupation, rather than initial colonization. The dividing line became continually blurred as time went on, especially in the cases of uprisings (Aufstände). Thus suppression, usually a job for garrison troops, became a military goal for army governors and commanders. The melding of campaigns and punishment was sometimes characterized as “revenge campaigns” (Rachefeldzüge). The haphazard blending found its greatest expression in the Herero genocide (1904–1907), a development that is analyzed in detail below. The Maji Maji Rebellion (1905–1907) in Eastern Africa was another curious admixture of campaigning and suppressing.

On a deeper level, the harsh and militaristic colonial environment also provoked the creation of a specific brand of masculinity. A crisis of masculinity taking place in the metropole arrived in the colonies, but the unique setting provided a means of escape, and eventually the formation of a hegemonic settler masculinity.

Both nationalism and bourgeois sensibilities emphasized the idea of “the whole man,” an ideal masculinity that harmoniously combined rationalism and emotionalism. Martina Kessel has argued convincingly that this “holistic version” of man amalgamated male and female characteristics in an attempt to create a distinctly masculine world. New societal norms emphasized traditional areas of masculinity, such as intellectualism and productivity, yet also espoused “typical” feminine characteristics of sensitivity and passion. Society placed bounds on subjective versions of identity, asserting the primacy of order and harmony, or the careful balance of male/female attributes. Nonconformance to the new mores supposedly led from a depraved individual to an ill nation-state, thus introducing a national peril that reinforced the need for widespread adherence. Industrialization promoted urbanization, and nationalists felt that concentration in the cities created sexual abnormality, “alienation,” and a removal from the traditional German soil. The rapid pace of urbanization and industrialization prompted a crisis in masculinity whenever the gender order appeared in question. Africa, therefore, with its abundant land and ruralness could be the answer. It could be a world created in masculine form, emphasizing all of the characteristics of “the whole man.” That this world would be distinctly masculine in nature is supported by the fact that, even after efforts to increase female presence, both German Southwest and East Africa held ratios of seven German men to only one white woman. The isolated nature of Africa distorted the wholeman concept into an extremely rugged

The heightened masculinity of the military found greater expression in an environment that promoted strength, danger, and domination
Military commanders subscribed to a specific precolonial ethnographic discourse that, when wedded with colonial masculinity and German military ideology, created an ethos in which extremely coercive measures, and eventually even genocide, were considered necessary. The inherently violent nature of the military resulted in interpretations of ethnographic discourse that highlighted the allegedly savage and inhuman nature of those colonized. Coercive behavior against fellow whites in Europe became, fairly easily, murderously violent acts against “inhuman” and “cruel” blacks in Africa. The metropole government made no serious attempt to restrain this behavior until the genocide of the Herero created a backlash that fundamentally shifted colonial ideology away from the Kulturmission imposed primarily by the military.

The Transfer of the Metropolitan Imperial Army

Distinct from other imperial powers, Germany did not have a specifically designated colonial army, making it possible to frame some aspects of colonial military practice within the metropolitan-based military institution. Initially, the German colonial army (Schutztruppe) was organized under the German Imperial Naval Office, but was in reality a kind of “third branch” of the German military. The army conducted all infantry training within Germany, and indoctrinated troops received the dominant military ideologies and belief systems prevalent in the homeland. This primarily meant an emphasis on the “skilful, independent understanding of a mission [eines Auftrages], prudent deliberation, quick and appropriate decisions, and outstanding vigour and bravery.”

Courses in military history would “safeguard the officer from excessive humanitarian outlooks [Anschauungen]… that in war certain severities cannot be done without, that in fact often the only true humanity lies in their ruthless application.” Furthermore, the official field manual sanctioned harsh “preventative measures” against occupied populations. While it would be a mischaracterization to suggest that the colonial environment itself had no impact on troop behavior, indoctrination and military culture provided fundamental attitudes toward military practice wherever German troops were stationed. Unit formation in the colonies, however, differed markedly from the metropolitan army. Colonial units were temporary and makeshift, resulting in a lack of cohesion normally formed through common regional origins, constant group interaction, and social maintenance. Continuity in leadership and experience was severely hindered by short terms of service; half of the officers served only one year in the colonies and only 12 per cent served more than three years. Therefore, the standardized military training received in Germany was a particularly important influence on collective behavior, as it was the strongest source of group identity.

Shared knowledge of doctrine and standard operating procedures strongly informed group behavior. Auftragstaktik, already a hallmark of the German army, became a recurrent and enlarged capacity for individual action at all levels of the military hierarchy within the colonies. Large numbers of troops on European battlefields during the Wars of Unification had shown the relative merits of a flexible mission system compared to attempts at near-absolute control of subordinates in the Napoleonic Wars. German officers gave orders that lacked specific detail, and they preferred troops to adapt when confronted with the fog of war or complications on the battlefield. This was not, however, a free pass for an officer to do as he pleased. The “coherence of the plan” was a guide to follow, and the fulfilment of the overall mission was always the goal.

On the other hand, it required a degree of latitude: officers were expected to produce action and take risks, but with the reciprocal expectation that mistakes could happen and would be forgiven if it could be shown that the officer had worked within the framework of Auftragstaktik. Any military action that vaguely supported the intentions of higher-ranking commanders was usually sufficient evidence. If performed correctly, the system allowed adaptability to changing battlefield conditions, and resulted in greater speed and maneuverability compared to armies that required lengthy, vertical hierarchical communication. The need for mission-based tactics was clear in the African colonial context. Germany controlled an area roughly five times the size of its European territory, along with an indigenous population of over 11 million. With a German colonial population of 22,000, of which only 6,500 were military troops, a wide degree of authority was necessary within any given field of operations. This produced a much greater sphere of responsibility, especially for lower ranking personnel, such as junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Authority predicated on mission-based tactics provided the pretext for much of the violent coercion that colonial troops enacted. The system’s interpretive nature allowed a wide scope for individual initiative, but without the usual restraints of specific military goals or a defined battlefield. The problem became particularly acute when orders from above conflicted with standard notions of European military ethics, as will be shown in the context of the Herero uprising. The home government reduced this authority only when “mistakes” rose to the level of genocide, and even then only because of the resulting furor in the metropole as well as by other colonial powers.

