

Research Article

Framing Military Violence in German Africa: Metropolitan Indoctrination, Masculinity, and the Conceptualized Other

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Explanations for German colonial violence in Africa tend to revolve around either proto-Holocaust centered theories or the colony as a permeated space of continual violence. Both methods falter due to overgeneralization, often through lack of nuanced consideration of differing societal groups within the German colonial populations. This article addresses one of these populations, namely the German military administrations and personnel, primarily before the scandal of the Herero genocide resulted in a loss of relative administrative power for the colonial army. Military violence in the colonies arose through a combination of army values developed in Germany, an adapted version of metropolitan masculinity, and potent interpretations of European discourse on the colonized peoples. Coercive command became standard policy to maintain the equilibrium of the perceived power differential between colonizer and colonized. Although this balance became the standard goal of native policy for all German societal groups within the colonies, the military remained the only group with the ability to exert coercive command on a large scale.

Since 1894... [t]his indefatigable, dashing, militarily and scholarly distinguished officer made a name for himself.... Adored by his colored troops, he was the terror of all agitators.... His name... made the colored hearts tremble. Iron energy and the greatest lack of consideration for himself, he coupled this with a jubilant temperament and an unfailing benevolence for his subordinates.

EULOGY FOR MAJOR HANS
DOMINIK, 1911¹

THE POPULAR NEWSPAPER *Kolonie und Heimat* expressed these panegyric sentiments after Major Dominik died from the strains of quelling an uprising of the Maka people in Cameroon. The uprising began after Dominik led a “punitive expedition” (*Strafexpedition*) in response to a tale that a “German trader had been ‘eaten’ in the area.”² He was, in the end, regarded as a great pacifier of the region. Dominik’s methods of warfare would have been atypical on a European battlefield, but the underlying ideas originated in the metropole. This military training was coupled with a form of masculinity also transmitted from the homeland, but adapted to the colonial environment. The eulogy depicts Dominik as the “whole man,” occupying such contradictory positions as idolized/feared, benevolent/ruthless, and serious/exuberant. He is militaristic, yet scholarly; energetic and dashing, but contemplative when needed. Armed with an overbearing and purposely manufactured feeling of superiority over the native African population, Major

Hans Dominik could enact violence in the euphemistic name of justified pacification. His case is not unique among the military in the colonies. A framework can be constructed in which colonial military violence in German Africa can be explained by three causal factors: standardized military training and indoctrination in Germany; the transfer of the “whole man” ideal from the metropole and its subsequent transformation into hyper-masculine form in the colonies; and, stereotypic conceptions of the colonized Other as existing outside European or German norms.

This article attempts to specify an origin of German violence in Africa within historical context, which has hitherto remained historiographically problematic. Many previous studies have focused on the genocide against the Herero as a precursor to the Holocaust, often with allusions to the once-ubiquitous *Sonderweg* theory. Although the issue of historical continuities is most often at the forefront, a subtler issue is the difficulty of building a comprehensive theory of colonial violence predicated on a specific endpoint that was neither “the end,” nor a representative case.³ Some scholars have attempted a generalized framework in which colonists performed violence as an integral part of a system of dominance. While this piece does not deny such a framework, a more nuanced view shows that varying motivations among colonial societal groups resulted in differing levels and types of violence. Central to investigating this theme are the strides made in the historiography since 1970, specifically in the way that the colonial spheres are viewed. The

effects of colonialism are no longer ignored under the pretext of existing as an ephemeral phenomenon.⁴ More recently, historians have used historical, cultural, and literary studies to probe the depths of colonists' minds, but also those of the colonized.⁵ The following framework for colonial violence takes a similar interdisciplinary approach to include the effects and interactions of institutions and actors. The most significant contribution of the recent historiography is that "actors" now includes the colonized peoples, who are no longer viewed simply as those "acted upon." This article continues this historiographical trend by differentiating sources of agency, but also by recognizing the interactivity of groups.

The German army is a useful starting point for inquiry into group differentiation. Though many institutions and classes of actors existed on the German side during the colonial era, the army contrasted most with other factions. The German army developed unique systems and beliefs that distinguished it from other contemporary European militaries. Experiences in the Wars of Unification formed an ideology that placed a premium on harsh expedients in pursuit of "military necessities." Doctrines such as mission-based tactics (*Auftragstaktik*) gave individual commanders significant amounts of autonomous authority to determine military necessity. The army had little regard for international laws in Europe and even less so in the rugged and "uncivilized" context of the African colonies. Without a specific colonial army, Germany transferred its European-based military to an area

subject to much less governmental oversight as well as outside the effectual, though highly circumscribed, realm of emerging international law. This provided the impetus for the evolution of violence from military campaigns (*Feldzüge*) during the initial colonization phase to the punitive expeditions of occupation. It is the peculiar manifestation of the latter that this article attempts to explain. The fundamental difference between military campaigns and punitive expeditions was whether a legitimate military goal existed. Beyond this ambiguous definition, punitive expeditions were more localized and often conducted during times of occupation, rather than initial colonization. The dividing line became continually blurred as time went on, especially in the cases of uprisings (*Aufstände*). Thus suppression, usually a job for garrison troops, became a military goal for army governors and commanders. The melding of campaigns and punishment was sometimes characterized as "revenge campaigns" (*Rachefeldzüge*). The haphazard blending found its greatest expression in the Herero genocide (1904–1907), a development that is analyzed in detail below. The Maji Maji Rebellion (1905–1907) in Eastern Africa was another curious admixture of campaigning and suppressing.

On a deeper level, the harsh and militaristic colonial environment also provoked the creation of a specific brand of masculinity. A crisis of masculinity taking place in the metropole arrived in the colonies, but the unique setting provided a means of escape, and eventually the formation of a hegemonic settler masculinity.

Both nationalism and bourgeois sensibilities emphasized the idea of "the whole man," an ideal masculinity that harmoniously combined rationalism and emotionalism.⁶ Martina Kessel has argued convincingly that this "holistic version" of man amalgamated male and female characteristics in an attempt to create a distinctly masculine world.⁷ New societal norms emphasized traditional areas of masculinity, such as intellectualism and productivity,

ruralness could be the answer. It could be a world created in masculine form, emphasizing all of the characteristics of "the whole man." That this world would be distinctly masculine in nature is supported by the fact that, even after efforts to increase female presence, both German Southwest and East Africa held ratios of seven German men to only one white woman.¹⁰ The isolated nature of Africa distorted the whole-man concept into an extremely rugged

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yet also espoused "typical" feminine characteristics of sensitivity and passion. Society placed bounds on subjective versions of identity, asserting the primacy of order and harmony, or the careful balance of male/female attributes. Nonconformance to the new mores supposedly led from a depraved individual to an ill nation-state, thus introducing a national peril that reinforced the need for widespread adherence.⁸ Industrialization promoted urbanization, and nationalists felt that concentration in the cities created sexual abnormalcy, "alienation," and a removal from the traditional German soil.⁹ The rapid pace of urbanization and industrialization prompted a crisis in masculinity whenever the gender order appeared in question. Africa, therefore, with its abundant land and

and un-tempered version of those characteristics considered most manly. In essence, attributes of masculinity were taken to extreme levels. Though precise ideas of which aspects of masculinity should be emphasized differed, the hyper-masculinized ideal of the whole man became hegemonic during the era. The methods of enforcement also differed by the class of the settler, but in the military realm, hegemony was enforced by "cultural consent, discursive centrality, institutionalization, and the marginalization or deligitimation of alternatives," but especially by physical force against the native peoples.¹¹ Furthermore, the heightened masculinity of the military found greater expression in an environment that promoted strength, danger, and domination.

Military commanders subscribed to a specific precolonial ethnographic discourse that, when wedded with colonial masculinity and German military ideology, created an ethos in which extremely coercive measures, and eventually even genocide, were considered necessary.¹² The inherently violent nature of the military resulted in interpretations of ethnographic discourse that highlighted the allegedly savage and inhuman nature of those colonized. Coercive behavior against fellow whites in Europe became, fairly easily, murderously violent acts against “inhuman” and “cruel” blacks in Africa. The metropole government made no serious attempt to restrain this behavior until the genocide of the Herero created a backlash that fundamentally shifted colonial ideology away from the *Kulturmission* imposed primarily by the military.¹³

The Transfer of the Metropolitan Imperial Army

DISTINCT FROM OTHER IMPERIAL powers, Germany did not have a specifically designed colonial army, making it possible to frame some aspects of colonial military practice within the metropolitan-based military institution.¹⁴ Initially, the German colonial army (*Schutztruppe*) was organized under the German Imperial Naval Office, but was in reality a kind of “third branch” of the German military.¹⁵ The army conducted all infantry training within Germany, and indoctrinated troops received the dominant military ideologies and belief systems prevalent in the homeland. This primarily meant an emphasis on the “skillful, independent understanding

of a mission [*eines Auftrages*], prudent deliberation, quick and appropriate decisions, and outstanding vigor and bravery.”¹⁶ Courses in military history would “safeguard the officer from excessive humanitarian outlooks [*Anschauungen*]... that in war certain severities cannot be done without, that in fact often the only true humanity lies in their ruthless application.”¹⁷ Furthermore, the official field manual sanctioned harsh “preventative measures” against occupied populations.¹⁸ While it would be a mischaracterization to suggest that the colonial environment itself had no impact on troop behavior, indoctrination and military culture provided fundamental attitudes toward military practice wherever German troops were stationed. Unit formation in the colonies, however, differed markedly from the metropolitan army. Colonial units were temporary and makeshift, resulting in a lack of cohesion normally formed through common regional origins, constant group interaction, and social maintenance.¹⁹ Continuity in leadership and experience was severely hindered by short terms of service; half of the officers served only one year in the colonies and only 12 per cent served more than three years.²⁰ Therefore, the standardized military training received in Germany was a particularly important influence on collective behavior, as it was the strongest source of group identity.