Nevertheless, the German government still condoned the army’s general doctrine on the treatment of civilians, ideas that encouraged a loose definition of military necessity. Again, experiences during the Wars of Unification, particularly the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, instigated a belief in harsh measures based on “military necessity.” Victory against an enemy military was not a guarantee of peace, as was shown by continuing anti-occupation operations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, instigated a belief in harsh measures based on “military necessity.” Victory against an enemy military was not a guarantee of peace, as was shown by continuing anti-occupation operations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, instigated a belief in harsh measures based on “military necessity.”

Though commanders initially, but questionably from a legal standpoint, ordered reprisals against spies and guerrilla fighters under the authority of Auftragstaktik, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke eventually
sanctioned the practice legally.39 Though German casualty figures by irregular French fighters was relatively low, a quarter of the field army was arrayed against the franc-tireurs due to their seeming ability to be anywhere at any time.30 Such an imbalance to combat small numbers of enemy fighters raised harsh responses to the level of military necessity in the eyes of field commanders. Horne and Kramer have shown extensively that the fear of guerilla tactics became mythologized in the psyche of the German military and played a crucial role in military decision making and doctrinal development in the subsequent decades.31 In the colonies, where the pervasiveness of the need for dominance was even more widespread, it was far easier to consider groups as rebel fighters. Whereas in Europe there were at least hazy limits as to what constituted rebellious or partisan behavior, the maintenance of the perceived power differential required a much lower tolerance for supposedly “threatening” behavior. Coupled with the belief that natives were inhuman and could only be subjugated through fear, this perceived power differential intensified the idea of reprisals as military necessity. Some, in fact, did directly compare reprisals against civilians or prisoners of war.32 Retired General Julius von Hartmann, a prominent writer on military affairs, expounded in Clausewitzian terms both the overall purpose of war, as well as the variables that would influence individual soldiers to act in the name of military necessity:

[T]he one, great, final goal of war is the subjugation of the enemy power, the overcoming of the enemy energy, the mastery of the enemy will. This one goal commands absolutely and it dictates law and regulation. The concrete figuration of this law appears in the form of military necessity, ... The course of war appears as a stringing together of actions, in which military personnel, as carriers of the military strength of the state and under the full exploitation... of the striving toward a common goal, are subject to particular targets of military necessity that they must execute. 34

There was, therefore, not an insistence on mission-based tactics in the name of military necessity in the German military; there was an understood compulsion. The pursuit of military necessity was defined as a basic right of the army and, with the use of Auftragstaktik, encompassed virtually anything that could lead to any vaguely defined goal of a superior. If the result were unsuccessful, latitude was given if the commander showed that he had attempted to work within this framework.

That these principles transferred from the metropole to the African colonies is clear. Training that took place in Germany ensured the indoctrination of this mindset. The primary difference was that, due to the expanses of territory and the miniscule amount of troops with which to control it, even low-ranking commanders held authority to impose large, broad fines or summarily execute those defined as rebels.35 In the midst of the Herero uprising, the German General Staff, in its historical analysis, asserted that “[w]homsoever wished to colonize here [Africa], must first grasp the sword and wage war, not with petty and delicate means, but rather with great, awe-inspiring power until the utter defeat of the natives.” This assessment did not differ from German precolonial theory, but the experience of colonization had seemingly validated extremely coercive methods, further enshrining them in standard colonial military practice. Additionally, Kaiser Wilhelm’s Kommandogewalt, or broad constitutional rights to command the armed forces, ensured that, when colonial troubles arose, he could appoint an officer closely aligned with his way of thinking.36 This would have serious repercussions during the Herero uprising with the appointment of Lothar von Trotha, as will be shown later, but it was also vitally important for the colonial military context as a whole. The combined framework of Immediatsystem, in which subordinates reported solely to the Kaiser, and the Kommandogewalt accentuated the image of the Kaiser’s authority, yet it also created what Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist have characterized as “Byzantinism.”37 Consequently, offices worked in relative seclusion, causing a lack of coordination in policy. The result for the military was an almost complete insulation from non-executive oversight. Though the Kaiser was the Commander-in-Chief of each branch of the military, his authority over the Schutztruppe was even more marked. Unlike the army, in which some states’ contingents, such as Bavaria and Saxony, maintained a “special bond” with their kings in peacetime, the navy was an exclusively imperial institution from the very beginning.38 Organizationally located under the navy, the Schutztruppe was under the absolute authority of the Kaiser during both times of peace and war. Due to precedent and the Kommandogewalt, his position and influence was circumscribed only marginally with its transfer to the Colonial Department in 1896 and then the Reichskolonialamt in 1907.

These kinds of constitutional and legal disconnects were widespread, effecting a seclusion of military development, both in the metropole and overseas, from virtually any civilian oversight. Clausewitz’s assertion of the military as a tool of policy was reversed.40 As one of the many repercussions of administrative Byzantinism, the military narrowed its view to the tactical and operational levels, forgoing much consideration of the political-strategic aspects of war-making. This produced a much greater emphasis on the actions of individual commanders in the field, allowing them to direct policy “on the ground.” The Kaiser set the tone of military governance through his customarily boisterous martial
declarations. An ingrained adherence to 
Auftragstaktik and a disdain for international laws of war ensured that the Kaiser's policies were transmitted down the chain of command. Ministers such as Chancellor von Bülow claimed that "colonial politics was still a policy of conquering, and that nowhere in the world did one succeed at appropriating land from a foreign people without battles.... Colonial wars will therefore invariably be a necessary consequence of conquering, and that nowhere in the field of physiology. Growing industrialization prompted labor unrest and socialist ideologies. Along with rising nationalism, these pervasive ideologies attempted to subsume the individual into society in the pursuit of higher ideals. Advances in technology seemed to "speed up time itself." Medical doctors promoted ideas of degeneracy, both physical and mental. While the ideologies co-opted masculinity with some success, science was mainly a man's preserve, and degeneracy prompted the most concern for the military. This particularly informed the debates on race in conceiving of the colonized as either inferior or child-like in development, but also in the potential degeneracy of the "white race" arising from biological or cultural admixture. To a large degree, the enforced racial hierarchy propagated by German colonists was based on these new developments in science. Africa functioned as one of several pressure valves for those wishing to escape the masculinity crisis in Germany. Many believed that the "untainted" naturalness, and therefore beauty, of the environment, along with harsh living conditions would help alleviate mental and physical degeneracy. Rather than simply a return to traditional, pre-industrial conceptions of masculinity, the masculinity crisis became a grandiose distortion of the old ideals. Manhood had once meant embodying naturalness and self-confidence, and being creative. The military provided an insular, masculinized world whether it was stationed within the metropole or beyond its borders. Nevertheless, the form that this masculinity took was also dependent upon its location. Thus, the "standardized" masculinity inculcated in troops in Germany during training was subject to change when it entered the African environs. The military environment allowed, promoted, and created a space for the expression of masculinity, but it was not the sole definer of male gender ideals. Manliness itself did not conform to such a narrow spectrum, and it was a fundamental basis for the colonial power framework more broadly. This was true among and between the varied classes of colonizers, but even more specifically in the case of military personnel. Africa was a battlefield in which industrialized warfare on a mass scale could not take place; this "allowed masculine heroism, determination and nobility to shine through." Colonists perceived Africa as a wide open space where a man could become his true and whole self without the artificial constraints imposed by industrialized society. This "true self" harkened back to a pre-industrial masculinity that arose during the Wars of Liberation. A working reconciliation between the individual and the collective defined the "militarization of masculinity." The collective was not necessarily German society as a whole, but rather the pursuit of a higher ideal that often involved some aspect of Deutschtum. Willpower was an integral component of manliness. It allowed a dogged determination for "heroism, death, and sacrifice" in the name of this higher ideal. Yet the valuation of a man along this ideal was based on his individual and particular attributes:

The ideal and particular attributes:

"The great community of the state will not be served by an internally changed person. Rather, he will lovingly serve in the manner that he wishes and is capable of, with an unbroken peculiarity and his entire soul." Ideal masculinity was not envisioned as a composition of mechanically functioning men, but of those that pursued a collective ideal with the individual talents he possessed.

German men saw Africa as a way to return to these values, and as an escape from the crisis that now befell masculinity in the metropole. This crisis arose primarily from industrialization, technological increase, and advances in the field of physiology. Growing industry prompted labor unrest and socialist ideologies. Along with rising nationalism, these pervasive ideologies attempted to subsume the individual into society in the pursuit of higher ideals. Advances in technology seemed to "speed up time itself." Medical doctors promoted ideas of degeneracy, both physical and mental. While the ideologies co-opted masculinity with some success, science was mainly a man’s preserve, and degeneracy prompted the most concern for the future of masculinity. This particularly informed the debates on race in conceiving of the colonized as either inferior or child-like in development, but also in the potential degeneracy of the "white race" arising from biological or cultural admixture. To a large degree, the enforced racial hierarchy propagated by German colonists was based on these new developments in science. Africa functioned as one of several pressure valves for those wishing to escape the masculinity crisis in Germany. Many believed that the "untainted" naturalness, and therefore beauty, of the environment, along with harsh living conditions would help alleviate mental and physical degeneracy. Rather than simply a return to traditional, pre-industrial conceptions of masculinity, the masculinity crisis became a grandiose distortion of the old ideals. Manhood had once meant embodying the physical representation of the family unit as a whole in dealings with the state; in essence, the husband solely represented the interests of his household and was, therefore, a citizen. In the colonies, due to a lack of family units and the attendant rise in land holding, the ideal transformed from head-of-family to “master over a domain.” This power was easily circumscribed by the colonial administration or, in the case of soldiers, the military. Nevertheless, colonists found outlets for exercising mastery in a variety of places, whether in labor relations with natives, sexual aggression, or military violence. Among military personnel, mastery was most obviously demonstrated by the summary judgment of supposed rebels through the wide breadth of command and emphasis on mission-based tactics, especially during Strafexpeditionen. Colonial men were also expected to be fearless, work hard, show dedication and self-confidence, and be creative. These were not new attributes of masculinity. They were, however, magnified by the environment and interactions with strange, new peoples. Diseases, weather, and animals were constant dangers, as well as African warriors with non-European customs and methods. The colonies initially lacked economic infrastructure, terminology that was still synonymous with "railroad network." Many believed that "economic salvation... lay in the construction of railways." Military commentators of the era believed that Strafexpeditionen could prompt economic growth by increasing German prestige in an era, something that Hermann von Wissmann supposedly benefited from in East Africa at the expense of the Hehe people. Nevertheless, until this infrastructural dream could become reality, agricultural work was widespread among the colonial population and necessary for subsistence in each locality. Although there was certainly exploitation of native labor, hard
Colonists perceived Africa as a wide open space where a man could become his true and whole self without the artificial constraints imposed by industrialized society. Physical labor remained necessary for settlers. Dedication was required both on the individual level and in working toward the "colonial experiment." Self-confidence contributed to an individual's life, but was also vitally important for interactions with native peoples and the maintenance of white hegemony. Creativity was predicated on initiative, risk-taking, and the ability to flexibly accomplish tasks. As the civilian governor Friedrich von Lindequist stated, it was an official goal to "awaken and promote the independence and spontaneity of the settlers as much as possible." As noted above, the lack of a specialized colonial army engendered a need for a generalized skill set. Auftragstaktik was the German military's answer to the question of initiative and risky pursuits. Though Lindequist referred to colonial settlers rather than the army explicitly, military experience in mission-based tactics was considered excellent preparation for future life as a colonist; soldier-turned-colonist was an outcome that was by no means rare.