Shared knowledge of doctrine and standard operating procedures strongly informed group behavior. *Auftragstaktik*, already a hallmark of the German army, became a recurrent and enlarged capacity for individual action at all levels of the military hierarchy within the colonies. Large numbers of troops

on European battlefields during the Wars of Unification had shown the relative merits of a flexible mission system compared to attempts at near-absolute control of subordinates in the Napoleonic Wars.²¹ German officers gave orders that lacked specific detail, and they preferred troops to adapt when confronted with the fog of war or complications on the battlefield. This was not, however, a free pass for an officer to do as he pleased. The “coherence of the plan” was a guide to follow, and the fulfilment of the overall mission was always the goal.²² On the other hand, it required a degree of latitude: officers were expected to produce action and take risks, but with the reciprocal expectation that mistakes could happen and would be forgiven if it could be shown that the officer had worked within the framework of *Auftragstaktik*.²³ Any military action that vaguely supported the intentions of higher-ranking commanders was usually sufficient evidence. If performed correctly, the system allowed adaptability to changing battlefield conditions, and resulted in greater speed and maneuverability compared to armies that required lengthy, vertical hierarchical communication. The need for mission-based tactics was clear in the African colonial context. Germany controlled an area roughly five times the size of its European territory, along with an indigenous population of over 11 million.²⁴ With a German colonial population of 22,000, of which only 6,500 were military troops, a wide degree of authority was necessary within any given field of operations.²⁵ This produced a much greater sphere

of responsibility, especially for lower ranking personnel, such as junior officers and noncommissioned officers.²⁶ Authority predicated on mission-based tactics provided the pretext for much of the violent coercion that colonial troops enacted. The system’s interpretive nature allowed a wide scope for individual initiative, but without the usual restraints of specific military goals or a defined battlefield. The problem became particularly acute when orders from above conflicted with standard notions of European military ethics, as will be shown in the context of the Herero uprising. The home government reduced this authority only when “mistakes” rose to the level of genocide, and even then only because of the resulting furor in the metropole as well as by other colonial powers.

Nevertheless, the German government still condoned the army’s general doctrine on the treatment of civilians, ideas that encouraged a loose definition of military necessity. Again, experiences during the Wars of Unification, particularly the French popular uprising and use of unconventional troops in the form of *franc-tireurs* during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, instigated a belief in harsh measures based on “military necessity.”²⁷ Victory against an enemy military was not a guarantee of peace, as was shown by continuing anti-occupation operations after the French field army was defeated in 1870.²⁸ Though commanders initially, but questionably from a legal standpoint, ordered reprisals against spies and guerilla fighters under the authority of *Auftragstaktik*, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke eventually

sanctioned the practice legally.²⁹ Though German casualty figures by irregular French fighters was relatively low, a quarter of the field army was arrayed against the *franc-tireurs* due to their seeming ability to be anywhere at any time.³⁰ Such an imbalance to combat small numbers of enemy fighters raised harsh responses to the level of military necessity in the eyes of field commanders. Horne and Kramer have shown extensively that the fear of guerilla tactics became mythologized in the psyche of the German military and played a crucial role in military decision making and doctrinal development in the subsequent decades.³¹ In the colonies, where the pervasiveness of the need for dominance was even more widespread, it was far easier to consider groups as rebel fighters. Whereas in Europe there were at least hazy limits as to what constituted rebellious or partisan behavior, the maintenance of the perceived power differential required a much lower tolerance for supposedly “threatening” behavior. Coupled with the belief that natives were inhuman and could only be subjugated through fear, this perceived power differential intensified the idea of reprisals as military necessity. Some, in fact, did directly compare reprisals against natives with the execution of civilians in the Franco-Prussian War.³²

Disregarding the dissenting opinions and diverging widely from emerging international law, the German military was primed for excessively violent means of coercion in the colonies. The German military, as a whole, viewed laws regulating warfare as an infringement on the basic right to conduct combat. Considering *Auftragstaktik* the only

method efficient enough to deal with irregular warfare, and the need to quickly and effectively combat it so paramount, the army fought any limits for responding to civilian fighters. This permeated down to the lower levels, and recruits were generally unaware of specific legal requirements on the treatment of civilians or prisoners of war.³³ Retired General Julius von Hartmann, a prominent writer on military affairs, expounded in Clausewitzian terms both the overall purpose of war, as well as the variables that would influence individual soldiers to act in the name of military necessity:

[T]he one, great, final goal of war is the subjugation of the enemy power, the overcoming of the enemy energy, the mastery of the enemy will. This one goal commands absolutely and it dictates law and regulation. The concrete figuration of this law appears in the form of military necessity.... The course of war appears as a stringing together of actions, in which military personnel, as carriers of the military strength of the state and under the full exploitation... of the striving toward a common goal, are subject to particular targets of military necessity that they must execute.³⁴

There was, therefore, not an insistence on mission-based tactics in the name of military necessity in the German military; there was an understood compulsion. The pursuit of military necessity was defined as a basic right of the army and, with the use of *Auftragstaktik*, encompassed virtually anything that could lead to any vaguely defined goal of a superior. If the result were unsuccessful, latitude was given if the commander showed that

he had attempted to work within this framework.

That these principles transferred from the metropole to the African colonies is clear. Training that took place in Germany ensured the indoctrination of this mindset. The primary difference was that, due to the expanse of territory and the miniscule amount of troops with which to control it, even low-ranking commanders held authority to impose large, broad fines or summarily execute those defined as rebels.³⁵ In the midst of the Herero uprising, the German General Staff, in its historical analysis, asserted that “[w]homever wished to colonize here [Africa], must first grasp the sword and wage war, not with petty and delicate means, but rather with great, awe-inspiring power until the utter defeat of the natives.”³⁶ This assessment did not differ from German precolonial theory, but the experience of colonization had seemingly validated extremely coercive methods, further enshrining them in standard colonial military practice. Additionally, Kaiser Wilhelm’s *Kommandogewalt*, or broad constitutional rights to command the armed forces, ensured that, when colonial troubles arose, he could appoint an officer closely aligned with his way of thinking.³⁷ This would have serious repercussions during the Herero uprising with the appointment of Lothar von Trotha, as will be shown later, but it was also vitally important for the colonial military context as a whole. The combined framework of *Immediatsystem*, in which subordinates reported solely to the Kaiser, and the *Kommandogewalt* accentuated the image of the Kaiser’s authority, yet it also created what Annika Mombauer and

Wilhelm Deist have characterized as “Byzantinism.”³⁸ Consequently, offices worked in relative seclusion, causing a lack of coordination in policy. The result for the military was an almost complete insulation from non-executive oversight. Though the Kaiser was the Commander-in-Chief of each branch of the military, his authority over the *Schutztruppe* was even more marked. Unlike the army, in which some states’ contingents, such as Bavaria and Saxony, maintained a “special bond” with their kings in peacetime, the navy was an exclusively imperial institution from the very beginning.³⁹ Organizationally located under the navy, the *Schutztruppe* was under the absolute authority of the Kaiser during both times of peace and war. Due to precedent and the *Kommandogewalt*, his position and influence was circumscribed only marginally with its transfer to the Colonial Department in 1896 and then the *Reichskolonialamt* in 1907.

These kinds of constitutional and legal disconnects were widespread, effecting a seclusion of military development, both in the metropole and overseas, from virtually any civilian oversight. Clausewitz’s assertion of the military as a tool of policy was reversed.⁴⁰ As one of the many repercussions of administrative Byzantinism, the military narrowed its view to the tactical and operational levels, forgoing much consideration of the political-strategic aspects of war-making. This produced a much greater emphasis on the actions of individual commanders in the field, allowing them to direct policy “on the ground.” The Kaiser set the tone of military governance through his customarily boisterous martial

declarations. An ingrained adherence to *Auftragstaktik* and a disdain for international laws of war ensured that the Kaiser's policies were transmitted down the chain of command. Ministers such as Chancellor von Bülow claimed that "colonial politics was still a policy of conquering, and that nowhere in the world did one succeed at appropriating land from a foreign people without battles.... Colonial wars will therefore invariably be a necessary consequence of a colonial politics."⁴¹ Nevertheless, this military culture and legal sanctioning only provided the ability to use violent coercion. It does not explain the motivation for such coercion, which requires an investigation of individual beliefs and actions.

The Transfer and Distortion of German Metropolitan Masculinity

THE MILITARY PROVIDED AN INSULAR, masculinized world whether it was stationed within the metropole or beyond its borders. Nevertheless, the form that this masculinity took was also dependent upon its location. Thus, the "standardized" masculinity inculcated in troops in Germany during training was subject to change when it entered the African environs. The military environment allowed, promoted, and created a space for the expression of masculinity, but it was not the sole definer of male gender ideals. Manliness itself did not conform to such a narrow spectrum, and it was a fundamental basis for the colonial power framework more broadly.⁴² This was true among and between the varied classes of colonizers, but even more specifically in the case of military

personnel. Africa was a battlefield in which industrialized warfare on a mass scale could not take place; this "allowed masculine heroism, determination and nobility to shine through."⁴³ Colonists perceived Africa as a wide open space where a man could become his true and whole self without the artificial constraints imposed by industrialized society.⁴⁴ This "true self" harkened back to a pre-industrial masculinity that arose during the Wars of Liberation.⁴⁵ A working reconciliation between the individual and the collective defined the "militarization of masculinity."⁴⁶ The collective was not necessarily German society as a whole, but rather the pursuit of a higher ideal that often involved some aspect of *Deutschtum*. Willpower was an integral component of manliness.⁴⁷ It allowed a dogged determination for "heroism, death, and sacrifice" in the name of this higher ideal.⁴⁸ Yet the valuation of a man along this ideal was based on his individual and particular attributes:

The great community of the state will not be served by an internally changed person. Rather, he will lovingly serve in the manner that he wishes and is capable of, with an unbroken peculiarity and his entire soul.⁴⁹

Ideal masculinity was not envisioned as a composition of mechanically functioning men, but of those that pursued a collective ideal with the individual talents he possessed.

German men saw Africa as a way to return to these values, and as an escape from the crisis that now befell masculinity in the metropole. This crisis arose primarily from industrialization, technological increase, and advances

in the field of physiology. Growing industry prompted labor unrest and socialist ideologies.⁵⁰ Along with rising nationalism, these pervasive ideologies attempted to subsume the individual into society in the pursuit of higher ideals. Advances in technology seemed to "speed up time itself."⁵¹ Medical doctors promoted ideas of degeneracy, both physical and mental.⁵² While the ideologies co-opted masculinity with some success, science was mainly a man's preserve, and degeneracy prompted the most concern for the future of masculinity. This particularly informed the debates on race in conceiving of the colonized as either inferior or child-like in development, but also in the potential degeneracy of the "white race" arising from biological or cultural admixture. To a large degree, the enforced racial hierarchy propagated by German colonists was based on these new developments in science. Africa functioned as one of several pressure valves for those wishing to escape the masculinity crisis in Germany. Many believed that the "untainted" naturalness, and therefore beauty, of the environment, along with harsh living conditions would help alleviate mental and physical degeneracy.

Rather than simply a return to traditional, pre-industrial conceptions of masculinity, colonial maleness became a grandiose distortion of the old ideals. Manhood had once meant embodying the physical representation of the family unit as a whole in dealings with the state; in essence, the husband solely represented the interests of his household and was, therefore, a citizen.⁵³ In the colonies, due to a lack of family units and the attendant rise in land holding,

the ideal transformed from head-of-family to "master over a domain."⁵⁴ This power was easily circumscribed by the colonial administration or, in the case of soldiers, the military. Nevertheless, colonists found outlets for exercising mastery in a variety of places, whether in labor relations with natives, sexual aggression, or military violence. Among military personnel, mastery was most obviously demonstrated by the summary judgment of supposed rebels through the wide breadth of command and emphasis on mission-based tactics, especially during *Strafexpeditionen*.

Colonial men were also expected to be fearless, work hard, show dedication and self-confidence, and be creative.⁵⁵ These were not new attributes of masculinity. They were, however, magnified by the environment and interactions with strange, new peoples. Diseases, weather, and animals were constant dangers, as well as African warriors with non-European customs and methods. The colonies initially lacked economic infrastructure, terminology that was still synonymous with "railroad network."⁵⁶ Many believed that "economic salvation... lay in the construction of railways."⁵⁷ Military commentators of the era believed that *Strafexpeditionen* could prompt economic growth by increasing German prestige in an era, something that Hermann von Wissmann supposedly benefited from in East Africa at the expense of the Hehe people.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, until this infrastructural dream could become reality, agricultural work was widespread among the colonial population and necessary for subsistence in each locality. Although there was certainly exploitation of native labor, hard

physical labor remained necessary for settlers. Dedication was required both on the individual level and in working toward the “colonial experiment.” Self-confidence contributed to an individual’s life, but was also vitally important for interactions with native peoples and the maintenance of white hegemony. Creativity was predicated on initiative, risk-taking, and the ability to flexibly

limits: masturbation was a contributor to internal weakness; marital sexual relations should be moderate; and laws should prohibit homosexuality.⁶¹ Homosexuals found little respite in the colonies as authorities considered it dangerous to the imperial cause from the beginning.⁶² They did not consider sexual relations, violent or consenting, with indigenous women

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accomplish tasks.⁵⁹ As the civilian governor Friedrich von Lindequist stated, it was an official goal to “awaken and promote the independence and spontaneity of the settlers as much as possible.”⁶⁰ As noted above, the lack of a specialized colonial army engendered a need for a generalized skill set. *Auftragstaktik* was the German military’s answer to the question of initiative and risky pursuits. Though Lindequist referred to colonial settlers rather than the army explicitly, military experience in mission-based tactics was considered excellent preparation for future life as a colonist; soldier-turned-colonist was an outcome that was by no means rare.

Masculinity also contained an explicit sexual component. Bourgeois values in metropolitan Germany acknowledged sexual desire as natural, but within

to be extraordinary, but rather quite normal, and it did not become a concern until there was a spike in interracial marriages. Colonizers were attracted to the “naturalness,” ease of availability, and perceived promiscuity of the natives.⁶³ These encounters allegedly cured boredom and loneliness, and authorities considered them to be expected given the dearth of German women in the colonies.⁶⁴ More than this, it was a way of further conquering Africa beyond the land or on the battlefield. Indeed, both consensual relationships and cases of rape became more frequent as the German military’s control over the colonies grew.⁶⁵

Challenges to this sexuality did arise after a turn toward racial components of masculinity. This came from two directions: German women’s concern over

male desire for natives, and citizenship through *jus sanguinis*, or descent by blood. In the later stages of colonization, the colonial administration’s position stated that German men could only succeed as true men through marital union with “racial equals.”⁶⁶ They reasoned that only German women, as the harbingers of future generations, were the guardians of culture and race.⁶⁷ Many nationalists in the metropole were of the same opinion. Unlike countries such as France, German law considered only biological descent as a qualifier for citizenship: the children of a married couple acquired the citizenship of the father, but if the father could not be determined, the child received the mother’s citizenship.⁶⁸ Furthermore, at the time of marriage, the wife received the husband’s citizenship.⁶⁹ This latter point, when applied to German-male/native-female marriages, offended German women in particular. The increasing opposition of German women to mixed marriages and the greater support by women in general for colonization resulted in an influx of female settlers. In the harsh colonial environment, the gender divide had already begun to blur, as women were expected “to be able to do everything their husbands did.”⁷⁰ This included many of the traditional colonial masculine qualities such as work ethic and willpower.⁷¹ Only in the area of sexuality did the entrance of German women attempt to alter conceptions of masculinity. In effect, these women expected reciprocation of the sexual modesty that men imposed on them. Yet for much of the era of colonization, German women were absent and played few significant roles in internal

colonial affairs. At least in the beginning, German women had little impact on the formation of colonial masculinity.

Colonial authorities considered the passage of citizenship to offspring as the clearer and more present danger. First, opposition to mixed marriages usually ignited specifically when soldiers were involved, regardless of the fact that this was a much less likely scenario than civilian mixed marriages.⁷² Soldiers, as the upholders of German honor and supposed models of German masculinity, were the most recognized symbol of Germany and its power in the colonies. Not only would other colonial powers recognize this, but also the native subjects, thus endangering the perceived power differential. Second, German citizenship entailed potential duties such as military service, voting rights, and the ability to hold public office.⁷³ The cultural level of the entire family unit was, therefore, governed by that of the wife, and marriage to a native defiled masculinity.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the children of such unions were supposedly “by rule, morally and physically weak, [and] combined the worst characteristics of both parents.”⁷⁵

It must be noted that these differing views necessarily meant that conceptions of masculinity were contested, though the settler-soldier model remained the hegemonic model. Settlers held to the exaggerated traditionalist form while colonial authority, now firmly in the hands of middle class administrators after news of the genocide provoked outrage in Germany, attempted to rein them in toward the rapidly racializing form of bourgeois values of propriety. After the colonial administration’s attempts to ban mixed marriages on racial grounds,

the Reichstag decision in 1912 to allow them to continue further heightened the crisis afflicting masculinity in the metropole.⁷⁶ In contrast, the settlers' legal argument rested on the traditional masculine legal right to pass on citizenship. Although the legal basis of citizenship was "by blood," this was never meant as racial categorization, but was firmly rooted in gender. As far as strict legal jurisprudence was concerned, laws that attempted to insert racial categories were an infringement on patriarchal rights, and therefore invalid.⁷⁷ The formalized citizenship laws of 1870 and 1913 were based on German men's rights and interests in contrast to women, not in contrast to "racial non-Germans." Marriage was an exceptional situation, however, and most sexual encounters remained in the form of rape, concubinage, or prostitution. Colonial and metropole authorities focused on marriage because it appeared an existential threat to the perceived power differential, a situation that always made settler-native relations more tense and violence more likely. Threats to sexual freedom with natives were met with legal challenges and refusals to testify against alleged rapists. German authorities never found a satisfactory solution for the frequent rapes during military campaigns or large scale containments, such as those that occurred after the establishment of concentration camps during the Herero uprising.