Masculinity also contained an explicit sexual component. Bourgeois values in metropolitan Germany acknowledged sexual desire as natural, but within limits: masturbation was a contributor to internal weakness; marital sexual relations should be moderate; and laws should prohibit homosexuality. Homosexuals found little respite in the colonies as authorities considered it dangerous to the imperial cause from the beginning. They did not consider sexual relations, violent or consenting, with indigenous women male desire for natives, and citizenship through jus sanguinis, or descent by blood. In the later stages of colonization, the colonial administration's position stated that German men could only succeed as true men through marital union with "racial equals." They reasoned that only German women, as the harbingers of future generations, were the guardians of culture and race. Many nationalists in the metropole were of the same opinion. Unlike countries such as France, German law considered only biological descent as a qualifier for citizenship; the children of a married couple acquired the citizenship of the father, but if the father could not be determined, the child received the mother's citizenship. Furthermore, at the time of marriage, the wife received the husband's citizenship. This latter point, when applied to German-male/native-female marriages, offended German women in particular. The increasing opposition of German women to mixed marriages and the greater support by women in general for colonization resulted in an influx of female settlers. In the harsh colonial environment, the gender divide had already begun to blur, as women were expected "to be able to do everything their husbands did." This included many of the traditional colonial masculine qualities such as work ethic and willpower. Only in the area of sexuality did the entrance of German women succeed as true men through marital union with "racial equals." They stated that German men could only succeed as true men through marital union with "racial equals." Settlers held to the exaggerated traditionalist form while colonial authority, now firmly in the hands of middle-class administrators, inverted the genocides provoked outrage in Germany, attempted to rein them in toward the rapidly racializing form of bourgeois values of propriety. After the colonial administration's attempts to ban mixed marriages on racial grounds,
the Reichstag decision in 1912 to allow them to continue further heightened the crisis afflicting masculinity in the metropole.76 In contrast, the settlers’ legal argument rested on the traditional masculine legal right to pass on citizenship. Although the legal basis of citizenship was “by blood,” this was never meant as racial categorization, but was firmly rooted in gender. As far as strict legal jurisprudence was concerned, laws that attempted to insert racial categories were an infringement but was firmly rooted in gender. As far as strict legal jurisprudence was concerned, laws that attempted to insert racial categories were an infringement on patriarchal rights, and therefore invalid.77 The formalized citizenship laws of 1870 and 1913 were based on German men’s rights and interests in contrast to women, not in contrast to “racial non-Germans.” Marriage was an exceptional situation, however, and most sexual encounters remained in the form of rape, concubinage, or prostitution. Colonial and metropole authorities focused on marriage because it appeared an existential threat to the perceived power differential, a situation that always made settler-native relations more tense and violence more likely. Threats to sexual freedom with natives were met with legal challenges and refusals to testify against alleged rapists. German authorities never found a satisfactory solution for the frequent rapes during military campaigns or large scale containments, such as those that occurred after the establishment of concentration camps during the Herero uprising.

Military personnel, though not in the same societal class as settlers in general, aligned closely with this general form of colonial hegemonic masculinity. Although settlers clung to traditional masculine legal rights, intermarriage was low, resulting in only 24 mixed marriages prior to 1905.78 This number rose marginally following the arrival of German troops during the Herero Wars.79 That these marriages occurred, offspring produced, and neither later repudiated by the German soldiers is evidence that imperial soldiers subscribed to the “settler version” of the sexual and citizenship aspects of masculinity. The same can be said for other types of sexual encounters, though rape and prostitution were perhaps more available and permissible expedients for soldiers than long-term concubinage, which was the most common scenario for established settlers. In other aspects, military conceptions of masculinity were in line with those standardized in the German army, but with a heightened emphasis on honor, adventure, and individual heroism. Volunteer officers were detached from the regular army and were more often of the eccentric variety, preferring the greater military action available in the colonies, and would perhaps have had less success in their careers domestically.80 The colonies were also a field in which formerly disgraced officers could begin anew.81 German military masculinity in the colonies aligned closely with the settler colonial mentality, though in militarized form. Settlers often called for harsher punishments to perceived or real threats from natives than even the heads of the military administrations; individual soldiers and units, through either Auftragstaktik or their own volition, were often more willing to oblig. This was a combination of hyper-masculinity and the army’s willingness to create a space for its expression. Coupled with the perceived dangers and adventure of Africa, military men were in a position to exercise their version of masculinity to a far greater extent than would have been possible in the metropole. The geographic distance and perception of residing outside the bounds of industrialized and “degenerate” metropolitan sexuality fostered the growth of colonial hyper-masculinity.

Conception of the Other and its Influences on Military Masculinity

Combined, the military structure and hyper-masculinity were unlikely to result in the level of violence that eventually occurred in Africa. Certainly, it could have resulted in scattered acts of violence, but a more universal explanation or motivation is needed to account for widespread aggression. A crucial component has thus far been absent: colonized men, both their masculinity and its effect on German masculinity. Although it is clear that military culture contributed to violence in Africa, the contribution of masculinity remains incomplete if one considers only the transformation of metropolitan manliness in the colonies. Yet, in many ways, distinguishing the impact of native sexuality on German masculinity is a more complicated task. It involves preconceived notions of natives, how actual contact altered these pre-conceived notions, responses and changes in natives engendered by the arrival of the German military and settlers, and the subsequent German responses to these changes in native behavior. These complicated sets of interaction formed much of the basis of settler-native relationships, though it is often difficult to divide action and reaction. Nevertheless, it is possible to find primary motivations, whether through inference from events or occasionally even clearly stated goals.

The main task of colonial governance was the maintenance of alterity, or the “otherness” of the natives, and is generally referred to as “native policy.”82 This did not necessarily mean that colonial authorities attempted to force natives into a static mode of life or culture, though this was the case in certain circumstances. The policy for alterity was predicated on an “assumption of an unbridgeable difference between themselves and their subjects and of the ineradicable inferiority of the colonized.”83 Therefore, the focus on the maintenance of otherness emphasized a need to maintain the recognition of this “unbridgeable difference,” rather than an attempt to ensure that this difference existed. This distinction is significant for understanding military and settler behavior; the colonizers believed that this difference was inherent and could not be changed, either through intermarriage or by any amount of cultural change. Intermarriage would only produce children of a lower level, and cultural change or assimilation were viewed as insidious mimicry, and not true improvement. The source of colonial power, and therefore the focus of imperial native policy, resided in the mutual recognition and perception of alterity and its immutability.

The belief of inherent inferiority was initially based on precolonial discourse. Early discourse was not uniform, and often contained contradictory representations of natives. Writers described the Khoikhoi both as practitioners of grotesque sexual
acts, but also as the “Hottentot Venus” in the case of women. They placed special emphasis on sexual aspects, ranging from alleged bestiality with apes to the commonly repeated astonishment at the size of various body parts. In other cases, the Khoikhoi were described either as noble savages, or with the more ubiquitous “ignoble savage” trope. Although the specifics of precolonial discourse differed by African ethnic group, all discourses were in agreement that Africans were on a lower civilizational level developmentally.

More generally, however, depictions emphasized the “compulsive nature of the [African] colonial soldier, his sexual energy, and the necessity to control these passions.” This supposed energy became a concern regarding relationships between German women and native men. The fear found its ultimate expression in Arthur Schnitzler’s short story “Andreas Thameyer’s Last Letter.” Thameyer’s wife had an illicit affair with an African on display at a zoo in Europe, but he refused to accept it, even after the illegitimate son was born. His sense of masculinity and honor led him to despair and disbelief:

I can in no way continue living. Because as long as I live, the people will mock, and nobody would see the truth. The truth is that my wife was true to me—I swear on all that I find holy, and I seal it through my death…. My Anna was alone—alone just once…. Who wouldn’t conceive that under these circumstances she must have felt a monstrous horror for this giant man with fervent eyes and a great, black beard.

Readers perceived a manifold of insecurities in the young Thameyer. Public perception and the ensuing scorn of Thameyer’s loss of masculinity drove him to suicide. He portrayed the African as a grotesque distortion of male sexuality, physically large with corresponding facial hair, and eyes that burned with sexual desire for the white woman. That something like this could happen on German soil, rather than thousands of miles away in the colonies, concerned contemporary readers. The worst infraction on Thameyer’s masculinity, however, is that if somehow this betrayal occurred, his wife was impregnated from a single encounter. His German masculine honor could be salvaged only through his suicide.

Varying discourses led to competing visions of ethnographic acuity. Different colonial social groups adhered to different views of the natives, and each attempted to construct policy accordingly, though always with the goal of stabilizing the perceived power differential between colonist and native. While educated officials were concerned with cultural and linguistic communication, and landowners with monetary incentives, the military viewed the older ethnographic discourse as proof that coercive command was the most suitable method for interacting with natives. During the early period of colonization, the military held primacy in policymaking, and sometimes held civil authority as well. This is more obvious during the initial military campaigns, but it extended afterward during “pacification.” Violent means of pacification often led to dismay and small-scale revolts. The military establishment cemented its importance in the colonial experiment by emphasizing its centrality in pacification, invoking a circularity of reasoning. To the metropolitan government, it seemed reasonable to continue military administration until pacification was complete. Typical military policy consisted of “coercive command” to enforce the recognition of difference and compliance with colonial authority. Quick initial victories reinforced the idea of German military supremacy. Although soldiers viewed the native peoples as inferior, they also believed them excessively cruel, a stereotype that allegedly legitimized massacres or atrocities. Captured enemy soldiers were often executed en masse, because they were labeled as rebels. This labeling was possible because of the unique German view on what constituted “occupied territory,” a significant distinction in determining whether a prisoner was a legitimate combatant or a rebel behind enemy lines. The German view held that “occupation began immediately behind the front lines, regardless of whether the ‘occupier’ actually controlled the area.” This presented an interesting, though unfortunate, scenario in the colonies; as inferior peoples were allegedly incapable of waging civilized warfare, front lines were virtually non-existent, resulting in the military administration often labeling the entire territory as occupied. Unsurprisingly, 54 “punitive expeditions” occurred in East Africa alone in the short span between 1891 to 1894.

With circular logic, the occurrence and frequent recurrence of coercion reinforced the perception that it was needed. Furthermore, it augmented the military’s preferred precolonial discourse. There were only minor changes from precolonial to colonial era discourse in the characteristics the military attributed to the natives; but, as infantry Captain Schwabe expressed, greater conviction and coercive command remained the best options:

One gets to know this people after one has lived among them for years… Mistrustful, conceited, proud, and in turn beggarly and servile, mendacious and faithless, thieving— whenever they are in the majority—violent and cruel…. The one thing that cannot be denied is bravery in battle, but only when the situation is at its direst. My judgment may be severe, but fair in every case, and the treatment [of this people] must be, and remain, severe and fair. The Kaffir [common pejorative for Africans] must be given this treatment, or else they will play dirty tricks on us, because the Herero always considers meanness and leniency as weakness and cowardliness.

The description appears in many ways to be the opposite of the “whole man” concept; even bravery is only possible under extenuating circumstances. These sentiments were ubiquitous among the military community, and this led to conflicts with the natives in which commanders did not consider negotiation an option. To a degree, this was becoming the German view on war generally. Nevertheless, in the colonial context, the notion was taken to an extreme. Harshness continued to serve “native policy” because punishments such as large fines, public humiliation, and executions would “keep their subjection permanently awake in the native’s memory.” Of particular importance was the idea, as expressed by Captain Schwabe, that leniency
would only lead to further revolts or, in other words, the breakdown of the perceived power differential.

German soldiers’ justifications for violence were not limited to pure military reasoning, but were more often intimately tied to ideas propagated in precolonial discourse as well as the implicit goals of the colonial project. Although, as shown above, the natives’ battlefield characteristics were held in low regard, German soldiers also considered them lazy regarding work more generally.99 This was anathema to “true German manliness,” but especially to the prevailing colonial view. Gustav Frenssen, in his 1906 fictional book Peter Fahren, in his 1906 fictional book Peter

“true German manliness,” but especially to the prevailing colonial view. Gustav Frenssen, in his 1906 fictional book Peter

to the massacre of natives:

Disparity in knowledge was a particular area of contention because natives had access to the more intimate parts of the colonizers’ lives. In effect, the colonizers were always on display, and therefore it was necessary to perpetually show mastery and power.106 In the earlier days of military penetration, this was of little concern for the soldiers, as power or mastery was shown through battlefield victories, sexual violence, or the purchase of prostitutes.107 When these relationships transformed into household servitude, domestic unions, or marriage, the prominent scandals of the era clearly displayed the limits of privacy. Sexual honor became a concern through the legal crime of sodomy; it was legally impossible for a man to be raped.108 Fears of “unnatural seductions” arose through propaganda of the “amplified affinity of the African for homosexuality.”109 There was, therefore, an effort to portray the male African Other as unmanly. Attributes that were “more manly” than German conceptions were derided as unnatural, beastly, and unrefined—the whole man was a balance. This derision allowed a freer hand when implementing military coercion. The military occupation allowed a space for the expression of hyper-masculinity; the addition of comparing natives to this ideal, and then finding them wanting, perpetuated a willingness for, and conduct of, violence.