Military personnel, though not in the same societal class as settlers in general, aligned closely with this general form of colonial hegemonic masculinity. Although settlers clung to traditional masculine legal rights,

intermarriage was low, resulting in only 24 mixed marriages prior to 1905.⁷⁸ This number rose marginally following the arrival of German troops during the Herero Wars.⁷⁹ That these marriages occurred, offspring produced, and neither later repudiated by the German soldiers is evidence that imperial soldiers subscribed to the "settler version" of the sexual and citizenship aspects of masculinity. The same can be said for other types of sexual encounters, though rape and prostitution were perhaps more available and permissible expedients for soldiers than long-term concubinage, which was the most common scenario for established settlers. In other aspects, military conceptions of masculinity were in line with those standardized in the German army, but with a heightened emphasis on honor, adventure, and individual heroism. Volunteer officers were detached from the regular army and were more often of the eccentric variety, preferring the greater military action available in the colonies, and would perhaps have had less success in their careers domestically.⁸⁰ The colonies were also a field in which formerly disgraced officers could begin anew.⁸¹ German military masculinity in the colonies aligned closely with the settler colonial mentality, though in militarized form. Settlers often called for harsher punishments to perceived or real threats from natives than even the heads of the military administrations; individual soldiers and units, through either *Auftragstaktik* or their own volition, were often more willing to oblige. This was a combination of hyper-masculinity and the army's willingness to create a space for its expression. Coupled with the perceived dangers

and adventure of Africa, military men were in a position to exercise their version of masculinity to a far greater extent than would have been possible in the metropole. The geographic distance and perception of residing outside the bounds of industrialized and "degenerate" metropolitan sexuality fostered the growth of colonial hyper-masculinity.

Conception of the Other and its Influences on Military Masculinity

COMBINED, THE MILITARY STRUCTURE and hyper-masculinity were unlikely to result in the level of violence that eventually occurred in Africa. Certainly, it could have resulted in scattered acts of violence, but a more universal explanation or motivation is needed to account for widespread aggression. A crucial component has thus far been absent: colonized men, both their masculinity and its effect on German masculinity. Although it is clear that military culture contributed to violence in Africa, the contribution of masculinity remains incomplete if one considers only the transformation of metropolitan manliness in the colonies. Yet, in many ways, distinguishing the impact of native sexuality on German masculinity is a more complicated task. It involves preconceived notions of natives, how actual contact altered these pre-conceived notions, responses and changes in natives engendered by the arrival of the German military and settlers, and the subsequent German responses to these changes in native behavior. These complicated sets of interaction formed much of the basis of settler-native relationships, though

it is often difficult to divide action and reaction. Nevertheless, it is possible to find primary motivations, whether through inference from events or occasionally even clearly stated goals.

The main task of colonial governance was the maintenance of alterity, or the "otherness" of the natives, and is generally referred to as "native policy."⁸² This did not necessarily mean that colonial authorities attempted to force natives into a static mode of life or culture, though this was the case in certain circumstances. The policy for alterity was predicated on an "assumption of an unbridgeable difference between themselves and their subjects and of the ineradicable inferiority of the colonized."⁸³ Therefore, the focus on the maintenance of otherness emphasized a need to maintain the recognition of this "unbridgeable difference," rather than an attempt to ensure that this difference existed. This distinction is significant for understanding military and settler behavior; the colonizers believed that this difference was inherent and could not be changed, either through intermarriage or by any amount of cultural change. Intermarriage would only produce children of a lower level, and cultural change or assimilation were viewed as insidious mimicry, and not true improvement. The source of colonial power, and therefore the focus of imperial native policy, resided in the mutual recognition and perception of alterity and its immutability.

The belief of inherent inferiority was initially based on precolonial discourse. Early discourse was not uniform, and often contained contradictory representations of natives. Writers described the Khoikhoi both as practitioners of grotesque sexual

acts, but also as the “Hottentot Venus” in the case of women.⁸⁴ They placed special emphasis on sexual aspects, ranging from alleged bestiality with apes to the commonly repeated astonishment at the size of various body parts.⁸⁵ In other cases, the Khoikhoi were described either as noble savages, or with the more ubiquitous “ignoble savage” trope.⁸⁶ Although the specifics of precolonial discourse differed by African ethnic group, all discourses were in agreement that Africans were on a lower civilizational level developmentally.

More generally, however, depictions emphasized the “compulsive nature of the [African] colonial soldier, his sexual energy, and the necessity to control these passions.”⁸⁷ This supposed energy became a concern regarding relationships between German women and native men.⁸⁸ The fear found its ultimate expression in Arthur Schnitzler’s short story “Andreas Thameyer’s Last Letter.” Thameyer’s wife had an illicit affair with an African on display at a zoo in Europe, but he refused to accept it, even after the illegitimate son was born. His sense of masculinity and honor led him to despair and disbelief:

I can in no way continue living. Because as long as I live, the people will mock, and nobody would see the truth. The truth is that my wife was true to me—I swear on all that I find holy, and I seal it through my death.... My Anna was alone—alone just once.... Who wouldn’t conceive that under these circumstances she must have felt a monstrous horror for this giant man with fervent eyes and a great, black beard.⁸⁹

Readers perceived a manifold of insecurities in the young Thameyer.

Public perception and the ensuing scorn of Thameyer’s loss of masculinity drove him to suicide. He portrayed the African as a grotesque distortion of male sexuality, physically large with corresponding facial hair, and eyes that burned with sexual desire for the white woman. That something like this could happen on German soil, rather than thousands of miles away in the colonies, concerned contemporary readers. The worst infraction on Thameyer’s masculinity, however, is that if somehow this betrayal occurred, his wife was impregnated from a single encounter. His German masculine honor could be salvaged only through his suicide.

Varying discourses led to competing visions of ethnographic acuity.⁹⁰ Different colonial social groups adhered to different views of the natives, and each attempted to construct policy accordingly, though always with the goal of stabilizing the perceived power differential between colonist and native. While educated officials were concerned with cultural and linguistic communication, and landowners with monetary incentives, the military viewed the older ethnographic discourse as proof that coercive command was the most suitable method for interacting with natives.⁹¹ During the early period of colonization, the military held primacy in policymaking, and sometimes held civil authority as well.⁹² This is more obvious during the initial military campaigns, but it extended afterward during “pacification.” Violent means of pacification often led to dismay and small-scale revolts. The military establishment cemented its importance in the colonial experiment by emphasizing its centrality in pacification, invoking a circularity

of reasoning. To the metropolitan government, it seemed reasonable to continue military administration until pacification was complete. Typical military policy consisted of “coercive command” to enforce the recognition of difference and compliance with colonial authority. Quick initial victories reinforced the idea of German military supremacy. Although soldiers viewed the native peoples as inferior, they also believed them excessively cruel, a stereotype that allegedly legitimized massacres or atrocities.⁹³ Captured enemy soldiers were often executed *en masse*, because they were labeled as rebels. This labeling was possible because of the unique German view on what constituted “occupied territory,” a significant distinction in determining whether a prisoner was a legitimate combatant or a rebel behind enemy lines. The German view held that “occupation began immediately behind the front lines, regardless of whether the ‘occupier’ actually controlled the area.”⁹⁴ This presented an interesting, though unfortunate, scenario in the colonies; as inferior peoples were allegedly incapable of waging civilized warfare, front lines were virtually non-existent, resulting in the military administration often labeling the entire territory as occupied. Unsurprisingly, 54 “punitive expeditions” occurred in East Africa alone in the short span between 1891 to 1894.⁹⁵

With circular logic, the occurrence and frequent recurrence of coercion reinforced the perception that it was needed. Furthermore, it augmented the military’s preferred precolonial discourse. There were only minor changes from precolonial to colonial era discourse in

the characteristics the military attributed to the natives; but, as infantry Captain Schwabe expressed, greater conviction and coercive command remained the best options:

One gets to know this people after one has lived among them for years... Mistrustful, conceited, proud, and in turn beggarly and servile, mendacious and faithless, thieving—whenever they are in the majority—violent and cruel.... The one thing that cannot be denied is bravery in battle, but only when the situation is at its direst. My judgment may be severe, but fair in every case, and the treatment [of this people] must be, and remain, severe and fair. The Kaffir [common pejorative for Africans] must be given this treatment, or else they will play dirty tricks on us, because the Herero always considers mellowness and leniency as weakness and cowardliness.⁹⁶

The description appears in many ways to be the opposite of the “whole man” concept; even bravery is only possible under extenuating circumstances. These sentiments were ubiquitous among the military community, and this led to conflicts with the natives in which commanders did not consider negotiation an option.⁹⁷ To a degree, this was becoming the German view on war generally. Nevertheless, in the colonial context, the notion was taken to an extreme. Harshness continued to serve “native policy,” because punishments such as large fines, public humiliation, and executions would “keep their subjection permanently awake in the native’s memory.”⁹⁸ Of particular importance was the idea, as expressed by Captain Schwabe, that leniency

would only lead to further revolts or, in other words, the breakdown of the perceived power differential.