A Case Study: From the Leutwein System to the Genocide of the Herero

Although colonial violence in general, rather than genocide in particular, is the focus of this article, it is useful to analyze the progression and escalation of violence in a case-study format. Colonial violence and cruelty were not rare, but one native reaction invariably resulted in the escalation of coercion: rebellion. Few uprisings were very large, but the Herero rebellion of 1903 was a major response to sustained maltreatment, fines, land disputes, and sexual violence. In 1894, army officer Theodor Leutwein was appointed as a high-ranking colonial administrator, and then governor in 1898.110 His native policy has become known as the Leutwein System, and consisted of diplomacy, divide and rule tactics, and military coercion. A typical example of this model was the requisitioning of cattle from natives: first, bribery was attempted, then official favoring of certainchieftains, and finally outright violent coercion. When this ultimately failed to satisfy the needs of colonists, he repeated the cycle for native-land acquisition. Again, the colonists were not satisfied and reservation land was parcelled out to native groups. If the natives were unable to use natural resources as “real men,” the military administration believed it necessary to transfer such resources to settlers. Finally, in January 1904 the Herero rose up against the German administration. A local colonial association called for an “energetic military action” because “only through the absolute perpetuation of the supremacy of [the white] race can its rule be enforced.”111 In effect, only extreme violence maintained the perceived power differential. Unsurprisingly, Leutwein attempted to subdue the native peoples through force. He claimed to critics in Germany that there were no orders to kill women and children or refuse prisoners. This would have been in contradiction to military and metropole masculine values. Still, he admitted that the troops had been acting in excess.112 There had been a flood of reports, though erroneous, that the Herero had butchered German women and children and burned houses, further proof of unmanly and savage behavior. Masculine honor demanded the protection of all three signifiers of the household domain. Nevertheless, Leutwein’s goal had always been to use enough violent coercion to open negotiations.113 His final mistake, in the eyes of military authorities, was his personally-ordered retreat of his unbeaten troops at Oviumbo on April 13, implemented both for military as well as administrative concerns.114 Within the context of the German military culture of offense, which contemporary military theorists often defined in stereotypic nineteenth century masculine terms such as energetic and inexorable, this retreat was a defeat.

Owing both to the ineffectiveness of
Leutwein to quell the rebellion and his shameful retreat, the German military sent General Lothar von Trotha to restore order. Trotha was the quintessential example of the new, heightened colonial military masculinity. Although he had gained experience during the Wars of Unification, his career was particularly successful outside of Germany, owing to merciless, but successful, campaigns in East Africa and China. Trotha’s brutality was well known, and Kaiser Wilhelm either directly appointed or personally approved his appointment to the Southwest African command on May 3. The Kaiser, identifying the rebellion as a serious matter of national security and using his constitutional prerogative of Kommandoewalt, placed the conduct of operations under military control, instead of civilian leadership. Trotha, in a letter to Leutwein, stated that “the use of [v]iolence with stark terrorism and cruelty was and is my policy. I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of money.” The “whole man” concept of balanced rationality and emotionality is present in this statement, the rationality of an industrialized nation’s war-making system and the emotional vision of “justified” blood-letting, violence, and terrorism. Trotha believed that negotiation, as Leutwein now advocated, would destroy the perceived power differential between colonists and natives, and future German administrative policy would forever be met by armed rebellion if the Herero succeeded in this instance.

This line of reasoning was used in the aftermath of the battle of Waterberg, which had taken place on August 11. The Herero were soundly defeated in an attempted concentric battle of annihilation, a Vernichtungskrieg in the military sense. Owing to difficulties in the conduct of the battle, however, many of the Herero escaped and Trotha did not consider it a “total military victory.” When the Herero attempted multiple times to open negotiations, as had normally happened after previous military defeats, Trotha refused on the grounds that it would show “weakness and embarrassment,” thus impugning both military and manly honor. Meanwhile, some German troops had begun to openly massacre the Herero, regardless of age or gender. Trotha attempted to limit such actions to armed men classified as rebels. Thus, courts martial were no longer necessary. This was a clear departure from the Leutwein System and ensured an escalation of sanctioned military violence. That many of the troops were recently arrived and inexperienced reinforcements from Germany increased the likelihood that the infliction of violence would be less restrained. Standard military practice emphasized relentless pursuit to defeat enemies that had escaped destruction by concentric attack, as had occurred at Waterberg. A refusal to negotiate inspired continual and escalating violence and the lack of logistical support promoted small groupings of German soldiers; especially at this low level of the military hierarchy, the shooting of civilians continued. By September 30, supply levels were perilous and Trotha ordered the pursuit to end. Two days later he issued the Vernichtungsbefehl, thus ending any idea of future negotiations, and rejecting even the complete submission of the Herero.

Aside from the escalation of the idea of Vernichtung, Trotha still operated within the framework of the colonial German military. In Southwest Africa, frontlines did not exist, and it was customary to execute rebels. As the Vernichtungsbefehl made clear, a large scale revolt of this nature expanded the definition of “rebel” to include “every Herero, with or without rifle… [and] no more women or children accommodated.” The attribution of “rebel” was tied to the familiar trope of the “cruel Herero,” by citing crimes such as murder, theft, and the mutilation of wounded German soldiers. Trotha’s own dealings in Southwest Africa, the violence against the Herero escalated gradually, as shown through the development of the Leutwein System. Though this earlier policy and its violence had always been extreme compared to European contexts, the move to genocide was an evolution of German military native policy and administration. Furthermore, it was the result of progressive dehumanization and the “fear of a possible loss of prestige.” It was not, however, systematic murder. This does not mean that there was not intended genocide. Instead, it is acknowledgment that German soldiers were not expected to systematically
execute thousands, rather they were to not prevent deaths resulting from starvation and dehydration.\(^{127}\) Still, German soldiers had already escalated violence beyond the limits prescribed by the Vernichtungsbefehl. This was carried on at the lowest tactical levels. The order gave official direction to more effectively pursue what was already being done through personal expressions of violence. For those who had not been inclined to such gratuitous violence, an institutional culture of obedience ensured compliance. This was the case for Major Ludwig von Estorff as he pursued the Herero under Trotha’s orders to drive them into the desert:

I followed their tracks and arrived at several wells behind them and found a dreadful sight. Cattle that had died of thirst were lying in heaps around them…. Now the Herero flew further from us…. The dreadful scene was always repeated. With frantic speed the [Herero] men attempted to tap the wells, but the water always became sparser, the waterholes more infrequent. They flew from one to another and lost almost all of their animals and a great many people. They dwindled away to scarce remnants and were gradually at our mercy. Some escaped now and some later…. It was a policy that was as foolish as it was cruel, to shatter those people. Many of the people and livestock could still be saved, if they were now spared and readmitted, they were punished enough. I suggested this to General von Trotha, but he wanted their complete destruction.\(^ {128}\)

Though Major Estorff disagreed with the policy and found its implementation egregious, he complied. There was certainly variance in the amount of violence that individual units performed. Nevertheless, the guidelines set forth by the highest commander, the Vernichtungsbefehl, became the minimum acceptable level of violence for soldiers through the combination of an institutional culture of obedience and a gender-enforced commitment to duty. Although the war with the Herero was construed as a racial war in the mind of Trotha, it was not considered a life-or-death struggle between two peoples. The goal was not the survival of the “German race,” but instead a means of restoring the perceived colonial power differential, predicated on colonial hyper-masculinity and normativity, even if this meant the destruction of one side of the equation. The standard practices of the German military were certainly at play during these events, but masculine ideals played a key role in their initiation and perpetuation. This is true both for those ideals that were inherent in the German metropolitan military and those that arose during the course of colonization and occupation. Nevertheless, genocide was a unique outcome of native policy as a whole. Though it can be seen as a logical conclusion of the progression of military native policy, this was only one colonial group’s method, and cannot be generalized. It occurred through an exclusive combination of attributes, abilities, and beliefs that only the military possessed. The backlash in the metropole ensured that the military would rarely again have such unfettered administrative power.

**Colonial military violence**

arose from three primary areas:

standardized military training in Germany; the distorted transfer of masculinity from the metropole to the colony; and conceptions of the colonized Other. No single aspect is sufficient to account for the use of violence, though each was necessary. Furthermore, though the colonies were generally a cruel and violent place, military coercion escalated progressively for the supposed furtherance of native policy. Once administrators felt that the “lesson” was understood, the environment would return to its normal level of violence. However, with circular logic, subsequent lessons were harsher so as to quell supposed native beliefs of German weakness.

The standardized military training that soldiers received in Germany was the fundamental component of the colonial army’s ability to function coercively. It provided both the means and the authority to do so. Auftragstaktik sanctioned individual actions of violence and punitive expeditions. Legal theories developed in Germany allowed a wider range of treatment under the guise of suppressing rebels, even if most other countries agreed that international law ended at the borders of Europe. The German military’s disregard for international law within Europe was a precursor for what could be expected in the colonies. Everything seemed proportionally larger in the colonies: land; freedom; opportunity. It is not surprising that the same applied to military violence.

The scope and scale of masculinity was also enlarged. Manliness achieved new levels of domination. Owning land in Germany was unlikely and the alternative was an unpleasant existence in a factory. In the colonies, men could employ themselves for real, tangible benefits on a large plot of land. This produced a work ethic that colonists perceived was higher than that in the metropole because the work was more fulfilling to a man. As shown above, many soldiers opted to remain in the colonies rather than return to Germany. A man was the head of his household in Germany, but still a mere citizen of the state. In Africa, settlers perceived themselves as kings of their estates. Men could exert more dominance over women with relative impunity. Native women were plentiful, and seemingly servile within the binary hierarchy of native and German. For soldiers, Africa was filled with adventure and danger that was more natural than the rapidly industrializing and impersonal battlefields of Europe. Opportunity for advancement for those willing to work hard was possible in the colonies, a perception that few had of the homeland. This was especially true for those in the military, as Germany was not engaged in a traditional, European war until the First World War.

Yet the ideology for dominance on a larger scale was impossible without two further components: a belief in the inferiority of the colonized and the mutual recognition of this judgment by both Germans and native peoples. For the German military, approaching hegemony on the Continent after its victory against France, a hubris-filled interpretation of precolonial discourse seemed natural. Rapid victories during initial colonization efforts reinforced these interpretations. A coercive command mentality circularly bolstered many of these conceptions and seemed to validate them. With rare exceptions,
For the German military... after its victory against France, a hubris-filled interpretation of precolonial discourse seemed natural

violence prevented the formation of large-scale rebellions. Small bands of indigenous rebels were defeated, and this was submitted as further proof of native inferiority. Furthermore, these rebellious acts lent credence to the alleged inherent cruelty of the natives. That the intolerable conditions of coercion may have led to such rebellion held little stock, and the military used this as evidence that more, not less, coercion was needed. Authorities, the military, and settlers thought little of the sexual attack of indigenous women, who were already considered promiscuous and wanton. German men in Africa considered the dominance of men an established fact, and they saw the imposition of the perceived power differential as proof, rather than the cause of this dominance.