German soldiers' justifications for violence were not limited to pure military reasoning, but were more often intimately tied to ideas propagated in precolonial discourse as well as the implicit goals of the colonial project. Although, as shown above, the natives' battlefield characteristics were held in low regard, German soldiers also considered them lazy regarding work more generally.⁹⁹ This was anathema to "true German manliness," but especially to the prevailing colonial view. Gustav Frenssen, in his 1906 fictional book *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest*, portrayed the German soldier's reasoning for the massacre of natives:

These blacks have earned death from God and man. Not because they murdered 200 farmers and revolted against us, but because they have built no houses or dug wells.... God has allowed us victory because we are noble and strive for progress.¹⁰⁰

German correspondents deplored the lack of adventurous spirit of natives, that "the house, the village, or at most the countryside was the world of his field of vision."¹⁰¹ This was certainly not the cosmopolitanism of the "whole man." Military atrocities, therefore, revolved more around a worldview than the military acts or abilities of the natives. Masculinity required hard physical labor and progress, and the precolonial and contemporary discourse emphasized that the natives were incapable of this sustained test of manliness.¹⁰² An even more pernicious native response was mimicry. Through the course of

European contact, natives became more knowledgeable about the colonizers than the reverse; some natives were bilingual, received non-native names, or converted religions.¹⁰³ A "talent for mimicry" was not complimentary. Rather, it seemed to upset the recognition of difference, and therefore the entire colonial order.¹⁰⁴ Permitted mimicry, such as black colonial troops in German uniforms, became a source of discomfort when these same soldiers became "rebels," yet continued to wear the uniforms.¹⁰⁵ Authorities and colonists did not view mimicry as cultural change, or the advancement of native culture. Instead, they perceived it as a tool of the natives to upset the power differential.

Disparity in knowledge was a particular area of contention because natives had access to the more intimate parts of the colonizers' lives. In effect, the colonizers were always on display, and therefore it was necessary to perpetually show mastery and power.¹⁰⁶ In the earlier days of military penetration, this was of little concern for the soldiers, as power or mastery was shown through battlefield victories, sexual violence, or the purchase of prostitutes.¹⁰⁷ When these relationships transformed into household servitude, domestic unions, or marriage, the prominent scandals of the era clearly displayed the limits of privacy. Sexual honor became a concern through the legal crime of sodomy; it was legally impossible for a man to be raped.¹⁰⁸ Fears of "unnatural seductions" arose through propaganda of the "amplified affinity of the African for homosexuality."¹⁰⁹ There was, therefore, an effort to portray the male African Other as unmanly. Attributes that were "more manly" than German

conceptions were derided as unnatural, beastly, and unrefined—the whole man was a balance. This derision allowed a freer hand when implementing military coercion. The military occupation allowed a space for the expression of hyper-masculinity; the addition of comparing natives to this ideal, and then finding them wanting, perpetuated a willingness for, and conduct of, violence.

A Case Study: From the Leutwein System to the Genocide of the Herero

ALTHOUGH COLONIAL VIOLENCE IN general, rather than genocide in particular, is the focus of this article, it is useful to analyze the progression and escalation of violence in a case-study format. Colonial violence and cruelty were not rare, but one native reaction invariably resulted in the escalation of coercion: rebellion. Few uprisings were very large, but the Herero rebellion of 1903 was a major response to sustained maltreatment, fines, land disputes, and sexual violence. In 1894, army officer Theodor Leutwein was appointed as a high-ranking colonial administrator, and then governor in 1898.¹¹⁰ His native policy has become known as the Leutwein System, and consisted of diplomacy, divide and rule tactics, and military coercion. A typical example of this model was the requisitioning of cattle from natives: first, bribery was attempted, then official favoring of certain chieftains, and finally outright violent coercion. When this ultimately failed to satisfy the needs of colonists, he repeated the cycle for native-land acquisition. Again, the colonists were not satisfied and reservation land was parceled out to native groups. If the

natives were unable to use natural resources as "real men," the military administration believed it necessary to transfer such resources to settlers. Finally, in January 1904 the Herero rose up against the German administration. A local colonial association called for an "energetic military action" because "only through the absolute perpetuation of the supremacy of [the white] race can its rule be enforced."¹¹¹ In effect, only extreme violence maintained the perceived power differential. Unsurprisingly, Leutwein attempted to subdue the native peoples through force. He claimed to critics in Germany that there were no orders to kill women and children or refuse prisoners. This would have been in contradiction to military and metropole masculine values. Still, he admitted that the troops had been acting in excess.¹¹² There had been a flood of reports, though erroneous, that the Herero had butchered German women and children and burned houses, further proof of unmanly and savage behavior. Masculine honor demanded the protection of all three signifiers of the household domain. Nevertheless, Leutwein's goal had always been to use enough violent coercion to open negotiations.¹¹³ His final mistake, in the eyes of military authorities, was his personally-ordered retreat of his unbeaten troops at Ovumbo on April 13, implemented both for military as well as administrative concerns.¹¹⁴ Within the context of the German military culture of offense, which contemporary military theorists often defined in stereotypic nineteenth century masculine terms such as energetic and inexorable, this retreat was a defeat.

Owing both to the ineffectiveness of

Leutwein to quell the rebellion and his shameful retreat, the German military sent General Lothar von Trotha to restore order. Trotha was the quintessential example of the new, heightened colonial military masculinity. Although he had gained experience during the Wars of Unification, his career was particularly successful outside of Germany, owing to merciless, but successful, campaigns in East Africa and China.¹¹⁵ Trotha's brutality was well known, and Kaiser Wilhelm either directly appointed or personally approved his appointment to the Southwest African command on May 3.¹¹⁶ The Kaiser, identifying the rebellion as a serious matter of national security and using his constitutional prerogative of *Kommandogewalt*, placed the conduct of operations under military control, instead of civilian leadership.¹¹⁷ Trained in Germany and long part of the system, Trotha understood the German military concept of *Vernichtungskrieg*, the complete and comprehensive military defeat of the enemy. Nevertheless, in the colonial context, he linked the same verbiage (*vernichten*) with methods contrary to normal European warfare. Rather than the destruction of military forces, Trotha, in a letter to Leutwein, stated that "the use of [v]iolence with stark terrorism and cruelty was and is my policy. I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of money."¹¹⁸ The "whole man" concept of balanced rationality and emotionality is present in this statement, the rationality of an industrialized nation's war-making system and the emotional vision of "justified" blood-letting, violence, and terrorism. Trotha believed that negotiation, as Leutwein now advocated, would destroy the perceived

power differential between colonists and natives, and future German administrative policy would forever be met by armed rebellion if the Herero succeeded in this instance.

This line of reasoning was used in the aftermath of the battle of Waterberg, which had taken place on August 11. The Herero were soundly defeated in an attempted concentric battle of annihilation, a *Vernichtungskrieg* in the military sense. Owing to difficulties in the conduct of the battle, however, many of the Herero escaped and Trotha did not consider it a "total military victory."¹¹⁹ When the Herero attempted multiple times to open negotiations, as had normally happened after previous military defeats, Trotha refused on the grounds that it would show "weakness and embarrassment," thus impugning both military and manly honor.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, some German troops had begun to openly massacre the Herero, regardless of age or gender. Trotha attempted to limit such actions to armed men classified as rebels.¹²¹ Thus, courts martial were no longer necessary. This was a clear departure from the Leutwein System and ensured an escalation of sanctioned military violence. That many of the troops were recently arrived and inexperienced reinforcements from Germany increased the likelihood that the infliction of violence would be less restrained. Standard military practice emphasized relentless pursuit to defeat enemies that had escaped destruction by concentric attack, as had occurred at Waterberg. A refusal to negotiate inspired continual and escalating violence and the lack of logistical support promoted small groupings of German soldiers; especially at this low level of the military hierarchy,

the shooting of civilians continued. By September 30, supply levels were perilous and Trotha ordered the pursuit to end. Two days later he issued the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, thus ending any idea of future negotiations, and rejecting even the complete submission of the Herero.¹²²

Aside from the escalation of the idea of *Vernichtung*, Trotha still operated within the framework of the colonial German military. In Southwest Africa, frontlines did not exist, and it was customary to execute rebels. As the *Vernichtungsbefehl* made clear, a large scale revolt of this nature expanded

circular logic regarding this violence, mentioned above, was applicable in this situation. The Herero, thought the military administration, were rebelling because they believed the Germans were weak, and only an even greater display of force could stabilize the mutual recognition of racial and civilizational difference. Ironically, native policy conducted along military lines would theoretically eventually lead to colonies without natives.