The convergence of military training, masculinity, and negative racial conceptualization found its ultimate expressions of dominance in the colonies. These ideas were transferred from the metropole and shaped by the unique characteristics of the African environment and the colonial state. Yet, to dominate requires those who are dominated. Precolonial discourse and new discourse that arose during colonization implanted firm beliefs in the military that the natives desired to be dominated by coercive force. This domination required a native policy that maintained the perceived power differential; only the military apparatus initially seemed suitable for the forced subjugation of an indigenous population that was 500 times larger than the German presence. The military had the training, legal authority, hyper-masculine identity, and racial ideology to pursue and execute coercive command in the colonies. It took only circular logic for this combination to perpetuate itself into ever greater levels of violence.

ENDNOTES

1 Anon., “Major Hans Dominik,” Kolonie und Heimat 4, no. 16 (1910/11): 7. “Seit 1894... hat sich dieser unermüdliche, schneidige, militärisch und wissenschaftlich hervorragende Offizier... einen Namen gemacht.... Von seiner farbigen Truppe vergöttet, war er der Schrecken aller Unruhestifter; sein Name... die farbigen Herzen zittern machte. Eiserne Energie und die grösste Rücksichtlosigkeit gegen sich selbst verband er mit einem glücklichen Temperament und mit nie versagendem Wohlwollen für seine Untergeben.” All translations are those of the author, unless specifically noted.
5 Ibid., 87–88.

1 Ibid., 23.


3 Ibid., 227.


6 This discourse included images, portrayals in travel journals, public debate, and all other forms of native representations created by the major colonial powers. For a detailed analysis, see George Steinnetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 138. The number of troops is based on a 1914 statistic. It is interesting to note that the total number of soldiers was a mere three thousand in 1900.

7 Ibid., 139.

8 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 117.


11 Ibid. Though the authors carry this thesis out to the First World War, they are also explicit that it was a grave concern in the intervening years. See Raffael Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 85–88. As late as the Second World War, German troops compared European partisans to Hottentots and had a tendency to label black troops compared European partisans to Hottentots and had a tendency to label black troops as ‘primitives.’" See also, Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay, "German Imperialism in Africa: The Distorted Images of Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo," Journal of Black Studies 23, no. 2 (1992): 239. These numbers were calculated from Table 1 without including the figures for the Asian and Pacific colonies. These figures are from 1916 population statistics.


13 Ibid. See also Robert Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Citino shows that this latitude was present at least as far back as the armies of Frederick the Great. The key difference was that Auftragstaktik was more likely to exonerate an officer even if his battlefield decisions had ultimately resulted in failure.

14 Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay, "German Imperialism in Africa: The Distorted Images of Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo," Journal of Black Studies 23, no. 2 (1992): 239. These numbers were calculated from Table 1 without including the figures for the Asian and Pacific colonies. These figures are from 1916 population statistics.
Framing Military Violence in German Africa

Christopher Goodwin

Hull, Absolute Destruction, 133.


Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist, introduction to The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. This power was explicitly spelled out in §11 (Reichskriegswesen), Article 63 of the Constitution of the German Reich of 1871.

Ibid.


For an in-depth discussion of Clausewitz and later German interpretations, see Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Routledge, 1983).


Ibid., 17.


Ibid., 47.

Ibid., 57.


Mosse, Image of Man, 79.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

See Dirk van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur: Deutsche Planung für eine Erschließung Afrikas, 1880 bis 1960 (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004). Particularly important is van Laak’s discussion of “railway imperialism” as a means of empire-building through the extension of economic, but also political, capital associated with long-distance power projection.

Ibid.


For an in-depth discussion of Clausewitz and later German interpretations, see Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Routledge, 1983).


Ibid., 17.


Ibid., 47.

Ibid., 57.


Mosse, Image of Man, 79.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Framing Military Violence in German Africa

Christopher Goodwin

62

Past Tense

Volume 5, Issue 1

50. Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 139.
54. Ibid., 79.
55. Ibid., 83. These body parts included the buttocks as well as the sexual organs of both men and women.
56. Ibid., 90.
57. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 50. These distinctions, as with any characterization of large swathes of society, are generalizations. Nevertheless, although individual behavior and beliefs may have varied from group norms, policies actually implemented by each group align closely with Steinmetz’s model.
62. Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 139.
64. Ibid., 124.
65. Ibid., 132.
68. Ibid., 177.
73. Ibid. 103.
74. Ibid., 102.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., 31–32.
80. Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 61.
83. Ibid., 22.
84. Ibid.
85. Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 64.
86. Jeremy Sarkiny, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* (Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, 2011), 190–1. There remain questions as to the nature of the Kaiser’s selection of Trotha. The Kaiser knew of Trotha’s exploits; whether it was direct appointment or merely approval, Kaiser Wilhelm and Trotha were aligned closely in the methods deemed necessary to effectively administer colonization.
89. Kenosian, “Colonial Body Politic,” 188.
91. Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*, 183.
92. Ibid., 103.
94. Ibid., 103.
95. Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*, 183.
A Well-Worn and Far-Travelled Tome: The Life and Times of a 1652 Edition of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s Don Quixote

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Translated into dozens of languages and published thousands of times in numerous countries around the world in its 411 years of existence, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s (1547–1616) The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote of La Mancha has attained recognition as one of the most read books in western culture. Various reproductions of Don Quixote over the last four centuries include parodies, plays, paintings and illustrations, cartoons, comic books, movies, and music. Of the many text editions in existence today, this short study will address a particular copy of Cervantes’ Don Quixote: The History of the Valorous and Witty-Night Errant Don Quixote of La Mancha, Translated out of the Spanish [by T. Shelton] now newly corrected and amended (1652), along with a few of the people who produced this seminal work and several of the notable individuals who have owned it through time. This leather-bound tome about a fictional member of Spain’s petty nobility has passed from one minor British aristocrat to another, only to mysteriously rest in Stony Brook University’s Rare Book Collection in Stony Brook, Long Island.¹

The cross-hatched leather binding of Cervantes’ tale about an aging and eccentric member of the Spanish nobility endears itself to musings on how the character Don Quixote may have appeared to the reader. In addition to the fading varnish and stains collected over centuries of use, this well-worn mottled-brown leather re-binding bears the scars of many readings. There is still evidence of a long lost elegance in the faintly discernable gold piping.

¹ Blackshire-Belay, “German Imperialism in Africa,” 239.