The genocide could not have occurred without Trotha's order, but the *Vernichtungsbefehl* and its results were made possible only through the already

Standard military practice emphasized relentless pursuit to defeat enemies

the definition of "rebel" to include "every Herero, with or without rifle... [and] no more women or children accommodated."¹²³ The attribution of "rebel" was tied to the familiar trope of the "cruel Herero," by citing crimes such as murder, theft, and the mutilation of wounded German soldiers.¹²⁴ Trotha's call for annihilation was not a mistaken usage of the word, but rather a conscious escalation of military values exported from Germany, heightened by prevailing notions of colonial masculinity. A European-style defeat had not been inflicted and masculine honor could not allow negotiation. Violent coercion had been successful against smaller uprisings thus far. The

violent colonial context. Contrary to Trotha's own dealings in Southwest Africa, the violence against the Herero escalated gradually, as shown through the development of the Leutwein System.¹²⁵ Though this earlier policy and its violence had always been extreme compared to European contexts, the move to genocide was an evolution of German military native policy and administration. Furthermore, it was the result of progressive dehumanization and the "fear of a possible loss of prestige."¹²⁶ It was not, however, systematic murder. This does not mean that there was not intended genocide. Instead, it is acknowledgment that German soldiers were not expected to systematically

execute thousands, rather they were to not prevent deaths resulting from starvation and dehydration.¹²⁷ Still, German soldiers had already escalated violence beyond the limits prescribed by the *Vernichtungsbefehl*. This was carried on at the lowest tactical levels. The order gave official direction to more effectively pursue what was already being done through personal expressions of violence. For those who had not been inclined to such gratuitous violence, an institutional culture of obedience ensured compliance. This was the case for Major Ludwig von Estorff as he pursued the Herero under Trotha's orders to drive them into the desert:

I followed their tracks and arrived at several wells behind them and found a dreadful sight. Cattle that had died of thirst were lying in heaps around them.... Now the Herero flew further from us.... The dreadful scene was always repeated. With frantic speed the [Herero] men attempted to tap the wells, but the water always became sparser, the waterholes more infrequent. They flew from one to another and lost almost all of their animals and a great many people. They dwindled away to scarce remnants and were gradually at our mercy. Some escaped now and some later.... It was a policy that was as foolish as it was cruel, to shatter those people. Many of the people and livestock could still be saved, if they were now spared and readmitted, they were punished enough. I suggested this to General von Trotha, but he wanted their complete destruction.¹²⁸

Though Major Estorff disagreed with the policy and found its implementation egregious, he complied. There was certainly variance in the

amount of violence that individual units performed. Nevertheless, the guidelines set forth by the highest commander, the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, became the minimum acceptable level of violence for soldiers through the combination of an institutional culture of obedience and a gender-enforced commitment to duty.

Although the war with the Herero was construed as a racial war in the mind of Trotha, it was not considered a life-or-death struggle between two peoples. The goal was not the survival of the "German race," but instead a means of restoring the perceived colonial power differential, predicated on colonial hyper-masculinity and normativity, even if this meant the destruction of one side of the equation. The standard practices of the German military were certainly at play during these events, but masculine ideals played a key role in their initiation and perpetuation. This is true both for those ideals that were inherent in the German metropolitan military and those that arose during the course of colonization and occupation. Nevertheless, genocide was a unique outcome of native policy as a whole. Though it can be seen as a logical conclusion of the progression of military native policy, this was only one colonial group's method, and cannot be generalized. It occurred through an exclusive combination of attributes, abilities, and beliefs that only the military possessed. The backlash in the metropole ensured that the military would rarely again have such unfettered administrative power.

COLONIAL MILITARY VIOLENCE
arose from three primary areas: standardized military training in

Germany; the distorted transfer of masculinity from the metropole to the colony; and conceptions of the colonized Other. No single aspect is sufficient to account for the use of violence, though each was necessary. Furthermore, though the colonies were generally a cruel and violent place, military coercion escalated progressively for the supposed furtherance of native policy. Once administrators felt that the "lesson" was understood, the environment would return to its normal level of violence. However, with circular logic, subsequent lessons were harsher so as to quell supposed native beliefs of German weakness.

The standardized military training that soldiers received in Germany was the fundamental component of the colonial army's ability to function coercively. It provided both the means and the authority to do so. *Auftragstaktik* sanctioned individual actions of violence and punitive expeditions. Legal theories developed in Germany allowed a wider range of treatment under the guise of suppressing rebels, even if most other countries agreed that international law ended at the borders of Europe. The German military's disregard for international law within Europe was a precursor for what could be expected in the colonies. Everything seemed proportionally larger in the colonies: land; freedom; opportunity. It is not surprising that the same applied to military violence.

The scope and scale of masculinity was also enlarged. Manliness achieved new levels of domination. Owning land in Germany was unlikely and the alternative was an unpleasant existence in a factory. In the colonies, men could

employ themselves for real, tangible benefits on a large plot of land. This produced a work ethic that colonists perceived was higher than that in the metropole because the work was more fulfilling to a man. As shown above, many soldiers opted to remain in the colonies rather than return to Germany. A man was the head of his household in Germany, but still a mere citizen of the state. In Africa, settlers perceived themselves as kings of their estates. Men could exert more dominance over women with relative impunity. Native women were plentiful, and seemingly servile within the binary hierarchy of native and German. For soldiers, Africa was filled with adventure and danger that was more natural than the rapidly industrializing and impersonal battlefields of Europe. Opportunity for advancement for those willing to work hard was possible in the colonies, a perception that few had of the homeland. This was especially true for those in the military, as Germany was not engaged in a traditional, European war until the First World War.

Yet the ideology for dominance on a larger scale was impossible without two further components: a belief in the inferiority of the colonized and the mutual recognition of this judgment by both Germans and native peoples. For the German military, approaching hegemony on the Continent after its victory against France, a hubris-filled interpretation of precolonial discourse seemed natural. Rapid victories during initial colonization efforts reinforced these interpretations. A coercive command mentality circularly bolstered many of these conceptions and seemed to validate them. With rare exceptions,

For the German military... after its victory against France, a hubris-filled interpretation of precolonial discourse seemed natural

violence prevented the formation of large-scale rebellions. Small bands of indigenous rebels were defeated, and this was submitted as further proof of native inferiority. Furthermore, these rebellious acts lent credence to the alleged inherent cruelty of the natives. That the intolerable conditions of coercion may have led to such rebellion held little stock, and the military used this as evidence that more, not less, coercion was needed. Authorities, the military, and settlers thought little of the sexual attack of indigenous women, who were already considered promiscuous and wanton. German men in Africa considered the dominance of men an established fact, and they saw the imposition of the perceived power differential as proof, rather than the cause of this dominance.

The convergence of military training, masculinity, and negative racial conceptualization found its ultimate expressions of dominance in the

colonies. These ideas were transferred from the metropole and shaped by the unique characteristics of the African environment and the colonial state. Yet, to dominate requires those who are dominated. Precolonial discourse and new discourse that arose during colonization implanted firm beliefs in the military that the natives deserved to be dominated by coercive force. This domination required a native policy that maintained the perceived power differential; only the military apparatus initially seemed suitable for the forced subjugation of an indigenous population that was 500 times larger than the German presence.¹²⁹ The military had the training, legal authority, hyper-masculine identity, and racial ideology to pursue and execute coercive command in the colonies. It took only circular logic for this combination to perpetuate itself into ever greater levels of violence.

ENDNOTES

¹ Anon., "Major Hans Dominik," *Kolonie und Heimat* 4, no. 16 (1910/11): 7. "Seit 1894... hat sich dieser unermüdliche, schneidige, militärisch und wissenschaftlich hervorragende Offizier... einen Namen gemacht... Von seiner farbigen Truppe vergöttert, war er der Schrecken aller Unruhestifter; sein Name... die farbigen Herzen zittern machte. Eiserne Energie und die grösste Rücksichtslosigkeit gegen sich selbst verband er mit einem glücklichen Temperament und mit nie versagendem Wohlwollen für seine Untergegeben." All translations are those of the author, unless specifically noted.

² Peter Giersche, "Von Gravenreuth and Buea as a Site of History: Early Colonial Violence on Mount Cameroon," in *Encounter, Transformation, and Identity: Peoples of the Western Cameroon Borderlands, 1891–2000*, Ian Fowler and Verkijika G. Fanzo, eds. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 92n71. Hans Dominik's earlier exploits were captured in his autobiographical work: Hans Dominik, *Kamerun: Sechs Kriegs- und Friedensjahre in deutschen Tropen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1911).

³ The most recent general history of German colonization can be found in Sebastian Conrad, *German Colonialism: A Short History*, Sorcha O'Hagan, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The current state of the historiography is represented in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal, eds. *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005). For various, other perspectives on the debate, see Henning Melber, "How to Come to Terms with the Past: Re-Visiting the German Colonial Genocide in Namibia," *Africa Spectrum* 40, no. 1 (2005): 139–48; Janntje Böhlke-Itzen, *Kolonialschuld und Entschädigung. Der deutsche Völkermord an den Herero (1904–1907)*, Perspektiven Südliches Afrika 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes and Apsel, 2004); Jürgen Zimmerer, "Holocaust und Kolonialismus. Beitrag zu einer Archäologie des genozidalen Gedankens," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 51 (2003): 1098–119; Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama, eds., *German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Birthe Kundrus, "Grenzen der Gleichsetzung. Kolonialverbrechen und Vernichtungspolitik," *Blätter des iz3w* 275 (March 2004), 30–33; Birthe Kundrus, "From the Herero to the Holocaust? Some Remarks on the Current Debate," *Africa Spectrum* 40, no. 2 (2005): 299–308; Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2011).

⁴ Birthe Kundrus, "Blind Spots: Empire, Colonies, and Ethnic Identities in Modern German History," in *Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography*, Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert, eds. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 87.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 87–88.

⁶ Martina Kessel, "'The Whole Man': The Longing for a Masculine World in Nineteenth-Century Germany," *Gender and History* 15, no. 1 (2003): 2. The linking of rationalism and emotionalism began much earlier, but became most prevalent during the Napoleonic Wars of Liberation. For background, see Karen Hagemann, *"Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre": Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002); Karen Hagemann, "Of 'Manly Valor' and 'German Honor': Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon," *Central European History* 30, no. 2 (1997): 187–220; and Karen Hagemann, *Revisiting Prussia's Wars Against Napoleon: History, Culture and Memory*, Pamela Selwyn, trans. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Furthermore, Nancy Reagan has pointed out that,

in the colonial context, “[w]hat was bourgeois in Germany, however, was simply ‘German’ abroad.” See Nancy R. Reagin, “German Brigadoon? Domesticity and Metropolitan Perceptions of Auslandsdeutschen in Southwest Africa and Eastern Europe,” in *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness*, Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 250.

⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁸ George L. Mosse, “Nationalism and Respectability: Normal and Abnormal Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 2 (1982): 224. See also, George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985). For further information concerning subjective identity in the context of masculinity, see Christopher E. Forth, *Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁹ Ibid., 227.

¹⁰ Daniel J. Walther, “Sex, Race and Empire: White Male Sexuality and the ‘Other’ in Germany’s Colonies, 1894–1914,” *German Studies Review* 33, no. 1 (2010): 50.

¹¹ R. W. Connell, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” *Gender and Society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 846. For further explication on the subject, see Raewyn Connell, *Der gemachte Mann: Konstruktion und Krise von Männlichkeiten* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015).

¹² This discourse included images, portrayals in travel journals, public debate, and all other forms of native representations created by the major colonial powers. For a detailed analysis, see George Steinmetz, *The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); For a focus on the precolonial period, see Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial German, 1770–1870* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).

¹³ Cornelia Essner, “Zwischen Vernunft und Gefühl: Die Reichstagsdebatten von 1912 um koloniale ‘Rassenmischehe’ und ‘Sexualität,’” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 45, no. 6 (1997): 505. This *Kulturmission* should not be confused with the idea of spreading German culture to the natives. Rather, it was the pseudo–social Darwinian belief that advanced cultures would survive by physically spreading their culture, which was contained only within the body of the colonist.

¹⁴ Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 132.

¹⁵ Tanja Bühler, *Die kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika: Koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und transkulturelle Kriegführung, 1885 bis 1918* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011), 87.

¹⁶ “Literatur,” *Neue militärische Blätter*, vol. 48 (1896), 276–77. This was an editorial that commented on the Field Manual of 1894. “... geschickte selbständige Auffassung eines Auftrages, umsichtige Erwägung, schnelle treffende EntschlieÙung und hervorragende Thatkraft und Tapferkeit.”

¹⁷ German General Staff, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1902), 3. “... wird den Offizier vor übertrieben humanitären Anschauungen bewahren... daß der Krieg gewisser Härten nicht entbehren kann, daß vielmehr in ihrer rücksichtslosen Anwendung häufig die einzig wahre Humanität liegt.” My translation. For officer education specifically, the best source remains Steven E. Clemente, *For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860–1914* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).

¹⁸ German War Ministry, *Felddienst-Ordnung* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn,

1908), 104.

¹⁹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 133. See, for instance, Theodor Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1908), 211. Leutwein cites expansive territory and a shortage of soldiers as reasons for the ad-hoc assembly of units.

²⁰ Bühler, *Die kaiserliche Schutztruppe*, 115.

²¹ Daniel J. Hughes, “Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914,” *Journal of Military History* 59, no. 2 (1995): 270.

²² German War Ministry, *Exerzir-Reglement für die Infanterie* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1888), 129–30.

²³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 117. See also Robert Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Citino shows that this latitude was present at least as far back as the armies of Frederick the Great. The key difference was that *Auftragstaktik* was more likely to exonerate an officer even if his battlefield decisions had ultimately resulted in failure.

²⁴ Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay, “German Imperialism in Africa: The Distorted Images of Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo,” *Journal of Black Studies* 23, no. 2 (1992): 239. These numbers were calculated from Table 1 without including the figures for the Asian and Pacific colonies. These figures are from 1916 population statistics.

²⁵ Woodruff D. Smith, *German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 138. The number of troops is based on a 1914 statistic. It is interesting to note that the total number of soldiers was a mere three thousand in 1900.

²⁶ Ibid., 139.

²⁷ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 117.

²⁸ John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 141.

²⁹ Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 378.

³⁰ Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities*, 142.

³¹ Ibid. Though the authors carry this thesis out to the First World War, they are also explicit that it was a grave concern in the intervening years. See Raffael Scheck, *Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 85–88. As late as the Second World War, German troops compared European partisans to Hottentots and had a tendency to label black French troops *franc-tireurs*.

³² Robert von Friedeburg, “Konservatismus und Reichskolonialrecht—Konservatives Weltbild und kolonialer Gedanke in England und Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 263, no. 2 (1996): 382.

³³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 120.

³⁴ Julius von Hartmann, “Militärische Nothwendigkeit und Humanität,” *Deutsche Rundschau* 13 (1877): 453–54. “[D]as eine große Endziel des Krieges: die Bezwingung der feindlichen Kraft, die Überwindung der feindlichen Energie, die Bewältigung des feindlichen Willens. Dieses eine Ziel gebietet absolut, es dictirt Gesetz und Vorschrift. Die concrete Gestaltung dieses Gesetzes erscheint in der Form der militärischen Nothwendigkeit... Der Verlauf des Krieges stellt sich dar als eine Aneinanderreihung von Kriegshandlungen, welche das Kriegspersonal, als Träger der Wehrkraft des Staates, unter voller Ausbeutung... der Erstrebung des allgemeinen Kriegszieles und der ihm eingeschlossenen Einzelziele nach Maßgabe der militärischen Nothwendigkeit zu vollführen hat.”

³⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 133.

³⁶ War History Department I of the Great General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, 1906), 4. “Wer hier kolonisieren wollte, mußte zuerst zum Schwert greifen und Krieg führen—aber nicht mit kleinlichen und schwachlichen Mitteln, sondern mit starker, Achtung gebietender Macht bis zur völligen Niederwerfung der Eingeborenen.” My translation.

³⁷ Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist, introduction to *The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. This power was explicitly spelled out in §11 (Reichskriegswesen), Article 63 of the Constitution of the German Reich of 1871.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte: 1866–1918*, vol. 2, *Machtstaat vor der Demokratie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013), 202. Also, Annika Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16–17.

⁴⁰ For an in-depth discussion of Clausewitz and later German interpretations, see Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (London: Routledge, 1983), 89–105.

⁴¹ Fürst von Bülow, “Denkschrift über die Ursachen des Aufstands in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1905,” in *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages*, vol. 222 (Berlin: Julius Sittenfeld, 1906), 3080. “... denn Kolonialpolitik ist noch immer Eroberungspolitik gewesen und nirgends in der Welt erfolgt die Besitzergreifung eines Landes durch ein fremdes Volk ohne Kämpfe. Kolonialkriege werden daher stets zu den notwendigen Folgen einer Kolonialpolitik gehören.”

⁴² Heike I. Schmidt, “Who is Master in the Colony? Propriety, Honor, and Manliness in German East Africa,” in *German Colonialism in a Global Age*, Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 110.

⁴³ David Ciarlo, “Globalizing German Colonialism,” *German History* 26, no. 2 (2008): 289.

⁴⁴ Daniel J. Walther, “Gender Construction and Settler Colonialism in German Southwest Africa, 1894–1914,” *Historian* 66, no. 1 (2004): 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁶ George L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 44. See also, Emilio Willems, *A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism, an Anthropological Approach* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴⁹ Hans Kohn, “Romanticism and the Rise of German Nationalism,” *Review of Politics* 12, no. 4 (1950): 465n35. Originally in Eichendorff, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 10, 341. “So wird auch der grossen Genossenschaft des Staates mit innerlich ausgewechselten Gesellen nicht gedient, sondern der der liebste sein, der ihr, weil mit ungebrochener Eigenthümlichkeit, aus ganzer Seele dient, wie er eben kann und mag.” Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff expounded upon this valuation during the initial conceptions of Romantic Nationalism during the Napoleonic Era.

⁵⁰ Mosse, *Image of Man*, 79.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Eve Rosenhaft, “Gender,” in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Jonathan Sperber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 225.

⁵⁴ Walther, “Gender Construction,” 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ See Dirk van Laak, *Imperiale Infrastruktur: Deutsche Planung für eine Erschließung Afrikas, 1880 bis 1960* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004). Particularly important is van Laak's discussion of “railway imperialism” as a means of empire-building through the extension of economic, but also political, capital associated with long-distance power projection.

⁵⁷ “Intensive Kulturpolitik,” *Koloniale Zeitschrift*, May 9, 1901. “... die wirtschaftliche Rettung... im Eisenbahnbau liege.” My translation. Although this quote refers specifically to East Africa, due to its unique geography, the case was similar in other German colonies.

⁵⁸ C. v. Perbandt, G. Richelmann, and Rochus Schmidt, *Hermann von Wissmann: Deutschlands grösster Afrikaner: Sein Leben und Wirken unter Benutzung des Nachlasses* (Berlin: Alfred Schall, 1906), 433.

⁵⁹ Walther, “Gender Construction,” 5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6. It should be noted, however, that this was not the usual policy of colonial governors, who more often believed that colonial governance was an extension of metropolitan control.

⁶¹ Mosse, *Image of Man*, 62.

⁶² Daniel J. Walther, “Racializing Sex: Same-Sex Relations, German Colonial Authority, and Deutschtum,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 17, no. 1 (2008): 11.

⁶³ Steinmetz, *Devil's Handwriting*, 95.

⁶⁴ Walther, “Sex, Race and Empire,” 55.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 49–53.

⁶⁶ Walther, “Gender Construction,” 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁸ Lora Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 264.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 265. It should be noted that a woman received the citizenship of her husband whether he was German, another European nationality, or native. In the case of acquiring native citizenship, this was often left unacknowledged, as it was an even more emotionally volatile issue than the German male/native female citizenship controversy.

⁷⁰ Walther, “Gender Construction,” 15.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 94. After one thousand German soldiers decided to officially settle in the colony, only two applied for a mixed marriage license.

⁷³ Tina M. Camp, “Converging Spectres of an Other Within: Race and Gender in Prewar Afro-German History,” *Callaloo* 26, no. 2 (2003): 329.

⁷⁴ Walther, “Gender Construction,” 10.

⁷⁵ Essner, “Vernunft und Gefühl,” 503. “Die Abkömmlinge sind in der Regel sittlich und körperlich schwach, vereinigen in sich die schlechten Eigenschaften beider Eltern.” My translation.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 518.

⁷⁷ Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship,” 268.

⁷⁸ Nils Ole Oermann, “The Law and the Colonial State,” in *Wilhelmism and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meanings of Reform, 1890–1930*, eds. Geoff Eley and James Retallack (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 176.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 139.

⁸¹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 132–33.

⁸² George Steinmetz, “‘The Devil’s Handwriting’: Precolonial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity, and Cross-Identification in German Colonialism,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (2003): 44.

⁸³ Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*, 36.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 83. These body parts included the buttocks as well as the sexual organs of both men and women.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Ulrike Lindner, “German Colonialism and the British Neighbor in Africa before 1914: Self-Definitions, Lines of Demarcation, and Cooperation,” in *German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany*, eds. Volker Max Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 260.

⁸⁹ Arthur Schnitzler, “Andreas Thameyers letzter Brief,” in *Gesammelte Werke von Arthur Schnitzler: Erste Abteilung*, vol. 1, *Die erzählenden Schriften* (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1912), 220. See also *ibid.*, 227. “Keineswegs kann ich weiterleben. Denn solange ich lebe, würden die Leute höhnen, und niemand sähe die Wahrheit ein. Die Wahrheit aber ist, daß mir meine Frau treu war—ich schwöre es bei allem, war mir heilig ist, und ich besiegle es durch meinen Tod... [M]eine Anna war allein—mit einem Male allein... wer begreift nicht, daß sie unter diesen Umständen ein ungeheures Grauen vor diesen Risenmenschen mit den glühenden Augen und den großen schwarzen Bärten empfinden mußte?” My translation.

⁹⁰ Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*, 48.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 50. These distinctions, as with any characterization of large swathes of society, are generalizations. Nevertheless, although individual behavior and beliefs may have varied from group norms, policies actually implemented by each group align closely with Steinmetz’s model.

⁹² Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 139.

⁹³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 134.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁹⁶ K. Schwabe, *Der Krieg in Deutsch-Südwestafrika, 1904–1906* (Berlin: C. A. Weller Verlag, 1907), 69–70. “Man lernt dieses Volk erst kennen, nachdem man jahrelang unter ihm gelebt hat... Mißtrauisch, dünnelhaft, stolz und wiederum bettelhaft und hündisch, lügnerisch und treulos, diebisch und—wenn sie in der Überzahl sind—gewalttätig und grausam.... Das Einzige, was man der Mehrzahl nicht absprechen kann, ist Tapferkeit in Kriege, aber auch nur, wenn es zum Äußersten kommt. Hart mag mein Urteil sein, gerecht aber ist es jedenfalls, und hart und gerecht muß auch die Behandlung sein und bleiben, die wir den Kaffern angedeihen lassen, sonst warden sie uns noch oft übel mitspielen, den her Herero halt Milde und Nachsicht stets für Schwäche und Feigheit!” My translation.

⁹⁷ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 176.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁹⁹ David Kenosian, “The Colonial Body Politic: Desire and Violence in the Works of Gustav Frenssen and Hans Grimm,” *Monatsheft* 89, no. 2 (1997): 186.

¹⁰⁰ Gustav Frenssen, *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest: Ein Feldzugsbericht* (Berlin: G. Grote’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906), 200. “Diese Schwarzen haben vor Gott und Menschen den Tod verdient, nicht weil sie zweihundert Farmer ermordet haben und gegen

uns aufgestanden sind, sonder weil sie keine Häuser gebaut und keine Brunnen gegraben haben?... ‘Gott hat uns hier siegen lassen, weil wir die Edleren und Vorwärtstrebenden sind.’” My translation.

¹⁰¹ Julius Smend, “Wie der Neger in Togo wohnt,” *Kolonie und Heimat* 3, no. 2 (1909/10): 6.

¹⁰² Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*, 183.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁰⁵ Kenosian, “Colonial Body Politic,” 188.

¹⁰⁶ Heike I. Schmidt, “Colonial Intimacy: The Rechenberg Scandal and Homosexuality in German East Africa,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 17, no. 1 (2008): 53.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 31–32.

¹⁰⁹ Sandra Maß, “Das Trauma des weißen Mannes: Afrikanische Kolonialsoldaten in Propagandistischen Texten, 1914–1923,” *L’Homme* 12, no. 1 (2001): 26.

¹¹⁰ Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 61.

¹¹¹ “Zu den Unruhen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika,” *Flugblatt des Deutschen Kolonial-Bundes*, January 14, 1904. Source located at BArch R 1001/2111. “... eine energische militärische Aktion... nur durch unbedingtes Aufrechterhalten der Suprematie seiner Rasse seiner Herrschaft Geltung verschaffen kann.”

¹¹² Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 14.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Smith, *German Colonial Empire*, 64.

¹¹⁶ Jeremy Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* (Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, 2011), 190–1. There remain questions as to the nature of the Kaiser’s selection of Trotha. The Kaiser knew of Trotha’s exploits; whether it was direct appointment or merely approval, Kaiser Wilhelm and Trotha were aligned closely in the methods deemed necessary to effectively administer colonization.

¹¹⁷ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 12.

¹¹⁸ “Gewalt mit krassem Terrorismus und selbst mit Grausamkeit auszuüben, war und ist meine Politik. Ich vernichte die afrikanischen Stämme mit Strömen von Blut und Strömen von Geld.” My translation. Cited in Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: Der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus, 1884–1915*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1984), 156.

¹¹⁹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 45.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ General Staff, *Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen*, 190.

¹²² Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 60.

¹²³ BArch R 1001/2089. “[J]eder Herero mit und ohne Gewehr... nehme keine Weiber und Kinder mehr auf.” My translation. This document has been customarily named the “*Vernichtungsbefehl*,” but was more commonly known at the time as the “*Aufruf an das Volk der Herero*,” or “*Proclamation to the Herero people*.”

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* “Sie haben gemordet und gestohlen, haben verwundeten Soldaten Ohren und Nasen und andere Körperteile abgeschnitten.”

¹²⁵ Kundrus, “Herero to the Holocaust,” 304.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Ludwig von Estorff, *Wanderungen und Kämpfe in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika, 1894–1910* (Windhoek, Namibia: Christoph-Friedrich Kutscher, 1979), 117. “Ich folgte ihren Spuren und erreichte hinter ihnen mehrere Brunnen, die einen schrecklichen Anblick boten. Haufenweise lagen die verdursteten Rinder um sie herum.... Die Herero flohen nun weiter vor uns.... Immer wiederholte sich das schreckliche Schauspiel. Mit fieberhafter Eile hatten die Männer daran gearbeitet, Brunnen zu erschließen, aber das Wasser ward immer spärlicher, die Wasserstellen seltener. Sie flohen von einer zur anderen und verloren fast alles Vieh und sehr viele Menschen. Das Volk schrumpfte auf spärliche Reste zusammen, die allmählich in unsere Gewalt kamen, Teile entkamen jetzt und später... Es war eine ebenso törichte wie grausame Politik, das Volk so zu zertrümmern, man hätte noch viel von ihm und ihrem Herdenreichtum retten können, wenn man sie jetzt schonte und wieder aufnahm, bestraft waren sie genug. Ich schlug dies dem General von Trotha vor, aber er wollte ihre gänzliche Vernichtung.” My translation.

¹²⁹ Blackshire-Belay, “German Imperialism in Africa,” 239.

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Critical Commentary

A Well-Worn and Far-Travelled Tome: The Life and Times of a 1652 Edition of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s *Don Quixote*

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Stony Brook University

Translated into dozens of languages and published thousands of times in numerous countries around the world in its 411 years of existence, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s (1547–1616) *The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote of La Mancha* has attained recognition as one of the most read books in western culture. Various reproductions of *Don Quixote* over the last four centuries include parodies, plays, paintings and illustrations, cartoons, comic books, movies, and music. Of the many text editions in existence today, this short study will address a particular copy of Cervantes’ *Don Quixote: The History of the valourous and witty-knight-errant Don Quixote of La Mancha, Translated out of the Spanish* [by T. Shelton] *now newly corrected and amended* (1652), along with a few of the people who

produced this seminal work and several of the notable individuals who have owned it through time. This leather-bound tome about a fictional member of Spain’s petty nobility has passed from one minor British aristocrat to another, only to mysteriously rest in Stony Brook University’s Rare Book Collection in Stony Brook, Long Island.¹

The cross-hatched leather binding of Cervantes’ tale about an aging and eccentric member of the Spanish nobility endears itself to musings on how the character Don Quixote may have appeared to the reader. In addition to the fading varnish and stains collected over centuries of use, this well-worn mottled-brown leather re-binding bears the scars of many readings. There is still evidence of a long lost elegance in the faintly discernable gold piping